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The dissertation starts from a broad research theme that addresses the use of the idea of 
culture in the formation of the state of Jordan and the interrelated process of the politics of 
development. Keeping the context of Jordan close to the analysis, the dissertation also aims 
to draw attention to Wadi Araba, a so-called out-of-the-way place. Wadi Araba is a southern 
area running along the Israel/Palestine border, south from the Dead Sea. (Settled) Bedouin 
groups inhabit the area. The progress of the dissertation has been steered by three (general) 
points. These points have been decisive to elucidate the process to form Wadi Araba as a 
governable space(s) within the broader formation of Jordan. 
 First, the naturalisation of the notion of culture has created a dichotomy between a 
normalised perception of life and the life of people in Wadi Araba as a-normal or a-civic. 
Second, development is an act of governmentality. Third, places in the margins of the state, 
as Wadi Araba, are of crucial importance for an understanding of the process of state 
formation and the politics of development. Starting from these three points, the concepts 
culture, development and governmentality serve as keywords throughout the dissertation.  
 With the broader theme and the three aforementioned points, the doctorate has two 
objectives. On the one hand the dissertation illustrates that development initiatives 
designated for Wadi Araba imply what I have called ‘a design for life’. The way local 
Bedouins organise their living is not perceived as modern and causes a barrier for Jordan to 
be fully recognised as a modern state (i.e. a neoliberal state). On the other hand, I want to 
illustrate and underline, as Michel Foucault states, that power is not homogeneous and total. 
In the attempts to govern Wadi Araba as a govern space, its habitants will not let them be 
subjugated. Every intervention to implement a development project will cause a reaction.    
 
Despite the existence of an extended tradition of research (mainly within anthropology) that 
is concerned with the relation between the notions of culture, development and 
govermentality, the contribution of this dissertation is to introduce this interrelationship further 
into the political sciences. I describe this doctorate as a political cultural critique. The notion 
of culture is largely absent from the political sciences but is, as I argue throughout the 
dissertation, crucial to understand the social and political implications of the discourses and 
practices of development and state formation. The use of the idea of culture as a tool of 
power has been significant in the history of the state formation of Jordan. The choice of Wadi 
Araba as context for the case studies has given the ultimate opportunity to illustrate the 
strategies of culturalisation in the development of a political formation as Jordan. Research 
related to Wadi Araba has been predominantly situated in the field of archaeology, which has 
delivered some very interesting work. However, anthropological and political studies have 
	  
 
been limited. The doctorate is in this regard equally an original contribution to the already 
existing literature.  
 
Besides an extended literature study, which was rather multi-disciplinary, fieldwork was 
conducted as well. Spread over four years, twelve months of research has been conducted 
in Jordan. During the field research, predominantly (semi-structured) interviews were done 
with actors related to the different cases. The interviews were of crucial importance to 
complement the existing literature concerning Wadi Araba. The fieldwork data could be 
abstracted from a reality that is rather unique.  
 
Four years of research have resulted in a dissertation that is divided, besides a general 
introduction and methodology chapter, in four central chapters. These four chapters illustrate 
together past and current initiatives that have created a space for development planners and 
Jordanian state to control and manage a targeted group of the population (i.e. inhabitants of 
Wadi Araba). 
 
The introduction elaborates on the aforementioned three points and indicates the broader 
theoretical framework. The methodological chapter brings theory on methodology together 
with the process that the research has followed and has developed during the four years. 
The next chapter briefly elaborates on the development of Jordan from a newly independent 
state to a neoliberal state. The emphasis is on the use of difference – expressed in cultural 
terms – between the population as a ‘tool’ to indentify itself as a state and to be placed on 
the international map. In this chapter the notion of ‘the idea of culture’ borrowed from Don 
Mitchell. The following chapter relates to the previous as it illustrates how the use of cultural 
difference has been incorporated in concrete development initiatives through a simultaneous 
representation of a (fantasised) landscape and community. Housing en agriculture are used 
as concrete examples. In the third main chapter the Royal Society for the Conservation of 
Nature, a Jordanian nature organisation is the central case. The organisation experiences a 
lot of protest from the local population when the RSCN tries to implement a new project. The 
protest is translated as ignorance or lack of scientific knowledge of the local inhabitants. The 
degradation of the environment is from this perspective due to the locals. The chapter 
analyses why despite the attempts to turn towards a participatory approach RSCN keeps on 
encountering resistance. In the final main chapter, I look into the megalomanic water 
conveyor that will connect the Red Sea with the Dead Sea. Jordan, Palestine and Israel have 
launched the project in 2005. It could bring salvation for the shrinking Dead Sea, provide the 
needed fresh water and be a step closer to regional peace. The water conveyor has been 
	  
 
presented as pure technological. However, in the chapter I try to illuminate the political and 
social meaning of the conveyor for Jordan and particularly for Wadia Araba.  
 
Economic and infrastructural development should give Wadi Araba a push towards 
modernity. Housing, agriculture, tourism or nature conservation are planned and executed as 
if they are empty of social and political meaning. With this dissertation I show that these 
initiatives do not only bring houses or roads, but they also create opportunities for 
development planners and government to manage and control the targeted population. With 
the construction of a new road connecting the southern villages with the capital, the 
organisation of agriculture, the distribution of houses to the nomadic population, instalment of 
protected areas etc. the area and its habitants are connected to a powerful system that 
steers their lives in a particular direction, mainly away from the ‘life style’ they live today.  
One of the few places left for ‘the Bedouin culture’ is in tourism as living heritage. Despite the 


























Dutch summary  
 
Deze scriptie gaat na in welke mate ‘het idee van cultuur’ aanwezig is geweest en nog 
steeds is vandaag in het Jordaanse staatsvormingsproces en de daar aan gerelateerde 
politiek van ontwikkeling. De casussen die de ruime onderzoeksvraag illustreren situeren 
zich in Wadi Araba. Wadi Araba is één van de zuidelijke subdistricten van Jordanië dat zich 
uitstrekt langs de grens met Palestina/Israel ten zuiden van de Dode Zee. De meerderheid 
van de inwoners zijn (gevestigde) Bedoeïen die een zevental dorpen bewonen. 
  
Het doctoraat is gebouwd rond drie stellingen. Als eerste stel ik dat door de naturalisatie van 
de notie cultuur er een dichotomie gecreëerd is tussen een genormaliseerde perceptie van 
‘leven’ en het leven van de inwoners van Wadi Araba als a-normaal. Deze dichotomie wordt 
mede staande gehouden door bepaalde ontwikkelingsinitiatieven. Ten tweede onderschrijf ik 
het idee dat het domein van ontwikkeling een praktijk van governmentality is. Als derde en 
laatste stelling argumenteer ik dat een plaats/gebied in de marge van de staat, zoals Wadi 
Araba, onontbeerlijk is voor een beter begrijpen van staatsvorming en politiek van 
ontwikkeling. Vertrekkende van deze drie stellingen, hanteerde ik de noties ontwikkeling, 
cultuur en governmentality als drie centrale sleutelwoorden.  
 
Dit onderzoeksproject heeft ook een tweevoudige doelstelling; enerzijds wil ik aantonen dat 
ontwikkelingsprojecten in Wadi Araba een bepaalde blauwdruk bevatten die aanduidt hoe 
een ‘degelijk’ leven geleid moet worden. De levenswijze van de lokale Bedoeïen wordt als 
niet-modern beschouwd en als een hindernis voor Jordanië om als een moderne staat 
erkend te worden. Anderzijds wil ik aangeven dat, zoals Michel Foucault stelt, dat macht niet 
homogeen en allesoverheersend is. In de poging om Wadi Araba als governable space te 
besturen, laten de betrokken inwoners zich niet onderwerpen. Bij elke interventie om een 
project te implementeren zal er reactie zijn. 
 
Ondanks de reeds bestaande en uitgebreide traditie van onderzoek (hoofdzakelijk in 
antropologie) naar de relatie tussen de noties cultuur, ontwikkeling en governmentality draagt 
dit doctoraat bij door deze relatie verder te introduceren in de politieke wetenschappen.  Ik 
omschrijf deze studie als een politiek culturele kritiek.  De notie cultuur is in de discipline van 
politieke wetenschap quasi afwezig. Ik argumenteer doorheen het doctoraat dat deze notie 
cruciaal is om de sociale en politieke implicaties van een discours omtrent ontwikkeling en de 
reële ontwikkelingsprojecten te begrijpen.  Het gebruik van het idee van cultuur als een 
instrument van macht, is heel ingrijpend geweest in de geschiedenis van de staatsvorming 
van Jordanië. De keuze van Wadi Araba als context voor de casestudies heeft in het 
	  
 
bijzonder de mogelijkheid gegeven om de strategie van culturalisatie in de ontplooiing van 
een politieke formatie als Jordanië aan te tonen. Onderzoek omtrent Wadi Araba is 
voornamelijk gesitueerd in archeologie. Antropologische en politieke studies zijn zeer 
beperkt, het doctoraat is in dit opzicht een originele bijdrage aan de bestaande literatuur.  
 
Voor het onderzoek werd naast een uitgebreide literatuur studie die vrijwel multidisciplinair 
was, ook veldonderzoek uitgevoerd. Verspreid over vier jaar werd er twaalf maanden 
onderzoek gedaan in Jordanië. Tijdens het veldonderzoek werden er hoofdzakelijk (semi-
structurele) interviews afgenomen met actoren die gerelateerd waren aan de verschillende 
casussen. Deze interviews waren van cruciaal belang om de beperkte bestaande literatuur 
met betrekking tot Wadi Araba aan te vullen. Vanuit het veldonderzoek kon er unieke data 
verzameld worden vanuit een realiteit.    
 
Vier jaar onderzoek hebben geleid tot een doctoraat dat opgedeeld is - naast een algemene 
inleiding en methodologie - in vier hoofdstukken die de kern van het doctoraat vormen. De 
vier hoofdstukken samen illustreren historische en hedendaagse initiatieven die ruimte 
hebben gecreëerd voor ontwikkelingsplanners en de staat om een bepaalde doelgroep in de 
populatie (inwoners van Wadi Araba) te beheren en te controleren. In de inleiding wordt er 
dieper ingegaan op de reeds vernoemde drie stellingen en wordt het theoretische kader 
toegelicht. Het methodologische hoofdstuk brengt theorie en de wijze waarop het onderzoek 
is uitgevoerd samen. Het eerste kernhoofdstuk doorloopt (summier) de ontplooiing van 
Jordanië als een onafhankelijk staat tot een neoliberale staat. De nadruk ligt op hoe het 
uitspelen van cultureel verschil in de bevolking het mogelijk maakte om Jordanië op de kaart 
te plaatsen. Dit hoofdstuk introduceert tevens ‘de idee van cultuur’ ontleend van Don 
Mitchell. Het volgende hoofdstuk sluit hier bij aan door aan te tonen dat de nadruk op 
verschil in culturele termen ook in reële ontwikkelingsinitiatieven geïncorporeerd wordt in een 
simultane representatie van (fantasised) landschap en ‘gemeenschap’. Huisvestiging en 
agricultuur zijn hierbij concrete voorbeelden. Een derde hoofdstuk zoomt verder in op de 
Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature, een Jordaanse natuurorganisatie. De 
organisatie ervaart veel protest van de lokale bevolking bij de uitvoering van hun 
conserveringsprojecten. Het protest wordt veelal vertaald in als onwetendheid van de 
bevolking en degradatie van de natuurlijke omgeving is daaruit volgend verweten aan de 
lokale inwoners. Dit hoofdstuk gaat na hoe ondanks de pogingen om tot een participatieve 
strategie over te gaan, de RSCN steeds weerstand ondervindt.  In het vierde en laatste 
hoofdstuk wordt het megalomane waterproject dat de Rode Zee met de Dode Zee verbindt 
toegelicht. Het project dat in 2005 werd gelanceerd door Jordanië, Israel en Palestina zou 
een redding voor de krimpende Dode Zee kunnen betekenen, voorzien in het nodige 
	  
 
zoetwater en een mogelijke stap voor regionale vrede inhouden. Het project wordt als puur 
technologisch omschreven. In dit hoofdstuk wordt getracht de politieke en sociale betekenis 
van de water conveyor voor Jordanië en Wadi Araba in het bijzonder aan te tonen.  
 
Economische en infrastructurele ontwikkeling zou Wadi Araba een duw moeten geven 
richting ‘moderniteit’. Huisvestiging, agricultuur, toerisme of natuurconservering worden 
gepland en uitgevoerd alsof ze geen sociale en politieke betekenis hebben. Met dit doctoraat 
toon ik aan dat de initiatieven niet alleen huizen en wegen brengen, maar dat ze ook de 
betrokken bevolking trachten in te sluiten in een machtssysteem dat hen probeert weg te 
sturen van hun hedendaagse levenswijze. ‘Dé Bedoeïen cultuur’ kan enkel nog plaats 
gegeven worden als (levend) erfgoed, al dan niet tentoongesteld voor toeristen.  Ondanks de 
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Map 1: Jordan in the region 

























Map 4: Tribes in relation to villages 
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I General introduction 
 
1.1 On the question of culture 
Today the powers attributed to globalisation evoke wonder. How will the world evolve? How 
should or can we respond to it? How can the globe look different? At first sight it has grown 
into ‘a world where borders and boundaries have become increasingly porous, allowing more 
and more peoples and cultures to be cast into intense and immediate contact with each 
other’ (Inda & Rosaldo, 2002: 2). The image of a hyper-connected world has driven theorists 
to formulate hypotheses on clashes between cultures, the homogenisation of different 
cultures and the rule of one dominant culture. Such theories present a range of diverse 
images and sketch different futures. And while some may envision the death of anthropology 
itself as a discipline distinct from sociology, still they all centralise the notion of culture in their 
approach to global change.  
 
Traditionally, anthropological research as directed by Tylor was dedicated to the production 
of knowledge with regard to culture. Some of this knowledge ultimately found its way to non-
academic areas and became employed for purposes other than further research and our 
intellectual quest to know ourselves. In this development, it was not concrete knowledge on 
any specific culture that was utilised, but rather a particular mode of thinking about culture. 
Early on, in nineteenth century anthropology, peoples were classified in biological terms, 
their culture particulars recorded on a schema of human development in which ethnologists 
and their human science studied the lowest level, the ‘primitive’ and its ‘savages.’ The 
classification assumed to rank individual cultures on the racial ladder of evolution, a system 
of classification which – when it did not romanticise the state of nature as a golden age – was 
premised on the advance of Man. This evolutionary thesis of civilisation underwrote and 
sometimes materially supported the right of and need for the colonial powers to intervene 
and contribute to the upward movement of the inferior culture. The main thrust of the 
anthropological discipline, however, was to put aside the biological approach of scientific 
racialism to cultural differences, and redirect focus toward possible environmental, social and 
historical dimensions that could explain the variety of human socio-cultures (Wright, 1998: 8). 
Although this tried to counter the racial determination thesis, the cultural relativism of Franz 
Boas that emerged was later itself to become subject to critique: it made societal cultures 
bound to a particular place and time, thereby denying their dynamism and lack of restriction 
to territory. The loss of interest in the story of man’s dispersal (the dehistoricisation of 
anthropology) and compartmentalisation of ethnology (Malinowskian immersion into the life 
of a single tribe) led to a lack of cultural meta-analysis, one might argue, or a sublimation of 
General introduction 
 12 
the assumption of Western superiority. There thus emerged a view of culture perceived as 
more progressive and with an essentially open perspective but towards what would still, 
however, be described as ‘other cultures’.  
 
Just as colonial projects adopted the biological determination of cultures, the more relativistic 
approach to culture became similarly incorporated in discourses supporting a variety of 
political projects. Susan Wright (1998) refers, for example, to the New Right under Thatcher 
and later conservatives and to the development sector of the last decades as two domains 
where this new approach has been incorporated with different (political) aims. The latter 
example of the paradigm of development and the way culture is used to describe or manage 
a reality is a major theme in this thesis. It is not a little ironic that the language of difference 
developed to counter racism and think beyond the world as a tapestry of distinct cultures was 
reworked into an ‘essentialist concept to reassert boundaries’ and protect nationalised 
identities (Wright, 1998: 10).  
 
Employing a similar language, Samuel Huntington’s work makes a bridge from political 
science to the case of development. Although Huntington also recognises that cultures are 
not restricted to nations, crucially, he distinguishes boundaries between seven or eight 
civilisations, which he perceives as the highest cultural entities. These boundaries are drawn 
based on fundamental differences that have grown through history, and now that the world is 
becoming smaller he observes a more intense inter-civilisation interaction. According to 
Huntington this will increase awareness both of the differences between the civilisations and 
of the commonalities within them (Huntington, 1993: 25). Due to this interaction, the non-
Western civilisations become more modern, but do and will not become Western, as their 
values and interests are just too different. To protect itself, the Western civilisation will have 
to ‘maintain its economic and military power’ (Huntington, 1993: 49).  
 
Huntington does not specify what culture means to him in the Clash of Civilisations, but in a 
later (edited) work he does define it as a set of values. Different cultures, he asserts, have 
different values, and these values help or hinder cultures in respect of human progress. 
Without too much explanation, Huntington concludes that Ghana’s culture has prevented it 
from developing like South Korea: ‘South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, 
education, organization and discipline. Ghanaians had different values. In short, cultures 
count’ (Huntington, 2000: xiii). This whole book comprises works by authors who clearly 
support the idea that culture counts in the progress of human development. Daniel Etounga-
Manguelle, for example, wonders whether what Africa actually needs is a cultural adjustment 
program. The diversity of the African continent is recognised, but the differences considered 
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superficial compared to the underlying foundation of shared values, attitudes and institutions 
(Etounga-Manguelle, 2000: 67).  
 
Huntington doubts that Africa can count as a civilisation, but Etounga-Manguelle does not, 
defining it as a single culture that is ‘contaminated’ with characteristics (time attitude, lack of 
structure, animism, etc.) that prevent it from moving into modernity: 
 
If Europe, that fragment of earth representing a tiny part of humanity, has been able to 
impose itself on the planet, dominating it and organizing it for its exclusive profit, it is 
only because it developed a conquering culture of rigor and work, removed from the 
influence of invisible forces. We must do the same. (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000: 77) 
 
The new rhetoric on culture as dynamic and territorially unfixed thus found its way to a 
discourse that assumes the same assumption of (increased) cultural interaction and cultural 
specificities, but applies them in the service of cultural difference as an argument that 
differentiates between rates of success and ultimately styles of ‘human development’. 
Development emerged as a global concern in the decades after World War II, when 
international development institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (the former World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund were founded 
through the process initiated by the Bretton Woods Conference. Throughout the post-war 
decades, there was a continuous and very conscious (re)thinking of how the difference 
between the developed and undeveloped/underdeveloped (the so-called ‘first’ and ‘third’ 
worlds) came about and how the gap between them could be bridged. Porter (1995) refers to 
Marx to suggest that the notion of development was already adopted in the 19th century, 
whereby ‘development referred to a historical process that “progressed” without being 
consciously willed by anyone’ (Porter, 1995: 66). During the colonial period in the 1920s, 
Porter continues, the idea became firmly established that progress to a more advanced stage 
(modernisation) emerges through alleviating constraints.  
 
The ‘development thinking’ that became established as the international norm during the 
second half of the twentieth century thus inherited the assumption of cultural difference and 
level as an anthropological given with social implications implying a political project. The 
main critique of this work is directed towards the idea that it is appropriate (or even possible, 
let alone natural) to make a distinction between people (tribes, villages, nations, countries, 
etc.) that are developed and those that are not. It starts from a rejection of the notion that a 
standard is set and to reach the standard certain constraints will have to be lifted. Essentially, 
the argument is that out of the culture discourse, there grew an emphasis on values inherent 
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to certain cultures that prevented proper development of other cultures. As such, studies of 
‘other cultures’ and development discourse and practice meet in a particular way.  
 
More recently, in the dominant development institutions over the last two or three decades, 
there has been an evolution toward being ‘culture sensitive’, at least in the discourses 
targeting people and groups with which the institutions have partnerships and which are thus 
taken into consideration from a cultural perspective. A UNESCO document on culture and 
development from 1996, for example, reads as an internal critique on how, in the past, 
development institutions had failed to take into account people or cultures and how they did 
not recognise the friction this created. Indeed, the document appears as an attempt to 
contribute to a critical approach of what development means and has contributed/failed to do. 
However, even though there is an attempt, it fails to see how ‘the flows of creativity that it 
associates with vigorous “cultures” is a product of continuous assertion of the power to define 
in a political process involving local, national and international actors’ (Wright, 1998: 12). 
 
Manifestly, even ‘progressive’ approaches of culture may be power-blind, as it were – which 
brings us to the main arguments to be addressed in this dissertation.  The idea of culture, for 
example in Huntingtonian terms, operates not only in a discursive manner but also in 
professional (through political and social actors) and popular approaches to ‘other cultures’ 
as applied in a grounded reality. The emphasis on the idea itself of culture is based on Don 
Mitchell’s (1995) work. I would not go so far as Mitchell and state that ‘there is no such 
(ontological) thing as culture (Mitchell D., 1995:103)’, but I do follow his idea that there is a 
very powerful idea of culture. Mitchell refers to the ‘phantom nature’ (Mitchell D.,1995:104)of 
culture as that which gives power to the idea (and thus, as he argues, effects its reification). 
In this thesis, I will also look at how culture – in any of its interpretations – has become a 
naturalised concept in the realm of development and a necessity in the process of state (c.f. 
nation) formation. Specifically, I illustrate how the use of ‘the idea of culture’ has been very 
present and effective in the case of Jordanian state formation and the interrelated politics of 
(Jordanian) development implemented in the area of Wadi Araba, a Bedouin area in 
southern in Jordan. 
 
I use the notion of the politics of development in terms of the strategies employed to push 
Jordan along its path of state formation and later attempts to ‘catch up with the global 
developed world’. Within these strategies the cultural discourse has been adapted during 
successive decades. Also, the many adaptations of the idea of culture that formed or even 
reified a Jordanian culture since the early years of the kingdom can be traced. In this work, I 
will not analyse what real ‘Jordanian’ or ‘Bedouin’ culture is or is not, but focus rather on how 
General introduction 
 15 
the idea of culture is deployed by different actors. As the dissertation title indicates, the 
ultimate aim is to analyse how the idea of culture within the politics of development 
contributes to the creation of Wadi Araba as ‘governable space(s)’ during the period of the 
state formation of Jordan.  
 
I discuss my research in Wadi Araba along the lines of three propositions:  
• The naturalisation of the notion of culture has created a dichotomy between a 
normalised perception of life and the life of people in Wadi Araba as a-normal or a-
civic;  
• Development is an act of governmentality; 
• ‘Out-of-the-way places’ like Wadi Araba are important for an understanding of 
broader processes of state formation and the politics of development.  
 
1.2 The Jordanian issue of culture 
The research for this dissertation started with a focus on current and proposed projects that 
have been be framed in terms of development or progress for Jordan. Four case studies 
form the main part of the dissertation. These are separate, discrete cases, yet also linked to 
each other. The first project I looked into was a proposed water conveyor that would connect 
the Red Sea with the Dead Sea to save the Dead Sea and provide the needed fresh water 
for the regional partners. The water conveyor is primarily just a technological intervention, but 
with a rationale based on and consequent attention thus paid to its potential environmental 
and social implications. This project, located in Wadi Araba, led to the second case, which 
focuses on nature conservation. This is an example of a programme described in terms of 
participation or partnership with the affected local communities – here, with an environmental 
dimension, related to designated ‘protected’ or ‘special conservation areas’.  
 
At first sight these two projects have little in common besides their location in the Wadi Araba 
area and environmental dimension. What brings them together from my perspective is that 
they both come with a certain ‘design for life’. The implementation of both projects would i) 
connect Jordan to an international level of technological initiatives in an environmental 
context, in a manner that ii) reflects a worldview of how people in Jordan could and should 
develop their ways of life. Initially, as the first focus points of research, I questioned whether 
the design of these projects and hence life might, in fact, just be due to the neoliberal path 
Jordan took after 1989. Where does this idea that there exists a right way of living come 
from? By going back in time and opening the perspective beyond Jordan, I was able to trace 




With these researched projects located in the Bedouin area of Wadi Araba (the area 
generally is predominantly inhabited by Bedouins), it became difficult to ignore the gap 
between the discourse of the new approaches of development in terms of partnership and 
the projects’ descriptions and implementation. The ‘Bedouin culture’, as I will show through 
the dissertation, serves at the same time both as a burden and a benefit in the vision of 
development for Jordan. When the fixation on the Bedouin culture became apparent during 
my research, I first tried to understand what it was, exactly. But by instead asking the 
question of the place of this culture in the formation of Jordan as a contemporary state and 
its related development initiatives, I found a perspective presented on the political dimension 
of the usage of Bedouin and Jordanian culture – that is, on the ideas of these cultures. Thus, 
a larger question arose as to how early development projects, such as the creation of the 
colonial Desert Patrol (below), link up to the conservation areas and the water conveyor. 
Although separated by several decades, these all seem to be apolitical initiatives involving 
the Bedouin settlement that have contributed to state formation and the re-articulation of 
Jordan. This suggests a further elaboration of the first proposition: to complete the larger 
project of state formation, there was a need to start from a defined, territorialised ‘Jordanian 
culture’ that could legitimise Jordan as a modern state thus be deployed as reference point to 
‘others’. The notion of Bedouin culture has been of great importance in that regard. It has 
been interesting to observe today the implications of the role of ‘the Bedouin culture’ in the 
process of state formation in Wadi Araba.   
 
Why so much emphasis on culture? Over the course of decades, it had become natural to 
talk about Jordanian culture in relation to Bedouin culture. It is normal nowadays to present 
Bedouin culture as a window on old Jordanian traditions, a living heritage if you will. The 
chapters that form the main body of this dissertation address issues that can be perceived as 
just projects that will help Jordan and the people from Wadi Araba towards a more modern 
country and life. Indeed, the projects do bring houses and protect the unique environment – 
but they also contribute to the endurance of Don Mitchell’s phantom nature of culture, 
thereby enabling entry of a host of power values through the politics of the dominant into 
policies related to the administration of territory.  
 
1.3 Jordan, Wadi Araba and the aesthetic alibi 
The idea of Bedouin culture in Jordan is strongly interrelated with the idea of Jordanian 
culture: each is necessary to define the other. It is clear that the co-definitional culturalisation 
of the Bedouin population in Jordan and Jordanian inhabitants did not occur overnight. 
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Chapter three goes into more depth on this; here I contextualise this process with a brief 
introduction of Wadi Araba and Jordan. 
 
1.3.1 Jordan 
Every place in the world has a history that extends far beyond the moment of its encounter 
by the European travellers and entanglement in Western colonial power. The same is true for 
the place we refer to today as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Nevertheless, the history of 
Jordan is typically taken to start with the Mandate period, with perhaps a reference to earlier 
Ottoman times. This dissertation similarly starts with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and 
creation of the British Mandate of Palestine/Jordan in line with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 
1916. This is not to say that Jordan came into existence out of nowhere.  
 
Various authors, such as Salam Al Mahadin (2007a, 2007b), Christopher Parker (2009) and 
Eugene Rogan (1994, 1999) have indicated the dynamics of the pre-Mandate period in ways 
beyond its Ottoman stagnation, perceived and employed only as a pass-through area en 
route to Mecca. Following liberation from the Crusaders, to take a meaningful though also 
arbitrary point in time, there was half a millennium of sugar production and caravansary 
construction, the strategic location of the territory between competing kingdoms and 
dynasties and its incorporation in the wider territorial administrations of the Mamluks (today’s 
Syria, Egypt and Jordan),1 the presence of merchants from Palestine and the creation of 
markets (Parker, 2009: 94), that all ultimately contributed to the country Jordan is today.  
 
It is important to appreciate the critique of the aforementioned authors on the artificiality not 
only of borders but also of defining a point in time as a historical beginning. Al Mahadin refers 
to Rogan to summarise what this pinpointing of borders and time implies, namely, the 
revealing of ‘the colonial convenience behind its creation’ (Rogan, 1999 in Al Mahadin, 
2007b: 87)2. Therefore, I deliberately choose the Mandate period as an interesting time to 
start precisely because it clearly takes its cue from the formation of the idea of a Jordanian 
culture. Pre-mandate history played a crucial role in this formation, but crucially, Al Mahadin 
points out, as selected role by the Hashemite rulers that emerged with the Great Arab Revolt 
in response to the late Ottoman oppression. The Ottoman period and first decade of the 
twentieth century was thus reduced to an insignificant fact for Jordan, and the time of the 
                                                      
1 Andy Hilton introduced me here to the importance of the area of current Jordan before the mandate 
period.   
2 Rogan refers only to the drawing of the borders that illustrate the colonial convenience. I would argue 
that during the period of colonial administrations, the notion of time has played a crucial role in the 
definition of the colonial project.  
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period of the Nabateans of Petra became directly linked to the Hashemite legacy in the 
construction of a proto-nationalist mythology (Al Mahadin, 2007b: 90).  
 
It was a priority of the kings to rid the land of its marginal image, to do away with the stigma 
of being the Ottoman’s desert backyard. Indeed, the Ottomans ‘did not look on what we now 
call Jordan as a distinct administrative unit,’ since rather, for them, it was a frontier zone 
which extended from the Hawran to the Hijaz’ (Rogan, 1994: 33).  
 
When Britain and France (with Russian collusion) divided the Ottoman Arab lands between 
them, the territory of today’s Jordan, which came under the British Mandate, did not appear 
worthy of significant investment. The opportunity fell to Amir Abdullah to establish a position 
for himself as ruler and the country – so he had to create a raison d’être for the Hashemite 
rule, a context for his enthronement as King Abdullah bin Al-Hussein and a justification of 
what, as a nation, Jordan could be (Al Mahadin, 2007b: 314). A country needed to be 
imagined in order that it could be realised. 
 
Besides Abdullah and the later kings, international actors have also been crucial in the 
establishment of a Jordanian state. Directly or indirectly these have enhanced the 
culturalisation and thus maintained their privileged presence in the area. The British colonials 
were the obviously key actor in this respect as the effective creators by its division of the 
Palestinian Mandate of the Transjordan emirate over which Abdullah ruled, but international 
(British and American) development agents were also already present in Jordan, competing 
against each other (Kingston, 1994). The need to establish a political apparatus centred on 
the Hashemites and their entourages caused the political elite to neglect the necessity of an 
economic and social agenda that would represent the strengths and needs of the 
(fragmented) Jordanian society. This gap created a reason for the United Kingdom and Point 
Four (the early development branch of the United States of America, later USAID) not only to 
maintain an imperial presence in the area but to justify its new, developmentalist arrival 
there. It is not surprising that this presence caused social friction and triggered anti-Western 
nationalism. By the time king Abdullah’s grandson Hussein ascended to the throne, he 
inherited a struggle that continues today under king Abdullah II, one that involves a constant 
balancing act of ensuring that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan appears legitimate to the 
outside world and to its internal society.  
 
The formation of the state of Jordan and hence its identity and ascribed culture was many 
times subject to national and regional events that acted as causes for adaptation in the 
Jordanian discourse and kept the balancing act at its point. Two important examples, which 
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threatened this balance, were the nationalist movement that emerged in the 1950s and the 
civil war referred to as ‘Black September’ in 1970. Again, of course, these two events did not 
occur out of the blue. I will look at them in more detail in the third chapter and point to the 
issues of inclusion and exclusion that were central to them both.  
 
Although it is easy to create the impression that the central state embodied by the Hashemite 
monarchy stood above the ‘masses’ and steered from above when things moved in the 
wrong direction, I agree with Parker who argues that a perspective on Jordanian state 
formation that starts from a state-society division will fail insofar as it cannot see the 
intertwinement of the two (Parker, 2004: 115). For the main part of this dissertation, 
development practices will be presented as examples that can show this intertwinement.  
 
Jordan today, as a neo-liberal state, creates spaces for non-governmental/apolitical 
development initiatives. Housing, roads, water and electricity provision and social 
development were previously domains managed by the state; now they are run by NGOs, 
private sector or special decentralised governmental units. Nevertheless, these all link to the 
central government. The monarchy (in its broadest form) is represented in the projects but 
implementation sold as independent or apolitical. Besides the governmental involvement, the 
development initiatives are also strongly related to international connections. The aim of 
Jordan to participate in ‘the global market’ as a modern state is reflected in the current and 
historical development initiatives. 
 
1.3.2 Wadi Araba 
When talking about Wadi Araba, we refer to the area south of Ghor Safi down towards the 
city of Aqaba. The territory stretches longitudinally for over 130 km and varies between 5km 
and 20 km wide. In the 2400km2, there are seven settlements; Gregra, (new) Feynan, Risha, 
Rahma, Bir Mathkour, Qatar and Gwaebba. in which the biggest tribes are the Sa’ydeen, 
Amariin, Rashayda, Ahywat and Azazme (Table 1).  
 
Wadi Araba can be approached in many ways. It can be defined as a border area with 
Israel/Palestine, a Bedouin area, one of the poorest areas of Jordan, a military zone or else 
an area partly occupied by Israel until 1994, and, who knows, in the future, perhaps, as 
another development zone. Each of the definitions has left its mark and is still influential on 
the formation of Wadi Araba identity today. In my research on the ground, 1994 has often 
been mentioned as pivotal, the year Wadi Araba opened itself to the outside world. The 
peace treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed in Wadi Araba, and subsequently lifted 
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the military zoning, which certainly made the area more accessible to outsiders. But it goes 
without saying, of course, that Wadi Araba and its inhabitants know a much longer history 
than that subsequent to 1994. 
 
Table 1 Settlements and major tribes of Wadi Araba 
 
Settlement Tribe 
Feynan Rashayda (New Feynan) 
Azazme (Old Feynan)  
Gregra Sa’ydeen, Amariin 
Risha Sa’ydeen 
Rahma Ahywat  
Bir Mathkour Say’deen 
Qatar Say’deen,  Kbeash 
Gwaebba Azazme 
 
Important to note here also is that the aforementioned different descriptions of Wadi Araba 
describe it as a bounded and thus implicitly insular area; crucial to an understanding of the 
recent struggles in the area, however, are its cross-border and external connections. Only a 
minority of its Bedouin inhabitants continue to maintain a nomadic lifestyle, with most of the 
people now settled or only semi-nomadic, but the various tribes have only recently desisted 
from using the spaces of Wadi Araba and surrounding areas as winter/summer resting 
places, and they still refer to these territories as their tribal lands. And while formal, cross-
border relations with Israel/Palestine and Saudi Arabia are clearly defined by the official state 
borders with Jordan as drawn by international agreements,3 still Bienkowski (2006: 20) 
asserts that Wadi Araba became a political border by default.  
 
Wadi Araba does, literally form one of the margins of Jordan. And indeed, although, in 
general, the Bedouin population is perceived as the core and the loyal support of the 
monarch and as the national symbol of Jordan (Al Mahadin 2007b), the geographical 
marginality of the Wadi Araba area is also reflected in the representation of the people who 
                                                      
3 The border with Israel/Palestine was drawn in 1946 with the independence of Jordan, based on the 
Mandatory border of 1923; the border with Saudi Arabia was originally drawn according to the Hida’ 
agreement or 1925, but in 1965 the two countries agreed to redraw the border to the current line.  
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live in the area.  The inhabitants of Wadi Araba are not part of the big influential tribes of 
Jordan. However, they have experienced and are experiencing the political culturalisation of 
being Bedouin in the continuing process of state formation. One of the main ideas in this 
dissertation is that the inhabitants of Wadi Araba are often reduced to a merely cultural area 
and population. The ‘lifestyle’ of the Bedouin population in the area appeals to the 
imagination: tents, shepherds moving around in the endless desert with their herds, veiled 
women, and men in long dresses hiding from the sun drinking tea.  
 
The cultural representation of Wadi Araba as a geographical place and the local population 
in terms of ‘the Bedouin’ may be regarded as a construction of what W.J.T. Mitchell (2000) 
dubbed the ‘aesthetical alibi’. In short, the alibi is formed by (false or superficial) 
representations of landscape that create ‘a considerable power to mobilize political passions’ 
(Mitchell W.J.T., 2000: 195). The aesthetic alibi of Wadi Araba is predominantly based on the 
assumption that it is an empty space, one characterised either by a pristine nature and 
traditional outlook or by poverty, depending on the aim of the agency communicating or 
marketing the image – including development projects.  
 
This dissertation mainly focuses on Wadi Araba, but within the bigger picture of Jordan. As 
mentioned, the representation of Jordan has had its references as a backyard or buffer zone. 
Also today, Jordan is sometimes questioned as an independent state, most famously by the 
Zionist rational that ‘Jordan is Palestine’. As a reaction, the monarchy and its entourage try to 
counter this, not only by emphasising the (constructed/selected) vivid history of Jordan, but 
also by pushing its potential as a ‘modern’ state. This modernity is often expressed in an 
infrastructural boom, the capital Amman being exemplary of the extent to which this can go. 
Within the discourse of modernity, nature becomes an obstacle to be contained, conceptually 
by reduction to the aesthetic and materially by man’s domination of his environment. The last 
chapter of the dissertation draws on this in illustrating how Jordan tries to insert itself into the 
‘modern world’ by fighting water scarcity with a megalomaniac billion-dollar project.  
 
1.4 Development as an act of governmentality 
The aesthetic alibi created specifically for Wadi Araba but also for Jordan in general has 
moved or is moving a political passion for modernity, or development. As stated above, the 
cases described here might be seen as mere development projects, but as the second 
proposition of the dissertation asserts, development is an act of governmentality. Michel 




…the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this specific, albeit very complex power that has the 
population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential instrument. (Foucault, 2007: 108) 
 
With his notion of governmentality, Michel Foucault offered a perspective on governance 
since the 19th century that brought much more into the picture than just the sovereign ruler 
that was external to its population and has most interest in the defence of its territory. 
Foucault, in his class on governmentality,4 explains that since the 16th century questions 
have been raised about the relationship between power, people and territory. The form of 
governmental power has grown in different forms, like sovereignty and discipline, over the 
past centuries. His example par excellence is the Machiavelli’s Prince, which he takes as 
starting point to illustrate the further ‘governmentalisation’ of the state. It is important to 
understand that this governmentalisation is not a break with sovereignty or discipline as 
forms of power, but that these were rather its ‘initiators’, which resulted in a process of 
governmentality whereby the populace has become the target and field of intervention.   
 
Foucault explains the idea thus: ‘What is important for our modernity, that is to say, for our 
present, is not then the state’s takeover (étatisation) of society, so much as what I call the 
“governmentalisation” of the state’ – which is not to say that the state does not matter, or is 
non-existent, but that it is reduced to ‘a number of functions’ (Foucault, 2007: 109). The limits 
and the survival of the state, Foucault explains, are to be understood on the basis of the 
general tactics of governmentality. In the case of Jordan, the state is presented as a very 
solid, central and individual power, but analysis of the process of its formation from the 
perspective of governmentality reveals this apparently well delineated state rather as a link in 
or expression of a broader and more historically embedded system of power relations. Within 
this process, the idea of culture and the notion of development are crucial.  
 
The twin notions of development and progress are also enacted in practice (state or non-
state initiated) with the aim of staying out of the political realm and focusing on the socio-
economic improvement of the population. Many of today’s initiatives to improve society quite 
deliberately try to avoid political connotation. Probably the most obvious example is the 
general one of neoliberalism, which encourages the retreat of politics and the domination of 
the market (i.e. the end of politics). Through approaching development practices with the 
                                                      
4 Referring to the class of 1 February 1978; in fact, he elaborates further on the issues in subsequent 
lectures, to the extent that ‘Governmentality’ might have been the better title for the series than 
‘Security, territory, population’ (Foucault, 2007: 108).  
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perspective of governmentality, the political program is revealed. Here, I follow Thomas 
Lemke in my understanding of governmentality, that it ‘deciphers the so-called “end of 
politics” itself as a political programme’ (Lemke, 2002: 57). The approach of governmentality 
towards development can show us how development as such functions as a politics of truth 
and thereby produces ‘new forms of knowledge, inventing new notions and concepts, that 
contributes to the “government” of new domains of regulation and intervention’ (Lemke, 
2002: 55). Development initiatives contribute in a variety of ways to the survival of the state 
within the existence of governmental power. 
 
Within development theory and practice, I would argue that the idea of culture as portrayed 
by Mitchell has been vital to the rationale of intervention. In this context, I focus on the 
representation of Bedouin and Jordanian culture within the design of development projects. 
Identifying certain practices and naming or representing them as cultures ‘creates partial, yet 
globalizing, truths’ (Mitchell D., 1995: 109). These created truths are important to indicate the 
difference between people. Central in the formation of Jordan as a country, this has thus, 
and of necessity, been essential to the interrelated realm of development. Although the 
difference is perceived as inherent to the various cultures, and so varying in type and extent 
according to their specificities, some of those differences can, nevertheless, be alleviated by 
the right interventions – the differences, that is, between the paradigm(s) of modernity (as) 
represented by the central authority (and development agencies) and the various others, 
such as the Wadi Araba Bedouin. This creation of truths with regard to culture is a strong tool 
in the (re-)arrangement of power relations among the relevant actors and the dichotomies of 
meaning and power they embody (central/peripheral, state/non-state, national/local, etc.).  
 
The Jordan Valley has always been an important target within the development practice of 
Jordan. The authority in charge of the Valley, the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), is 
responsible thus for the development of Wadi Araba, situated in, as part of, the larger Rift 
Valley, and hence a major actor for this research. The quotation below illustrates the 
philosophy of the JVA on the improvement of the standard of people’s life stated by the (at 
that time) senior vice president of the JVA Dr. Munther Haddadin  
 
Social services just touch the skin of what we are trying to do in the Jordan Valley. It’s 
easy to build new buildings. What’s more difficult is social engineering, and the objective 
of social development is the betterment of the human being. How do we zero in on this? 
Above all, it’s a person’s well-being, environment and way of thinking. Is it social 
development when a man who has always ridden a donkey one day buys a Mercedes? 
What about his way of thinking? How he raises his family? It’s a slow process, but it can 
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only start by providing people with the most basic social services like schools, clinics, 
roads, electricity, water and houses. Then maybe in a year or two, they add a cultural 
centre, or a small sport complex. Things begin to change. Young people study new ideas. 
The entire village structure starts to loosen up. A rigid society starts to change… “Social 
development is people’s attitudes,” and it’s not easy to change attitudes quickly. How do 
we speed this up? The only thing we can do is plan and implement to provide the services 
that in turn give people the ability to decide about their own lifestyle. They begin to have a 
choice. (Khouri 1981: 226) 
 
The Jordan Valley has been part of the Jordanian development programme since early 
independence, mainly due to the influx of Palestinian refugees after the Arab-Israeli war of 
1948, but similar patterns can to be observed in Wadi Araba over the last several decades. 
The general idea of the Wadi Araba initiatives is that by building schools, community centres, 
protected areas, roads and suchlike, the people of Wadi Araba will learn that these will 
change their lives to a more ‘progressive way’ that will leave behind some parts of the old 
Bedouin culture. When projects do not work out as planned or encounter problems, 
therefore, this is often blamed on the Bedouin culture and its people that did not use the tools 
offered as it should.  
 
This refers to the design for life (above). There seems to be a general idea of what a decent 
life is. In 2008, for example, King Abdullah initiated a 100,000-apartment national housing 
initiative called ‘Decent Housing for Decent Living’. Through the distribution of houses (to 
low-middle income families, army veterans, etc.), social and economic security would be 
guaranteed to the people.5 The idea of a decent life was not imagined as a problematic, but 
rather assumed and thus introduced as an invisible value. In this dissertation, I argue that the 
decent life has much to do with spatial organisation and setting standards for or rather limits 
to what people are able to. I would call it a paradox that people are involved in development 
projects to improve their lives yet which also take lives out of their hands, as this process is 
managed between certain boundaries. Institutions such as the Jordan Valley Authority are 
appointed to provide ‘guidelines’ to people in order that they make ‘right’ choices:   
 
Studies of governmentality do not assume that everything is a political activity, but 
political activities are also not reducible to the trinity of politics, policy and polity. 
Governing means creating lines of force that make certain forms of behavior more 
probable than others. Measuring these lines of force does not mean asking how 
                                                      
5 www.kingabdullah.jo (November 2013) 
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people actually move within them. Studies of governmentality are more interested in 
how people are invoked to move within these lines. (Lemke et. al., 2011: 13) 
 
Development is thus an act of governmentality, a procedure by which people move toward, 
along and within the lines of prescribed behaviour (or at least, away from the proscribed). 
Governmentality thus takes on the function of constituting the populace, directing what it 
should be and not be. Governmentality is often translated as a conduct of conduct whereby 
the purpose of government lies in ‘the welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on’ (Foucault 1978, in Faubion, 
2000: 217). Such markers are attained, targets met, through the enablement of 
methodologies by the state for the realisation of empirically proven formulae that facilitate the 
conduct (opening of markets, medical provision, a national education system, etc.). 
Development programmes are situated within this general context.  
 Lemke’s remark that ‘not everything is political’, is employed here as a guideline, a 
heuristic to keep the research focused. I agree there is little point in seeing in every plan, 
activity or discourse a political agenda. Nevertheless, it is certainly revealing to place certain 
development projects and activities within a broader frame that illustrates how people’s lives 
are ‘guided’ or governed, how their conduct is conducted.  
 
1.4.1 Development and governmental spatiality or governable space 
Development discourse can do without its history but not its geography for, without 
geography, it would lack a great deal of its conviction and coherence. Spatial and organic 
images and metaphors have always been used to define what development is and does. 
The language of development constantly visualizes landscape, territory, area, location, 
distance, boundary and situation (Slater 1993, in Porter, 1995: 13).  
 
The aesthetic alibi is a visual/material representation of a space, such as in the case of Wadi 
Araba. I will argue in this dissertation that this alibi is also used as a justification to intervene 
in the population, the change of a physical space as a means to ‘improve’ a population, and 
vice versa. Within the domain of development, one can find rationalities in the proposed 
project for the amelioration of the living standards of the population and at the same time 
improvement of their cultures (or, often today, their mentalities). Foucault (2007: 21) uses the 
notion of ‘milieu’, where I will use the concept of landscape to get at the entanglement of 
natural givens and agglomeration of individuals, houses, the social.6 When we do not 
                                                      
6 Foucault bases his milieu on the work of Jean-Baptiste Moheau. My reference to landscape is based 
on the work of Tim Ingold (Chapter 4).   
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perceive the milieu or landscape as a pure disciplinary arena of visuality, surveillance and 
control, but also – as Huxley (2007: 199) points out – ‘as productive of political subjectivities 
and self-forming subjects’ and if ‘space is taken as integral to the exercise of power and the 
conduct of conducts’, then ‘spatial and environmental causalities can be examined as central 
elements in the thought of government’ (Huxley, 2007: 199). The production of governable 
subjects is inherent in the development of the modern state that focuses on the 
‘improvement’ of its population – they are the means enabling this end and yet become thus 
the end in itself (governable subjects are an improved population).  
 
The state of Jordan aims to improve its populations, to which purpose different strategies are 
applied to different populations and places. With the rationale of improving places and 
populations in a single way, according to the agreed aims of modernity, it follows that 
governable subjects are to be seen in a context of governable spaces. Watts (2004) explains 
how governable spaces are formed and remodelled on different scales (fabric, village, 
region, nation, etc.). In his perspective, the process of governable spaces is channelled 
through ‘the community’, or populace, if you will. I see Wadi Araba in terms of multiple 
governable spaces, because every project comes with a different rationale for improvement 
of the area, but always through the people of Wadi Araba who in each project embody a 
representation of the area.7 Through the intertwinement of Wadi Araba and the people who 
inhabit the area, I illustrate this intertwined landscape as a governable civic space, as a 
governable space of nature and as a governable space of tradition, but also as a governable 
space within the larger, national Jordanian governable space.  
 
Here, I argue that the notion of governable space is very important in order to go beyond the 
idea of space as a pure disciplinary arena, because the powers within the governable spaces 
are multiple, contrary to that of the (now classical) sovereign or disciplinary rule. The 
Jordanian state and development actors (national and international) are just part of the web 
of power relations – which is not to imply that the ‘locals’ (Bedouin) lose all agency in being 
trapped in this web. On the contrary,  power means ‘that the “other” (the one over whom 
power is exercised) be thoroughly recognised and maintained to the very end as a person 
who acts; and that, faced with a relation of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, 
results, and possible inventions may open up’ (Foucault 1982 in Li, 2007: 276). Some of 
those relations and their creative effects are considered here.
                                                      




1.5 The importance of being Wadi Araba 
I elaborated earlier (1.3.2) on the different representations of Wadi Araba, and noted that 
after 1994 the area became more accessible. Of course, the subsequent initiatives taken to 
improve the social and economic conditions of the area are to be seen within the context of, 
for example, the post-peace agreement and need for a buffer at the border. But still today, 
Wadi Araba and the inhabitants continue to be defined by their geographical situation, as at 
the margin. Much research has been done on marginal areas in the world in relation to 
issues like development, housing and land. The ideas most employed in guiding this 
research are thus heavily based on approaches that mainly flourished in the 1990s and early 
2000 (e.g. Gupta & Ferguson, 1997; Tsing 1993, 1994; Das & Poole, 2004; Mitchell T., 
2000).   
 
Even though Wadi Araba is not a newly discovered place and does not have the features of 
a rebellious or conflict area, I remain convinced about the importance of research on 
‘marginal places’, both in political science generally and for Wadi Araba specifically, because 
‘looking at the margins offers a unique perspective to the understanding of the state, not 
because it captures exotic practices, but because it suggests that such margins are a 
necessary entailment of the state, much as the exception is a necessary component of the 
rule’ (Das &Poole, 2004: 4). This is an important argument here since it emphasises that 
places like Wadi Araba and its inhabitants are not disconnected islands, but rather connected 
to broader scales of the state and beyond, a connection, moreover, made in a way that 
analytically implies them to be quite the opposite of dispensable (as their marginality might 
seem to imply) but rather included as definitional.  
 
For this research project, Wadi Araba is the main case study, but in a broader framing of the 
state formation of Jordan, which, in its turn, is not a single island but also related to different 
(internal and external) processes. I illustrate with this dissertation that the attempts to form an 
independent state like Jordan create ideas of culture that are incorporated into their 
development projects, with aims that apply both to Wadi Araba and Jordan as a whole. This 
connection to the central state can be translated as an ambiguous relation of exclusion and 
inclusion. Depending on mainly the (perceived) threats of the self-defined state, certain 
populations are included or excluded from what it means to be part of the heterogeneity of 
that state, or, in this case, what it means to be Jordan. In this respect, Wadi Araba is 
particularly interesting precisely for the reason that the Bedouin tribes there are not the big 




Some of the Wadi Araba tribes moved into the area only after the border with Israel/Palestine 
was officially ratified, while others fought on the Palestinian side during the Civil War of 1970-
71 (Bocco, personal communication, 2012). As a result, these tribes have always been 
excluded from the privileges that other badia8 tribes enjoyed. Nevertheless, they are Bedouin 
and within the current situation of Jordan they are perceived as part of the national tradition – 
but as not yet part of the modern society. Wadi Araba is designated as one of Jordan’s 
‘Poverty Pockets’ (Chapter 4), resulting in its formalised exclusion from ‘normality’. According 
to Foucault, it is inherent to societies that they ‘are discursively constituted through a series 
of normalizing judgments that are put into effect by a system of division, exclusion and 
oppositions’ (Gregory, 1995: 457). Wadi Araba thus becomes necessary to understand the 
state of Jordan, but at the same time, it also serves as a landscape to illustrate how the 
state, within governmentality as an art of government, is limited in the governance of its own 
territory including Wadi Araba.    
 
1.6 Dissertation outline 
Above, Wadi Araba has been approached as governable space(s) wherein the idea of 
culture has gained a significant influence on development practices and state formation. The 
following chapters aim to illuminate this process of culturalisation and its final reification in 
certain development projects. The idea is that through grounded concrete projects, I can 
show the entanglement of the processes of culturalisation, development and state formation.  
 
Although the chapters are ordered chronologically, the dissertation certainly does not present 
a linear narrative. Certain lines continue through time while operating as themes connecting 
are constantly also challenged by events. The aim is not a history of Wadi Araba and 
development, but to show how notions such as, here, Bedouin culture have become a 
(governmental) rationale for development interventions, and to suggest what difference this 
makes. 
 
The next chapter focuses on the importance of the idea of culture in the continuous process 
of the formation of Jordan from a mandated state (British imperial protectorate) until the 
emergence of the contemporary country as neoliberal state. In illustrating the historical 
process of the idea of Bedouin or Jordanian culture, I argue also that this idea was adapted 
over time according to specific events and strategic choices. In the attempt to constitute 
                                                      
8 Badia is an Arabic reference for desert, although the different badia areas (the majority of land 
surface in Jordan is badia) in Jordan have some different characteristics from a desert.  
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Jordan as a legitimate presence in the area, there was the need to create a political 
community that would be identified and identify itself as Jordanian. As Jordan has always 
been (as today) subject to outside (requested) interference as well as internal challenges, its 
rulers employed a fluctuating discourse regarding what or who was part of the Jordanian 
political community and what/who was not. In this chapter, I concretise the situations that 
emphasised a discourse of difference between populations with the aim of enabling the 
further development of a modern state. I try to provide insights into the early moments of the 
moulding of the idea of culture, which later in history was never so pronounced but 
nonetheless essential in the governance of Jordan and strongly affected the area of Wadi 
Araba and its inhabitants.  
 
Through time, the idea of culture became settled as practice, so this it is not only a discursive 
matter. The following chapter elaborates further on the design for life and how the ideas of 
what a civic or decent life is becomes integrated into concrete development projects. 
Initiatives such as housing for a nomadic population or agricultural activities for the poorest in 
a country can be observed as very concrete and necessary projects. These are very specific 
constructions, but here I want look beyond and see what the rationales are for 
implementation and how the material intervention is reflected in the representation of the 
targeted population. This chapter also introduces the ideas of fantasised landscape and 
fantasised community to go beyond the existing notion of imagined communities. During the 
research, I observed that it was not so much a matter of imagining ‘the Bedouin’, but rather 
one of how s/he should be and how s/he could be modelled. This chapter is an illustration of 
how development operates as an act of governmentality; through interventions directed on 
the population (in this case nomadic/Bedouin), the idea was to create a state (Jordan) with a 
modern outlook, yet within the infrastructure of, for example, housing, is realised a 
materialisation of the cultural representation of nomads or Bedouin as not civic.  
 
Representations do create truths. In Chapter 4, these truths are related to the issue of nature 
conservation. The Dana nature reserve extends from the highland ranges on the eastern 
escarpment of the Jordan Rift Valley and into Wadi Araba. The perceived success of the 
Dana biosphere conservation area (an initiative of the Royal Society of the Conservation of 
Nature) has led to proposals for a wider set of proposed nature areas in Wadi Araba. 
Although these preservation initiatives are framed in a participatory rhetoric, they encounter 
great resistance from local populations. The local population (undifferentiated, as a mass, an 
other) has been held responsible for the degradation of the environment, and the recent 
cancellation of new nature projects is attributed to the so-called ignorance of the locals. The 
RSCN is an especially interesting illustration of the tensions that exist in the narratives 
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through which the scales of local and global are made and reified and how conservation as a 
form of development contributes to the creation of truths. The truth/knowledge nexus that 
support the implementation of the conservation projects is perceived as scientific knowledge 
that places the local population out of place and even out of time, and thus out of power 
(their knowledge is ‘traditional’ as opposed to ‘modern’ or scientific knowledge, and thus 
devalued).  
 
In the final chapter of the main body (prior to the conclusion), I focus on a case study that 
actually does not yet exist, namely the water conveyor that will, supposedly, connect the Red 
Sea with the Dead Sea. The project has three purposes and is planned as a cooperative 
venture with Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It is presented as a win-win 
project for all: environmentally, it is as a solution for the shrinkage of the Dead Sea; 
economically, it will provide water and electricity (and in the future will enable the 
development of tourism, agriculture, industry and even new cities in the area); and politically, 
it will provide a framework for cooperation with neighbouring countries. The project is to be 
supported by the World Bank. This is not considered important here for discussion of its 
financial or environmental feasibility, but rather, in a focus on how the project and the visions 
it projects mobilise actors and resources.  
 
Jordan has a history of plans with regard to water infrastructure that have never materialised, 
but all located in a certain political time with particular political aims. Jordan ranks fourth on 
the ranking of water-scarce countries in the world.9 It is therefore no coincidence that the 
government pushes forward this conveyor with some urgency that otherwise could risk 
severe political consequences. Indeed, the prediction of water wars is never far away. The 
influx of neighbouring populations over decades due to conflicts (hundreds of thousands of 
people from Syria, at the time of writing) is incorporated in the discourse of necessity. The 
message is that Jordan cannot longer provide water for everybody if the demographic 
pressure continues. With the conveyor project (in whatever final form), the government tries 
to maintain the stability of its internal and external balance. Internally, the provision of water 
can ease the tension between different populations; externally, this represents an effort to 
work with two parties that are strongly related to Jordan but in conflict with each other. Also 
today, the mentioned conveyor is not the only option for a water conveyor. The existence of 
multiple plans and their effects already on the ground afford insights that go beyond the 
technical specifications of the pipeline.  
 
                                                      
9 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview (November 2013) 
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As the final, General Conclusions indicates, the connection between the four chapters is not 
just a place called Wadi Araba that is situated at the border with Israel/Palestine. It is also the 
culturalised perspective of Jordan and Wadi Araba that has made it possible to develop 











2.1 Back to Back 
This research began four years ago in Ghent. The news that a water conveyor would be 
constructed from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea triggered the scientific curiosity of one of my 
supervisors and encouraged me to look into it. At that point I did not know that the Wadi 
Araba would become the main (geographical) focus of my research. My initial idea was to 
compare the development process of the northern and southern part of the Jordan Rift 
Valley, referred to as the Jordan Valley, the Southern Ghors and Wadi Araba with the aim to 
illustrate broader development ‘trends’ in Jordan and to analyse the politics of development 
applied to the area that forms the boarder with Israel/Palestine. As I explain in greater detail 
below, that the research did not proceed in arbitrary ways but my research plan remained a 
continuous work in progress. Not only the geographical focus changed, but also my topics 
and themes of interest and even my way of doing research. I was always conscious of my 
methodological choices but also engaged in no small amount of improvisation along the way. 
(Cerwonka & Mallki 2008) 
 
At the beginning of research everything seems to be clear and a black spot at the same time. 
You have no idea how the research will go, but on the other hand in the classes on 
methodology you learned a bit the steps and methods you can apply. With still a blurry 
research topic I tried to find and select interesting and relevant literature for the future 
development of the project. A first introduction with the ‘field’ arrived fast and challenged 
directly all pre-formed ideas of how to do research. I was armed with ideas about how to 
enter a field with open or semi-structured question lists for interviews, possible participatory 
observation, or even going native and extending my project to a multi-sided ethnography and 
so on. On my first visit to Jordan, I frequently accompanied a colleague on interviews, and 
worked with structured questions (albeit with a more open style) to touch upon broader 
themes that might be useful in defining my own research project. I remember being mainly 
frustrated that I did not get the ‘right answers’ (i.e. juicy quotes) from respondents. I 
reassured myself that once back home it would all become clear to me by looking at the first 
experience from a distance. New literature and planning a next field trip would make my 
circle go round and form my research bit by bit as it should.  
 
Things did not become clearer at home and the circle went everywhere but round. Although 
methodology should be a guideline to read the script of a research, I experienced that it is 
mainly a tool to read afterwards the collected information and reflect on the research 
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process. It will always encounter issues that are not written down in a script. My methodology 
chapter will be about choices and reflections, and not so much about how to start a research. 
Edward Said (1985) dedicated a whole book to what a beginning is and the doctoral thesis of 
colleague Koenraad Bogaert reassured me that even the great Giorgio Agamben stated that 
in most cases of social science research the thinking about method follows the practical 
research part (Bogaert, 2011:24). 
 
Through the last four (almost five) years of working on my research, I frequently questioned 
on what I was doing. Looking back, I now see how those questions guided me through my 
research process. They will be the frame for this chapter. This chapter is divided in two parts: 
the first part addresses issues related to epistemology; while the second elaborates on the 
operational process of unfolding my research.   
 
2.2 School’s out 
I am absolutely not a structuralist. Structuralism is only a means of analysis. … I 
merely make use of the structuralist method to analyze all that. (Foucault 1970 in 
Faubion, 1994:341) 
 
One could say that Michel Foucault was a stubborn man who did not want to carry any 
academic label. But his statement is in my opinion quite useful to step into the discussion on 
how to match discipline, method and knowledge production. I learned that there is a general 
consensus that the boundaries between disciplines and the traditional related methods have 
become interchangeable. During my research project I worked with literature coming from 
different disciplines, including political science, anthropology, cultural studies, geography, 
etc. It was the subject being addressed rather than the disciplinary that was key in choosing 
what to read (or not) Undeniably, my educational background in cultural and development 
studies has pushed me in certain directions. Almost intuitively I would argue in complete 
favour of an interdisciplinary approach, or at least of recognising knowledge produced by 
other disciplines, together with ‘non-academic’ knowledge. Johannes Fabian summarises it 
well from his anthropological point of view.   
 
I deeply believe that a realistic view of our discipline [anthropology] must 
acknowledge that our kind of science is practiced in the presence of other kinds of 
knowledge production. These other kinds of knowledge production are not limited to 
other academic disciplines: they include the discursive, performative, aesthetics, and 




It may all seem very logical to work interdisciplinary or at least to have an open view on other 
ways of knowledge production. But it appears that there still exists a need to position and to 
name your research within a certain discipline, method and school (i.e. Marxist, post-modern, 
(post)structuralism, feminism, gender studies …). Out of a recent personal experience, I 
realised that in some cases for a paper to get accepted for publication the interpretation of 
disciplines is still taken quite strict and in my opinion rather with a narrow perspective on how 
one can/should organise his or her research. It is nice to see how anthropologist Liisa Malkki 
is concerned about her advice to - in the time – the advanced graduate student Allaine 
Cerwonka to incorporate ethnography in her research that was situated at a political science 
department. How might this interdisciplinary encouragement influence Cerwonka’s position at 
the department, what would be at stake? As Malkki points out in her work on ethnography, 
besides the current trend to value interdisciplinary work, it can as well be a restriction to have 
access to certain academic positions.  
 
When graduate students become job applicants in the academy, they are usually 
expected to hold a doctorate in the discipline to which they are applying. One of the 
most expedient mechanisms for reducing the pile of job applications facing a search 
committee is to weed out applicants with a doctorate in another discipline. The social 
and professional costs of doing interdisciplinary work are thus potentially very high for 
graduate students and untenured faculty. (Cerwonka and Malkki, 2007: 164) 
 
Between the sympathy for a disciplinary approach towards research and the awareness that 
it might come with a price to pay, I tried to position my research somewhere in the middle. 
Although I have been in the field for almost 12 months spread over seven field visits and 
conducted interviews while being there, I would not describe my research as anthropological. 
I have also been reluctant to call my research an ethnographic study of Wadi Araba, because 
I am not looking at Wadi Araba as a defined ‘cultural research subject’ that will be described 
in depth. I followed projects rather than people. The projects implemented in Wadi Araba 
brought me as well to Amman and Aqaba. Following the description of George Marcus 
(1995) on multi-sited ethnography, I could relate my research to this form of ethnography or 
at least as a limited version of it. 
 
It claims that any ethnography of a cultural formation in the world system is also an 
ethnography of the system, and therefore cannot be understood only in terms of the 
conventional single-site mise-en-scene of ethnographic research, assuming indeed it 
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is the cultural formation, produced in several different locales, rather than the 
conditions of a particular set of subjects that is the object of study.(Marcus,1995:99) 
Contemporary anthropology does not limit itself to research on delimited localities, but has 
broadened its scope to take on themes and topics traditionally seen as the concern of other 
disciplines. As Marcus also states that ‘[Thus], fieldwork as traditionally perceived and 
practiced is already itself potentially multi-sited’ (Marcus, 1995:100).I will come back later on 
the issue of fieldwork in relation to my own research. More important here is his idea that a 
cultural formation reflects a (certain) world system. I found a step going beyond ‘localism’. 
However, instead of talking about a world system I would rather talk about a cultural 
formation within a certain worldview or ‘world vision’. 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation does not want to deny the existence of 
culture. Ortner (2005) states clearly that the concept of culture is not inherently a dangerous 
or conservative concept, but that one has to recognise its political value (Ortner, 2005:35). In 
this dissertation the emphasis is mainly on its political aspect; culture is viewed from a 
perspective of power, something also Ortner points to. 
 
Thus while recognizing the very real dangers of ‘culture’ in its potential for essentialising 
and demonizing whole groups of people, one must recognize its critical political value as 
well, both for understanding the workings of power, and for understanding the resources 
of the powerless. (Ortner,2005:35) 
 
Despite all my references to anthropological literature and certain related methods as 
fieldwork, I would like to position my research and dissertation as a political cultural critique. 
Cultural critique is again predominantly related to anthropology as it has a ‘tradition’ of being 
self-reflexive through acquired knowledge from ‘abroad’ and to use this knowledge to 
formulate a critique on a home society. (Marcus & Fischer 1999; Ortner 2005) 
[Anthropological] cultural critique asks questions about the cultural shaping of subjects in 
relation to ever changing constellations of power. With my research I ask questions about 
these changing constellations of power and the entanglement with subjects. It is a political 
cultural critique as it looks at the use of culture within political formations (which is always 
intertwined with subject formation). In the anthropological cultural critique the critique or 
questions are more addressed to other anthropological insides on culture. My critique is 
directed towards the insights on culture and subject formation by actors of development or 




A political cultural critique creates space for at least two issues that I consider crucial for a 
better understanding of development initiatives. The first issue relates to Marcus’ perspective 
on cultural formation(s) in a world system(s)/worldviews and how through analysis of a 
cultural formation one also analyses a particular worldview. You could go as far as Bruno 
Latour (1993), who wrote an ethnography on technology and science, claiming that 
development theory and practice can be analysed ethnographically as a cultural formation. It 
would contribute to David Mosse’s (2005) perspective that it is more insightful to look at the 
process of how development initiatives work rather than if they work or not. Initiatives do not 
appear out of nowhere, neither are they elusive figments. They are grounded in their 
implementation and in their planning. As I will argue for an unbounded dynamic approach of 
culture, also the ‘culture of development’ is constantly in negotiation. Through an analysis of 
grounded initiatives, it is possible to shed light on a network of (conflicting) worldviews (what 
actually refers to the designs of life). A second issue deals with, perhaps bluntly spoken, 
‘counter-subject formation’. From a perspective of cultural critique one can see the political 
value of culture. This political value also refers to how people who are assigned to a 
particular culture are ‘knowing subjects ‘ (Ortner, 2005: 45) who will react if they are reduced 
to this particular culture. In the case of this research, people who are living in the area of 
Wadi Araba are often seen as a merely a cultural Bedouin without any recognition for their 
other cultural, political, economic or social relations.   
 
In my continuous questioning how to position myself, I consider a political cultural critique as 
the best of both worlds, political science and anthropology. I tried to sketch a perspective on 
the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, but instead of using political state theory to 
support empirical data, I turned towards literature and theories from predominantly 
researchers situated in anthropology and cultural studies. The main reason for this in-
between choice was the space that becomes available for an encounter for the notions of 
power and culture.10 
 
2.3 Governmentality as a methodological instrument 
In the edit volume ‘Cultural Theory: an Anthology’ the editors Szeman and Kaposy (2011) 
bring for the issue of ‘power’ some authors together that could be seen as the usual suspects 
such as Marx, Foucault, Deleuze, Smith, Fanon etc. In relation to culture they are a rather 
peculiar, nevertheless interesting choice, to underline the political value of culture. My 
research has been inspired especially by Foucault’s work and the how it has influenced a 
                                                      
10 I am not claiming that this is a unique perspective and that can be found solely in a political cultural 
critique. Anthropological researchers as Tania Li Murray bring together the same issues of culture and 
power, perhaps with more emphasis cultural practices.  
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very diverse academic fields. Governmentality is one of Foucault’s notions that was crucial 
for the development of my research. Governmentaltiy is less worked out in my final 
dissertation than it has been a key notion in my search for literature. Mainly to approach 
governmentality as a methodological tool was helpful to put all the research pieces together. 
 
I am aware that there is also literature that points at the limits of a perspective of 
governmentality. Tania Li who works very frequently with the notion of governmentality 
reveals at the same time the limits to it. Her general critique on Foucault is the seemingly 
unproblematic distinction between an analysis of a program and the real life that this program 
will affect. Foucault has been questioned on the issue that programs are not real, that they 
do not ‘substitute for reality’ and mainly his work on the Panopticon of Bentham is challenged 
with this critique. Foucault himself replies that ‘if I had wanted to describe “real life” in the 
prisons, I indeed wouldn’t have gone to Bentham. But the fact that this real life isn’t the same 
thing as the theoreticians’ schemes doesn’t entail that these schemes are therefore utopian, 
imaginary, and so on. One could only think of this if one had a very impoverished notion of 
the real’ (Foucault 1978 in Faubion, 2000 :232). The critique of Li and the reply of Foucault 
have been encouraging and at the same time a help to focus my own research process. 
Foucault’s idea of power, as never total and homogenous, made Li argue that to understand 
the power relations within a program as the Panopticon, ethnographic research should look 
also at the inside of the prison - the witches’ brew as Foucault refers to the inside –and at the 
reactions on the programs by involved actors. Power for Foucault is to be understood as: 
 
In the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in 
which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process 
which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or 
reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus 
forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions 
which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take 
effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state 
apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Foucault 
1976 in Szeman & Kapsoy, 2011 :134)  
 
To see these kinds of force relations from a governmentality perspective one can unravel the 
formation of these relations in a practice as the implementation of development projects. Li 
insists to look also at the reactions of the ‘targeted population’ while studying the programs. 
The work of Li and similarly minded scholars encouraged me strongly to go to the villages of 
Wadi Araba and to meet with people there. As I will elaborate more below, I did not succeed 
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in it as much as had hoped to. Not being able to go as deeply as I would have liked into Wadi 
Araba itself, I shifted my focus more towards the ‘programs’. In the understanding of 
Foucault’s description of power, the focus on programs does not imply an erasing or denial of 
the space of contestation and reaction. I would argue that the study of governmentality 
always asks for the incorporation of the diverse assemblages of power relations or networks.  
 
The analytic of governmentality asks ‘how different locales are constituted as 
authoritative and powerful, how different agents are assembled with specific powers, 
and how different domains are constituted as governable and administrable.(Dean 
1999 in Li, 2007:276) 
 
The aim of governmentaltiy is to look beyond the idea that government belongs to a central 
state and is enforced in one top-down direction. ‘Other actors’ are mostly translated as 
international donors, (trans) national companies or NGOs who are taken their place in 
domains that were previously designated to the state. Foucault states clearly that ‘powers 
comes from below; that is there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers 
and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix – no such duality 
extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very 
depths of the social body’ (Foucault 1976 in Szeman & Kaposy, 2011:134). In the end my 
dissertation starts from ‘programs’ that in themselves are part of power networks, and it 
would have been impossible to understand how the power relations relate and constitute 
each other without considering Wadi Araba and the local population as active actors that are 
part of the power constellation. To have a look into the witches brew, I had to make the 
journey from Ghent to Jordan. 
 
2.4. Fields of gold 
Methodology is definitely not reducible to fieldwork, but if (as my supervisor sometimes 
reminds of us) the theory is in the case, then so too is the method.  
 
Fieldwork has been crucial to this project in at least two respects. First, some of the existing 
literature on Jordan with regard to its development policies and history has been very 
thoroughly in facts and very descriptive mainly on the mandate period and the early decades 
after independents or post-1989 (e.g. Rogan & Tell 1994, Knowles 2005) Literature that 
explains the formation of Jordan as a state tends to apply a rather teleological approach 
whereby the passed decades are analysed as following distinct events (e.g. Curtis 2002, 
Robins 2004, Satloff 1994). Without doubt this literature has been fundamental in my 
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research to gain knowledge on historical facts and occurrences. However, I experienced this 
literature on the historical process in Jordan as too fragmented. The literature on Jordan that 
inspired me more was based on case-focused research in Jordan but connected to the 
broader (theoretical) frameworks and (genealogical) processes of Jordan (e.g. Bocco & 
Chatelard 2009; Chatelard 2003, 2005, Massad 2001; Parker 2009; Van Aken 1999, 2003, 
2005, 2007). For my research project I aimed to illustrate a bigger process (i.e. the political 
power of the culturalisation of state formation and development) through related case 
studies. Even if a case dealt with historical events, I wanted to analyse how those events 
affect Jordan and Wadi Araba today. The second reason and probably the most common 
reason for fieldwork; through following projects and to go into encounters with involved 
people, I wanted to try to avoid writing too much from the books and more from what I was 
taught in ‘the field’. This attempt brought many practical and ethical issues, which will be 
addressed below.  
 
The step after making the choice for fieldwork is to define the field. I explained briefly why I 
thought it would be essential to go to Jordan and to do fieldwork. I can also explain why Wadi 
Araba is meaningful as a site for fieldwork, but I never explicitly questioned why I choose 
Wadi Araba. Conducting fieldwork was a good exercise to turn the cultural critique I tried to 
formulate into in a critique on my research as part of my home society. 
 
2.4.1 Choice of field 
During the past four years I have argued that the choice of Wadi Araba as a research site 
was to a certain extend by ‘coincidence’. The initial idea was to look into the politics of 
development in the Jordan Valley with possible extension for comparison with the Southern 
Ghors and Wadi Araba. Mainly after the news on the proposed water conduit from the Red 
Sea to the Dead Sea, the southern part of the Jordan Rift Valley came more into the picture. 
One of the first informants, who introduced me more to the mega-project, brought me to 
Wadi Araba. He had a long history with the people there through his previous work. He 
became ‘the fixer’ who has been indispensible for my further introduction in the area and 
pointed my attention at other issues that were creating tension in Wadi Araba. Those points 
of friction have become the main cases of my dissertation. I realised early that the full 
covering of the entire Jordan Rift Valley would be practically impossible and after the 
encounter with Wadi Araba I decided to downscale my focus on Wadi Araba as research 




I (personally) consider fieldwork, no matter how extended and deeply one chooses to go into 
it, as the most interesting way of collecting data as it also delivers ‘the most value’ data. Due 
to my master thesis on the slums of Casablanca whereby I never conducted fieldwork and 
regretted it, it was almost obvious that with my doctoral thesis fieldwork would be included. 
Especially in the discipline of anthropology fieldwork is a key element in its methodology. But 
also in other disciplines it has taken a common place in a researcher’s methodology. Fellow 
researchers I met in Jordan where neither always anthropologists but conducted 
nevertheless intensive fieldwork during several months. These encounters convinced me that 
empirical research through fieldwork on issues related to ‘classic’ political science topics as 
state formation can contribute to a broadening of the discipline’s methods and research 
subjects. Besides being in favour of fieldwork as a methodological tool to bring together the 
many concerns that constituted my research, I want to illustrate that fieldwork within a 
political cultural critique can raise questions with regard to fieldwork as ‘taken for granted’. 
 
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) ask a surprising question: why has fieldwork never been 
questioned within anthropology? Many other issues as the notion of culture or ethnography 
as genre of writing have been questioned and strongly criticised (Gupta and Ferguson, 
1997:2). My point here is not to criticise fieldwork as a methodological practice –above I 
embraced it as enriching for political sciences. But I do think it is important to think through 
what it implies to incorporate fieldwork in one’s research. as ‘obvious’, like I did. 
 
The whole discussion on being aware that your presence as researcher has consequences 
or that there is no such thing as being ‘a fly on the wall’ has been elaborated extensively. But 
there are two points raised by Gupta and Ferguson in their literature that are left out of the 
discussion about the relation between researcher and the field. The two issues relate to 
choice of field and the distinction between home and field. I mentioned before that my choice 
of Wadi Araba as my field has been a rather coincidental process due to the ‘snow ball 
effect’. Gupta and Ferguson have an insightful answer to this ‘coincidence’ that counters this 
‘stumbling into the field’ (Gupta & Ferguson,1997:11). The explanation of stumbling or 
coincidence ‘prevents - according to Gupta and Ferguson - any systematic inquiry into how 
those field sites became to be good places for doing fieldwork in the first instance’ (Gupta & 
Ferguson,1997:11). Looking back on my decision of Wadi Araba as a research field, it 
happened through an encounter with anarea that has the features of a place in the margins 
of the state where everybody talked about as empty. The ‘characteristics’ of Wadi Araba and 
stories about the area were definitely triggers to focus on the area. Also the fact that little 
research has been conducted in Wadi Araba is an extra asset to add to a project description. 
In retrospect, the remark of Gupta and Ferguson is confrontational especially in relation to a 
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research whereby a main critique is the static, bounded and culturalistic approach of 
development initiatives. This relates to a second point of the aforementioned authors; the 
differentiation between home and field.  
 
The very distinction between "field" and "home" leads directly to what we call a 
hierarchy of purity of field sites. After all, if "the field" is most appropriately a place that 
is "not home," then some places will necessarily be more "not home" than others, and 
hence more appropriate, more "fieldlike." All ethnographic research is thus done "in the 
field," but some "fields" are more equal than others - specifically, those that are 
understood to be distant, exotic, and strange. (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997b:13) 
 
Despite the lessons learned with regard to relations between research and informants, the 
process of choosing a field and its position to a researcher’s home base, might still carry an 
old (colonial if you will) attitude with it. At least for my own research I always made a clear 
distinction between what belonged to my field research and home11. I took it as an important 
aspect of my research and more ‘workable’ to keep this clear distinction, while this 
(problematic) distinction should be an essential part of the research as a critique on the 
‘home society’ where one’s academic work is produced and read.  
 
2.4.2 Relations in the field 
The choice of field also implies a choice of informants who are essential for a research to 
proceed. While being in Jordan I conducted interviews with all kinds of actors who had 
connection with my case studies. I would visit employees of different ministries (agricultural, 
municipal affairs, planning, tourism and heritage, water and irrigation etc.), decentralised 
governmental units like the Jordan Valley Authority or the Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority, (Royal) Non-Governmental Organisations, researchers affiliated with Wadi Araba, 
local inhabitants of the villages of Wadi Araba and their municipality offices, researchers who 
work as consultant for projects as the water conveyor, planning offices etc. I tried to cover all 
the different scales that related to the described initiatives.12 It goes without saying that some 
contacts were easier in reaching out towards me with information than others, and that these 
relations changed over time.  
 
 
                                                      
11 Home can also be interpreted as a mental construction and not physical per sé. During the months 
in Jordan, the rented apartments in Amman were at different moments home or part of the field.  
12 Due to practical reasons I limited the scales within Jordan. Some cases, as the Royal Society of the 
Conservation of Nature, can be followed far beyond the Jordanian borders. This would have been a 
very insightful challenge.  
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2.4.2.1 Fluctuating IDs 
Interviews were mainly organised in Amman as most ministries, NGOs, researchers, 
planners are located there. In Amman or Aqaba the meetings could be done in English. 
Rarely did I record the conversations, which left me reliant on notes. Taping does not have to 
be an issue, but as Jordan is small you can sense that people are more reluctant to talk 
when the recorder is on. They will be open or even outspoken during interviews as long as it 
is not put black on white. Myself together with other research colleagues in Jordan 
experienced that when their words were shown on paper, it would make some go into denial 
or even feeling offended. One way to avoid missing too much information due to writing 
notes and asking questions at the same time, was to be accompanied with a fellow 
researcher who was interested in similar topics. 
 
In Wadi Araba the interviews were always in Arabic. This implied that an interpreter always 
accompanied me. Because I was not able to talk directly to people, this had two significant 
impacts on my research. First it created a barrier between the interviewees and myself to 
build a certain relation of trust. Several times I would meet with the same informant, but since 
the inability to talk personally there always was a sphere of formality. Secondly, the 
atmosphere and the information that was exchanged depended on who joined me as 
interpreter. The most frequent women who joined me where; a young German or a German-
Moroccan female colleague researcher and a senior female researcher as well as a local 
English-speaking woman. The fact that they are all female was not a conscious choice. 
These female interpreters joined mostly for rather structured interviews. Other visits to Wadi 
Araba were with representatives of the Jordan Valley Authority, Jordan River Foundation, 
Hashemite Fund for Development of Jordan Badia or the person who introduced me first to 
Wadi Araba. With each of them it has been a fascinating experience because all of them had 
a key to open one door or the other. On the other hand, depending who joined me, I received 
specific kinds of information. Also much depended, mainly with regard to the representatives 
of organisations or government, on how the current relation was between the interviewee 
and the institution that joined me. The status of that relation changed sometimes very fast. 
Unfortunately that reflected also upon me and influenced in its turn my relation to informants.  
 
The Janus-faced researcher? 
 
In Amman and Aqaba I was verbally stronger than in Wadi Araba. Obviously this also 
influenced the perception about who I was amongst informants. I look younger than I actually 
am, so in Amman I experienced several times that the interviewee(s) thought that they could 
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play me around. When I showed I had come prepared, it could move the conversation further 
or it would make them suspicious about who I really was. Maybe I was coming from the 
‘Other Side’ (code name for Israel) to collect data on what is happening in Wadi Araba. 
Google apparently informs that my research is on ‘Infrastructural violence in the West 
Bank’13, I was obviously asked for explanation and told that I smile like an angel, but I am not 
an angel of mind. At the same time, they would show me proudly around their implemented 
projects and would be open for many discussions. When I – as a young unmarried woman - 
was on my own in Wadi Araba I received guidance. I could not go anywhere without being 
accompanied. Although I was concerned how I could get access to information from men in 
Wadi Araba, it turned out to be rather a non-issue. As a European woman I was ‘classified’ 
as a third gender who has access to both female and male spaces. It was more being 
European that obstructed me from receiving information. During an interview when I was 
accompanied by the German-Moroccan colleague, the interviewee was talking to her in 
Arabic and telling her not to translate to me what he was explaining because as European I 
would not understand. It turned out that the topic of their conversation was fraud.  
 
2.4.2.2. Sympathy for the devil 
My visits to Wadi Araba were mainly single-day visits or multiple-days but with sleeping 
accommodation in Aqaba. I stayed once for several days with a single mother of five, but 
found myself too much of a burden. As mentioned above, I joined representatives of the 
Jordan Valley Authority on several occasions. The first time I was asked to join them for an 
explorative trip to see their projects in Wadi Araba, I was reluctant to accept the invitation. 
First, I was going to meet people of the villages accompanied with people who I tried not to 
be associated with. I wanted to make sure that this would not effect negatively on my 
contacts in Wadi Araba. Second, I was aware that my position towards development actors 
was more critical. So, how is it not hypocrite to join them on a rather informal field visit and 
formulating their information afterwards into a critique?  
 
In one way it could be perceived as being biased; the Bedouin population as the romantic 
noble sauvage and development planners as the bad ones. On the other hand it might be 
more a hypercorrection to avoid colonial traps of paternalism that in the end results in an 
attempt for the salvation of the local people of Wadi Araba (in a way a very colonial attitude). 
I place this ‘hypercorrection’ in the perspective of Gupta and Ferguson. We learned to be 
aware of our position as researcher towards informants, but maybe this awareness can also 
                                                      




turn into a hypercorrection that makes one blind for the approach to the field an sich (i.e. 
home – field distinction). The distinction carries as well a difference between Us and Them, 
exactly the position or attitude that is to be avoid in relations with informants.  
 
2.4.3 Expectations in a changing field 
I have established fieldwork relations in Jordan. Some ended more friendly than others. But 
they all formed a network that was the foundation for my research. Towards the end it 
became clear that some informants had (legitimate) expectations from me. These 
expectations came from local inhabitants as well as from government and organisation 
employees. All have had experiences with ‘outsiders’ coming in with questions or critiques (in 
relation to projects).  
 
People in the villages of Wadi Araba have seen people come and go with questionnaires or 
surveys, but not much was ever realised in concrete terms. So it might not be surprising that 
I was first approached with scepticism, and later received the question if I could provide them 
with a needed well for water or anything that could change their situation. I spent quite some 
time with people from the Jordan Valley Authority or the Royal Society for Conservation of 
Nature, which resulted in a rather open exchange of information. From their side, there were 
questions regarding advice on how to implement and manage their projects. One informant 
within the RSCN told us that they have been told many times before how not to do their 
initiatives, but never how they should do it. An analytic answer was not an option, what was 
needed were straight forward suggestions and advices. With this person, also the fixer, we 
spent hours in the car and discussed many topics. When he asked us a question he would 
finish with ‘do not answer as a political scientist’. The (co-authored) chapter in this 
dissertation on the issue of nature conservation and local knowledge was given to this same 
person to give us feedback and to illustrate what we do with the information. Unfortunately 
our critique formulated in the paper was not received well and caused severe damage to the 
trust that was built during the years. Although it is a very unpleasant experience, David 
Mosse reminds us that as researcher, you and your outputs are not external to a research 
project.  
 
Not only the author, but also the book itself is uncomfortably part of the world that it 
describes. It is not just a text (separate from action) but is performative. Indeed, it may be 
read less in terms of its ideas – for development managers the theoretical and 
comparative significance of my analysis was irrelevant – and more in terms of its capacity 
to disturb social relations linked to ruling representations; its potential to affect reputations 
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and materially to influence fund flows. (Mosse,2005: xii) 
 
Also Foucault mentions in his work on methodology how he has been irritating people as 
social workers. He formulated the objections he received in what a critique is and what it is 
not.  
 
Critique doesn’t have to be a premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what 
needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and 
refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in 
refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in a 
programming. It is a challenge directed to what is. (Foucault 1978 in Faubion, 
2000:236)  
 
2.4.4 Knowledge production from a cultural critique; a small step for the 
decolonisation of science? 
What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your 
demand: ‘Is it science?’ Which speaking, discoursing subjects – which subjects of 
experience and knowledge – do you then want to ‘diminish’ when you say: ‘I who 
conduct this discourse am conducting a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist’? 
Which theoretical-political avant-garde do you want to enthrone in order to isolate it 
from all the discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it? (Foucault, 
1994:205 in Goldman, 2001:205) 
 
I mentioned before that through the formulation of a cultural critique based on ‘foreign’ 
knowledge it offers space for a critique on a home society. Besides the awareness of how to 
approach informants and even the field as such, there still exists a great concern about how 
scholars produce knowledge about ‘the Other’. For my own personal research, I question 
how the representation of the Other (i.e. Bedouin population in Jordan) is incorporated in the 
development of Jordan. It should be natural that I also question this questioning. 
Nevertheless, the focus should still be on producing knowledge.  
 
Within literature on knowledge in relation to ‘science’, I always found the perspective of post-
colonial studies intriguing and insightful if I place it together with cultural critique. Timothy 
Mitchell illustrates that your own choice of paradigm can bring a whole other perspective on 
the world or on your own working field in specific. In many of our case studies, the fields are 




Unlike an argument about cultural relativism, a postcolonial perspective locates these 
problems of colonialism, global expansion, and translation within the history and 
practices of science, rather than outside it as secondary issues that might be 
addressed after the science is already formed. (Mitchell T., 2002:7-8) 
 
Walter Mignolo (2000a, 2000b) and Ramon Grosfoguel (2009), together with other post-
colonial authors (e.g. Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, Gloria Anzaldua) put ‘strategies’ 
forward for decolonising knowledge. The suggestions are quite straightforward and definitely 
questionable, but they offer some starting points. To mention a few: show your own 
epistemic location, be critical on Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalists, use different 
canons, encourage critical dialogues, take knowledge that is not your own serious, etc. 
(Grosfoguel, 2009:11) In sum these authors are working towards a future project that is ‘a 
radical universal decolonial diversality project’ (Grosfoguel, 2009:33). Besides the coercive 
tone, it is rightfully pointed out that we are still stuck within the same colonial power matrix 
that has led us to a ‘global coloniality’ (Grosfoguel, 2009:22). Such a global coloniality has 
been produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/capitalist system. Especially 
Mignolo is encouraging a different form of epistemology, namely border thinking. 
 
Today, silenced and marginalized voices are bringing themselves into the 
conversation of cosmopolitan projects, rather than waiting to be included. Inclusion is 
always a reformative project. Bringing themselves into the conversation is a 
transformative project that takes the form of border thinking or border epistemology--
that is, the alternative to separatism is border thinking, the recognition and 
transformation of the hegemonic imaginary from the perspectives of people in 
subaltern positions. Border thinking then becomes a "tool" of the project of critical 
cosmopolitanism. (Mignolo, 2000b:736-737) 
 
The post-colonial authors talk in ‘radical’ terms about new ways of knowledge production, but 
they do not aim to wipe out the colonial past and present. On the contrary, it can only be 
useful to work with the history of colonialism, its effects on the (colonial) present especially 
with its relation towards science and the reproduction of this coloniality through science. 
Therefore I relate the cultural critique to fieldwork as well. The cultural critique towards the 
state and development institutions in Jordan, can similarly be applied or used on the process 
of research. Both the institutions and researchers aim to produce knowledge and apply this 
knowledge (in certain cases). Not only the institutions should be aware of the ‘roots’ 
(genealogy if you will) of the premises where their knowledge is based on, the same goes for 
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researchers. The distinctions made between researchers and informants and between home 
and field are variables in the production of knowledge.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
My methodological chapter is the result of thinking about method after the practical research 
part. Actually it is rather a reflection of my thinking about how to do research during four 
years. Some parts of method were chosen consciously, other parts were improvisation while 
doing. Nevertheless, I experienced that the whole process becomes only observable 
afterwards. This resulted in a lot of questioning and ideas of how I could have done it 
differently. There should always be a will to improve. I know that I write more about my 
appreciation for post-colonial studies and its project for a different epistemology than I 
accomplished this is practice. Therefore the attempt to formulate a cultural critique has been 
an exercise for myself to understand how the critique I write could be applied on my own 
research and its methodology. I formulate the political cultural critique as a critical 
perspective towards the insights of culture and subject formation by actors of development or 
state formation, it is as important to be aware on how one’s own research contributes 
towards the idea of culture and subject formation.  
 
The issue of culture is as crucial in my methodology in relation to the practice of research, 
but as well in the final empirical study that this dissertation materialises. The main question of 
this research correspond to the point of what I mean with a political cultural critique; how has 
the use of the idea of culture been present and effective in the Jordanian state formation and 
in the interrelated politics of development for Jordan? The three main arguments that run 
through the next four chapters are as well translated within this methodology chapter but as 
critical points towards doing research. The first argument deals with the naturalisation of the 
notion of culture. I argue that in formation of the state of Jordan and in the realm of 
development this naturalisation has pushed forward the idea that there exist a civic and an a-
civic way of living. Due to the naturalisation, there is also a process of de-politicising the idea 
of culture. This can especially be noticed in development discourses and practices. Through 
the case studies I illustrate that development is on the contrary an act of governmentaltiy, 
hence an issue of politics that leans strongly on the idea of culture. Finally, this whole 
dissertation is also written to emphasise the importance of places in the margin like Wadi 
Araba for an understanding of broader processes of state formation and the politics of 
development. This last argument, I tried to fulfil by writing this dissertation, despite the great 
amount of existing literature concerned with development in the so-called rural areas of the 
world.   
On the issue of culture 
 49 
III. On the issue of culture 
 
During the last 510 years of the European/Euro-American capitalist/patriarchal 
modern/colonial world-system we progressed from the 16th Century “Christianize or 
we’ll shoot you” to the 19th Century “civilize or we'll shoot you” to the 20th Century 
“develop or we'll shoot you” to the late 20th Century “neoliberalize or we'll shoot you” 
to the early 21st Century “democratize or we'll shoot you”. (Grosfoguel, 2009: 28) 
 
Walking through the streets of Jordan’s capital city Amman, you can get the feeling of always 
being watched. There are billboards of all sizes spread across the city showing King 
Abdullah II, often accompanied by a family member. Most striking perhaps is the variety of 
outfits worn by the King. As representative of the Jordanian people, each of his outfits refers 
to a particular segment of the population. The-King-as-unifier-of-all-people is what we could 
call one of many such attempts to create a political community (Robins, 2004: 1) that would 
recognise itself (and the wider state) as Jordanian. Jilian Schwedler refers in her work on the 
recent protests in Jordan to two other unifying initiatives, those of ‘Jordan First’ and ‘We are 
all Jordan’ (Schwedler, 2012: 261). Schwedler points at a fundamental aspect of these 
national projects, that they are especially attempts to ‘construct a particular kind of new 
Jordanian citizen’ (Schwedler, 2012: 261).  
 
In the history of Jordan, the struggle towards ‘modernity’ and the creation of a ‘political 
community’ has been considered as necessary for its ultimate formation as a state. Within 
this process, the notion of culture, or rather the idea of culture, has had a very present but 
also somewhat ambiguous role. The Jordanian situation thus offers an opportunity to use the 
notion of culture not as a subject of research – into ‘the culture(s) of Jordan’ or ‘Bedouin 
culture’ – but rather as an analytical concept. By working with the concept of culture as an 
analytical tool, we can unravel the political meaning of the culturalisation of state formation 
and related development discourse and practices.14 Although the general process centres on 
the construction of a unified Jordanian nation, the dominant discourse mainly concerns 
difference, that of (within) the inhabitants of the Jordanian territory. Following Arjun 
Appadurai (1996), I will approach this difference as expressed in primarily cultural 
essentialist terms.  
 
                                                      
14 Which is not argue that culture is the tool par excellence for analysis, since I would argue more for a 
broad approach that gives space to other equally useful concepts’ such as race, gender and class; 
rather, this employs a (re)introduction of the notion culture in the political sciences (below). 
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As stated, the Bedouin population has played a significant role in the Jordanian state 
formation, and Wadi Araba is mainly inhabited by a (now settled) Bedouin population. 
Although the inhabitants of Wadi Araba do not belong to the most influential Jordanian tribes, 
the region forms an interesting space within which to unravel the entanglement of the 
development apparatus and the way Jordan’s economic-political system developed over 
time. Within this process, I will focus on the twinned course of de-politicisation and the 
culturalisation of development.  
 
This focus involves an illustration of the political use of the idea of culture through different 
periods in the creation of Jordan and how development institutions have taken part in this 
process. Colonisation, nationalisation and neoliberalism as specifications of three periods in 
Jordan are treated of as three separate parts of the chapter, but are at the same time 
understood as a continuum. Through reviewing the literature on the creation of Jordan and 
especially the role of the Bedouin population in this process, emphasis is placed on how 
culture was used through these different phases of state formation, and not just in the 
institutionalisation of development. The ambiguity of the role of Jordan’s Bedouin population 
in the ongoing (re-)creation of Jordan will also be a key element of the chapter. 
 
The first section of this chapter commences with the Mandate period, although recognising 
the shortcomings this implies with regards to a fuller historical picture of Jordan – meaning, 
this chapter is not intended as a reflection of the general historical creation of Jordan. In fact, 
starting with the British mandate directly entails ‘ignoring both the Ottoman experience and 
indeed the people of Jordan’ (Robins, 2004: 4). My intention, however, is to identify a certain 
moment in time with which to reference a trend of enculturalisation in the formation of 
Jordan.  
 
The first two sections start from a literature review on the progress of colonial and national 
events in Jordan. The third section on the enculturalisation of development is based on 
collected fieldwork material. This chapter thus represents an attempt to merge political 
science and anthropology.15 
 
                                                      
15 Lisa Wedeen (2002) made an explicit attempt to bring anthropology and political science together by 
introducing a new understanding of “culture” with an anthropological approach for political analysis.  
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3.1 The colonial difference 
A defining moment came with the British decision to separate the mandates of 
Palestine and of Transjordan; at last, the periphery was to become a centre in its 
own right. (Robins, 2004: 16) 
 
Jordan, or more precisely Transjordan, emerged from the map, literally as well as 
metaphorically, as part of the British mandate for Palestine established by the Cairo 
conference in 1921 and officially by the League of Nations in 1922.16 Transjordan had been 
administered as a separate entity within the united area of the Palestinian mandate state, but 
in 1923 it was designated as a single mandate territory. With Transjordan as an additional 
mandate area to be governed, a ruling system became necessary. Amir Abdullah, who 
arrived from Hijaz in Jordan in 1920, received recognition as head of Transjordan after a few 
years of jurisdiction over the new mandate (Robins, 2004: 36-37). With his appointment, the 
Hashemite lineage was secured for the throne of Transjordan. Before the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan could be realised, however, many challenges laid ahead for the newly 
appointed Amir and his colonial allies, in particular the need to establish control over the 
wilderness east of the Jordan River. As Michael Fischbach (2000) indicates, this colonial rule 
was not the first encounter with a form of governance for the peoples of Transjordan. 
Nevertheless, the inhabitants of the territory, ranging from settled farmers to nomadic 
Bedouin, had to be placed under the colonial apparatus.17  
 
An important challenge was that of how to create and manage a political community that 
would relate to the future state of Jordan and recognise the sovereignty of colonial or 
national rule? Certain issues during the early inception of Transjordan – the constant threat 
of tribal raids from Saudi-Wahhabi raiders,18 mainly from the east and south borders, and the 
armed Bedouin tribes within the territory – led the British to take decisions that could 
simultaneously serve a variety of purposes. The Arab Legion, founded in 1923 from existing 
police and military forces brought together by Amir Abdullah and British commander 
Frederick G. Peake, lost much of its competence during the ensuing years and was not able 
                                                      
16 Already in 1915, it was agreed that Britain would gain control of Transjordan in the then secret 
agreement referred to as the Sykes-Picot treaty that awarded to Britain and France the duty of 
recognition and protectorship of the ‘independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States, as the 
soon-to-be ex-Ottoman Arab lands were referred to in the opening clause.  
 http://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/9781851171507.php 
17 Nomadic Bedouins constituted almost half (46 percent) of the Transjordanian population in 1922, 
numbering 102,120 people out of a total of 225,350, according to the estimates of the Tribal 
Administration Department (Niyabat al-‘Asha’ir). (Massad, 2001: 56) 
18 See Bocco & Tell (1994) 
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to deal with the armed Bedouins. Thus, what proved to be a very effective measure was 
introduced: John Bagot Glubb, or Glubb Pasha, well known for his experience with 
(pacifying) Iraqi Bedouins, was called to Transjordan. When he arrived in 1930, he installed 
the Desert Patrol as part of the Arab Legion (Massad, 2001: 105). Its original task was the 
defence of the Saudi border, but the integration into the army of the Bedouin population co-
opted them into the colonial system for the control both of their own population and the 
general Bedouin population of the Mandatory-Hashemite state. Joseph Massad detailed the 
figure of Glubb Pasha as the embodiment of (British) colonialism in Jordan.19  
 
Of course the British generally were not as keen on the Bedouin population as was Glubb, 
but his decennia-long quest to normalise this segment of the Transjordanian population 
engendered an image of the colonial ‘other’ that was required to become the genuine 
Transjordanian man: ‘In that, Glubb’s project entailed molding the Bedouin’s body and mind 
into something new... His body was to become the national body’ (Massad, 2001: 117- 118). 
While Glubb’s colonial colleagues preferred to emphasise the a-modernity of the Bedouin 
population, Glubb himself gave great importance to the cultural difference.  
 
The approach to dealing with this distinct segment of the population was extremely gendered 
and characterised by racialisation. Above all, the Bedouin were conceived as radically 
different from settled men and women. It was not that Glubb ‘created’ a Bedouin culture; 
rather, he selected certain characteristics and promoted these as the typical Bedouin 
features, their distinguishing qualities. The chosen traits included such aspects as loyalty, 
attire and knowledge, those, in fact, that suited a military identity, as part of the army. The 
Bedouin could be sent out into the desert to create peace there and among themselves. This 
cultural difference helped Jordan to obtain and maintain control over newly gained territory in 
its first decades, but in later years would become a means to differentiate Jordan as a 
national entity and the people inside its established boundaries.  
 
Obviously, the creation of the special Bedouin army force does not represent the entire 
history of the Mandatory-Hashemite state, but it reflects the integration of ‘cultural difference’ 
into political processes, in the creation of a colonial or national state. Arjun Appadurai (1996) 
would call this process ‘culturalism’, which he defines very clearly and insightfully as ‘the 
conscious mobilization of cultural difference in the service of a larger national or transnational 
politics’ (Appadurai, 1996:15). Appadurai works with the notion of culturalism in the context of 
                                                      
19 Interestingly, Glubb was himself unaware of the way that he embodied the colonial system that he 
actually despised. His obsession with keeping the Bedouins in their ‘purest’ state made him ignorant of 
the fact that through his peculiar relationship with his beloved Bedouin, a relationship developed that 
gave him power over them, and thus facilitated the rule of colonial law (Massad, 2001: 15). 
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group mobilisation by a conscious identity politics. Such culturalist movements work very 
consciously with identity and culture with the aim of opposing state or other culturalist 
movements (Appadurai, 2005: 15). This can be related to the way the Bedouin population 
was appropriated by the British mandatory apparatus, based on specific characteristics, with 
the aim of mobilising them to serve the Mandatory-Hashemite state against potential outside 
threats. As Massad observes, the incorporation of the Bedouin moulded them as symbolic 
entities that would both represent and protect the new state. 
 
Schwedler’s examples of initiatives such as ‘We are all Jordan’ are very concrete and current 
illustrations of the creation of the idealised citizen. In such initiatives, there is a strong 
emphasis on erasing difference among the populace and a demand for it to take an active, 
individual responsibility in fashioning a united Jordan. During the mandate period, however; it 
was rather the (selective) difference of the Bedouin population that was underlined. At the 
same time though, while the difference was placed as central, the Bedouins were 
incorporated in a colonial system that required their material adaptation and integration (or, 
more strongly, assimilation). And ultimately, regardless of whether the difference between 
populations is emphasised or denied, at the level of discourse and eventually in practice it 
has the same function of establishing an idea or representation of the state and its citizens. 
In actual fact, the level of differentiation of the population has fluctuated through time (below).  
 
Within the theoretical literature this differentiation has been conceptually translated in a 
variety of ways. Pertinently, one is to be found in Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism, with its 
analysis of the use of ‘othering’ as a way to divide (between the Occident and the Orient) and 
the deployment of this division to legitimate (colonial) rule. The culturalism that Appadurai 
describes I perceive as inherent to Orientalism generally and to the colonial rule of the British 
mandate in particular:  
 
Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to 
engage in the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts. 
(Said, 1978: 72)  
 
Although Said sometimes questioned Foucault’s methods, his remark is very Foucauldian.20 
The process of integrating the Bedouin population into the Mandated state may be seen an 
                                                      
20  See e.g. Said (1972) for a critique, but against that, Said (1978: 23). 
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example of a governmentality technology of biopolitics.21 ‘Biopolitics’ is here understood in 
terms of technologies that aim to ‘normalise’ populations. The integration of the Bedouin 
population into the army, for example, had a significant impact on their nomadic way of living. 
Nomadism had to be abandoned for the Bedouin population to become proper citizens. 
Within the proposals to settle nomads there is a clear discourse pronouncing the difference 
between nomads (the primitive, implicitly tribal) and modern man (the civilised, implicitly 
national). The notion of biopolitics in Foucault’s work refers to the emergence of a specific 
(political) knowledge and of new disciplines, such as statistics, demography and 
epidemiology. These forms of discipline make it possible to analyse processes of life at the 
level of populations and to ‘govern’ individuals and collectives by practices of correction, 
exclusion, normalisation, disciplining, therapeutics and optimisation (Lemke, 2010: 431). By 
deciphering nomadism as Bedouins in statistics on literacy, demography, health and suchlike 
the ‘othering’ is clarified, given substance and thus enabled as object to be applied in 
governance.  
 
In the progress of the formation of the state of Jordan, even until today, the main rationale of 
enumerating was to enhance the improvement of the population inhabiting the state territory. 
Classical ways of implementing the rationale of improvement comprise involvement in 
housing, medical care and schooling. Although its aim is improvement, the question also to 
be posed is that of whom the improvement will benefit. In the end, Transjordan was a 
colonial project, whereby parts of the badia were perceived as the embodiment of 
‘otherness’. As Timothy Mitchell states, the non-West must play the role of the outside, the 
otherness that creates the boundary of the space of modernity’ (Mitchell T., 2000: 16). The 
control gained over the badia was a victory over the other through its incorporation and made 
the badia part of the new modern state of Jordan.  
 
After a long journey towards independence, in May 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
was declared independent, with Amir Abdullah as its monarch. Nevertheless’ although 
Jordan was ostensibly freed of its colonial administration in 1946, the colonial difference 
remains. This is entirely logical if we look at how Partha Chatterjee (1993) introduced the 
notion of colonial difference:  
 
[T]he representation of the ‘other’ as inferior and radically different, and hence 
incorrigibly inferior, is not only in relation between countries or nations but also 
                                                      
21 Biopolitics, biopower and governmentality have had a life of their own since being introduced by 
Foucault; the first two of which he never fully deployed but have definitely found their way since into 
multi-disciplinary studies.  
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within populations that the modern institutions of power presume to have normalized 
into a body of citizens endowed with equal and non-arbitrary rights (Chatterjee, 
1999:33).  
 
A colonial power such as the British Empire neither entered places that were unwritten 
pages, nor left without trace, although the British might sometimes have perceived this 
otherwise. Jordan, carrying the epithet of the backyard of Palestine or Syria, was mainly 
albeit definitely not exclusively inhabited by a nomadic population that would serve as a good 
object for colonial integration. Jordan was, in the words of Homi Bhabha (1994: 246), the 
terra incognita or the terra nulla22 that provided a human resource to safeguard the newly 
defined borders and population. 
 
The notions of ‘culturalism’, ‘orientalism’, ‘biopolitics’ and ‘colonial difference’ offer many 
(perhaps too many) ways to help us understand certain characteristics of government, in this 
case colonialism but including its later forms. Nevertheless, they all point at the power of the 
idea of culture that is predominantly articulated in terms of difference. This basis of 
governance is not only to be conceived of as directed towards the past, to the initial colonial 
establishment of nation and state, but is also of undeniable importance for the analysis of 
other historical and present-day dynamics in Jordan. The further development of Jordan as 
an independent state is still needed to protect its borders and population. In its early days, 
under King Abdullah, Jordan had a difficult time differentiating itself from the former British 
mandate and finding distinctive positions oriented towards neighbouring countries (Al 
Mahadin 2007). Indeed, the struggles Jordan had to overcome in its transition towards 
independence and beyond imply a notion of post-colonial material realities, I would argue, 
that is to be understood as a continuation of colonialism after decolonisation, and not as a 
break in time. Massad perceives colonialism similarly as a continuous process: 
 
After the end of formal colonialism, national identities and cultures in the postcolonies 
are not only modes of resistance to colonial power, they are also the proof of 
colonialism’s perpetual victory over the colonized. The irony of this is in having us 
believe that this colonial subjection and subjectivation is anticolonial agency. 
(Massad, 2001: 278) 
 
From the literature, it becomes clear that the first attempts of Abdullah I to find his and 
Jordan’s place in the region were very much rooted in the Mandate period. The British 
powers were still beside him after 1946 and the idea of a united Palestine-Jordan territory 
                                                      
22 See Homi Bhabha, The location of culture, (Bhabha,1994:246) 
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continued to be on the table.23 Obviously the latter objective became particularly sensitive 
following the occurrence of the Nakba in 1947-48 and subsequent political rearrangements of 
neighbouring countries vis à vis the new state of Israel and its alliance, leading to an 
atmosphere that was only to become more tense after deadly attacks by extremist Jewish 
groups against Palestinian villagers. The ambiguous relationship of Abdullah with the Jewish 
Agency did not create the most comfortable position for him at that time. Despite the heavy 
losses of the 1948-49 war and subsequent displacement of Palestinians to neighbouring 
countries, for King Abdullah I the war ended with the fulfilment of his dream: the unification of 
the west and east banks of the River Jordan.  
 
3.2 The Bedouin as national symbol and the significant other 
The unification of the banks (and the later disengagement from the West Bank) engendered 
a lasting discourse on ‘Who is Jordanian?’ within which the different segments of the 
population have been accorded different and shifting positions. The disputed integration of 
the West Bank in 1950 into Jordanian territory also implied a need for the integration of the 
Palestinian population. The population tripled after the inclusion, with Palestinians living 
before 1948 in Central Palestine, the previous reference for the West Bank, and displaced 
Palestinians who moved to the East Bank between 1948 and 1952, who were assigned 
Jordanian nationality.  
 
The annexation and assignment of nationality occurred when Abdullah I was still ruling. After 
his assassination in 1951 and a year of rule by his son Talal, Hussein – Talal’s oldest son – 
ascended the throne. Hussein inherited a newborn nation that had not yet found its internal 
balance or outwards position. There were many challenges for the newly established (and 
extended) kingdom, both internal and external. These challenges led King Hussein to move 
towards a phase of pluralist politics, within which different population groups were accorded 
more or less prominence depending on the nature of the emerging threat. King Hussein ruled 
for almost five decades and had to redirect his position continuously in the face of many 
‘potential threatening situations’. With a foiled coup d’état in 1957 (the first of several 
attempts), spearheaded from inside the palace, Hussein took severe measures introducing 
martial law to ‘bring to an end the turbulent experience of pluralist politics in the kingdom’ 
                                                      
23 Abdullah was aiming more precisely for an Arab Palestinian territory. This is all to be understood in 
the context of the cotemporaneous process of Zionism, leading to the partition of historical Palestine 
into Israeli (Jewish) and Arab (Jordanian, Palestinian) regions. Abdullah’s aspiration was for the 
unification of the west (part of the Arab regions) and east banks of the Jordan River.  
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(Robins, 2004: 101).24 Although normal political practices were put on hold, there was still a 
political apparatus acting upon the formation of the new country.   
 
The rise of nationalism in Jordan during this period presents an example of a process both 
guiding and guided national and regional forces and events. Like other nascent, post-colonial 
states in the Middle East – and Asia and Africa too, for that matter (Massad, 2001: 165) – 
Jordan had to negotiate different forms of nationalism that were active in its territory, notably 
including one strand that was more cultural, negatively oriented as anti-colonial and anti-
Western, and another that was more ethnically based, on the negative definer of an 
exclusiveness towards Palestinians, and which favoured relations with Western allies. These 
inherently competing forms developed even as Arab nationalism was flourishing and 
contested in neighbouring countries, mainly Egypt and Syria. After the ’57 coup and 
subsequently, the implementation of the martial law, the anti-Western form of nationalism 
was side-lined. The nationalism that Abdullah had supported – a politically oriented 
nationalism supporting connections to the old colonial powers – was reinstalled in the palace. 
Within this context, the United States were embraced as an ally of the Jordanian monarchy.  
 
Hussein’s main goal at that time was to create a feeling of harmony among his diverse 
populations. As Massad points out (2001: 200), Hussein tried to introduce a balanced 
representation of different population segments among the positions of power in the military 
and government. A strategy of group co-optation and playing off opposing individuals was 
implemented to put down any possible threat. Regardless of how hard Hussein tried to keep 
his entourage under strict surveillance, however, he could not prevent (street) protests, 
particularly after Israeli insurgencies in border villages.  
 
3.2.1 The new significant other 
By creating an imaginary but significant ‘other’, an identity is created, specified in 
contradistinction, by what the other is not.25 Said (1978: 2) illustrates this othering by 
illustrating how European colonialism created an Orient that was necessary to position the 
European powers as the superior in respect of the Orient, to help define Europe (or the 
West).26 Under King Hussein, the Bedouin and Palestinian populations were simultaneously 
                                                      
24 Under martial law, a temporary military government was established until November 1958. Martial 
law was again introduced in 1967, following the Arab/Israeli war (Brynen, 1992: 77). 
25 My appreciation to Kris Rutten for pointing out that this is actually the case for any form of 
nationalism; with reference to Benedict Anderson (1983) and Michael Billig (1995) 
26 This creation had material implications but was also accompanied with a powerful discourse. For the 
Occident, the Orient is a part of itself, but one (that) which had stagnated and remained fixed in 
another time. The Bedouin population is regularly represented as the Oriental.  
On the issue of culture 
 58 
deployed as both the ‘glue’ and yet also the other of society. As the ‘original’ inhabitants of 
the land, the Bedouin were (presented/regarded) as its ‘natural’ inheritors and represented 
as the nation with which the young and still fragile state was (to be) identified. At the same 
time, however, the nomadic lifestyle, history of banditry and allegiance to tribe cast them in 
the role of threatening outsiders. 
  
Attempts to keep the balance in Jordanian society came to a peak after the loss of the 1967 
war and then the civil war of 1970.27 Although the civil war reawakened the sense of internal 
threat (i.e. from Palestinians) and brought distrust and division (as well as death and 
militarisation), it also reinforced Jordanian national identity (Massad, 2001: 208).28 Through 
this process, the Bedouins were once again represented as the true and loyal Jordanians 
and soldiers. The concept of ‘the Jordanian Bedouin’ had been manufactured during the 
Mandate, but it remained accessible for the purposes of stability in times of need and still 
sufficiently malleable for adaption to changing circumstances. Notably also, Massad (2001: 
207) shows that at a certain point in the civil war, the distinction between Palestinian and 
Bedouin soldiers became gendered: Palestinian soldiers were ‘womanised’, meaning, 
portrayed as the weaker sex. 
 
After the civil war, nationalism grew more influential in the formation of Jordanian identity. 
The exceptional status of the Bedouin population as representative of the Jordanian tradition 
gradually weakened. In the post-civil war context, two factors in particular pushed this 
weakening. On the one hand, the tribal law was abolished in 1976, an abolition that brought 
the Bedouins into the social order as ‘non-alien’ citizens. On the other hand, the Palestinian 
presence on the East Bank gained the status as primary national security danger, requiring a 
stronger national or ‘indigenous’ counterweight. The decision to disengage from the West 
Bank in 1988 caused Palestinian Jordanians who living there to lose their Jordanian 
nationality or else receive a two-year Jordanian passport (Massad,2001:262). While Jordan’s 
rulers had lost political capital among Arabs for its war with the PLO following upon its 
Western orientation, an especially important trigger in reinforcing a nationalist discourse and 
policies was the Zionist insinuation that ‘Jordan is Palestine’.  
 
                                                      
27 ‘Black September’, fought between Palestinians – who, with refugees, by then outnumbered the 
‘native’ population by 2:1 – led by the PLO under Arafat against the (Trans-)Jordanians under 
Hussein. Final ‘victory’ was for the Hashemite lineage.  
28 The rhetoric of ‘One Jordan’ was – as it still is, in many ways – that of an imagined unity, as much 
persuasive ideology as descriptive dogma; also among ‘indigenous’ Jordanians, there was a tension 
between Jordanian nationalists and pan-Jordanians (although both segments had a rather exclusive 
vision towards Palestinians, and even for the pan-Jordanians, in favour of a unification of the two 
banks, Amman was to remain the centre of power (Robin, 2004: 135). 
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In the effort to create a united (in both demographic and geographic terms) Jordanian nation-
state out of the Ottoman and British colonial heritage, the ruling monarch and his political 
entourage ruled according to difference, that is, by creating a necessary other. The Bedouin 
population was first targeted to fill this role. This served, as illustrated, both the process of 
settlement/pacification and as an imagined reflection of a Jordanian tradition. As a second 
significant other, the Palestinian represented on the one hand the unification of the two 
banks and the possibility to live as one nation, and on the other hand became labelled as a 
potential threat to the harmony (and original identity) of the nation. Many more different 
population groups inhabit the territory of what is today Jordan, including immigrant 
populations ranging from the descendants of Russian/Ottoman incomers escaping 
oppression and persecution and more recent economic migrants, such as semi-skilled 
workers from Egypt and southern Asian countries. All contributed to and are called upon for 
the creation of contemporary Jordan, but it is predominantly the Bedouin and Palestinian 
groups that are represented in history as threats to a nation built upon still recent colonial 
and very much imagined foundations. 
 
3.2.2 Modalities of culturalisation 
As originally formulated by Foucault, governmentality, as a form of power exercised over 
populations, assumes the frame of the nation-state (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002: 996). 
Governmentality as a Foucauldian notion opens up an instructive perspective on the 
genealogy of Jordan. Although the two kings, Abdullah and Hussein, were of pivotal 
importance in the formation of Jordan, they were not the single modalities of power. Many 
other modalities have contributed to the continuous change of Jordan over time. These 
different forms of power have existed inside and outside Jordan; the colonial legacy and the 
long-lasting post-colonial relations with the British and later, especially, relations with 
international financial institutions are very concrete forms of power to which the head of the 
nation has many times had to bow.  
 
Both Abdullah and Hussein tried to fulfil their vision of how the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
should look. As noted, this process has involved practices of othering and biopolitics, 
especially in the formation of the Bedouin soldiers and the strategy to divide population into 
Jordanians and non-Jordanians, while the ambiguous relationship between Jordan and 
historical Palestine and Palestine’s displaced inhabitants within Jordan further marked the 
Jordanian process of state formation. As time progressed towards the late 1980s, a different 
governmental tool incorporating the idea of culture became installed, referred to by Anna 
Tsing (2000) as graduated sovereignty.  
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Tsing used this concept to analyse the relation between states and global markets. Her focus 
is on how states respond by activating or deactivating their different population segments 
according to the states’ possible connections to global markets. In the case of Jordan, it 
became very clear after 1989 how Jordan tried or was forced to connect to global markets 
and corresponding powers. The several agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) set the stage for a more business 
attractive environment (below), with economic and political reforms (i.e., in essence, reducing 
the state). After the IMF agreements (from 1989 until 2002), Jordan also entered into a Free 
Trade Agreement (2000) with the United States, became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (2000), created Qualified Industrial Zones, and engaged with other neoliberal 
oriented programmes and policies (bint Talal, 2004: 81).  
 
These arrangements were intended to pull Jordan upwards on the economic ladder that in 
international terms converts also into geo-political power. Although the loans and 
agreements are centred on a generalised progress or development, a critique of this 
approach would argue that generally the main benefactors are few: trickle down is just that, a 
trickle. Nevertheless, the state sanctioned message of and for the national ideal is clear 
enough: a good citizen is an entrepreneurial citizen. From this perspective, inclusion or 
exclusion depends on what one contributes to Jordan’s economic progress, regardless of, for 
example, ethnicity – so, pertinently here, no matter if citizens are Palestinian or Jordanian. In 
the preceding decades, by contrast, certain segments of society (i.e. the Bedouins and 
Palestinians) with the potential to connect to a broader economy had been deployed as 
secondary citizens (the Bedouin population in a more ambiguous way, to set and manage 
the boundaries of the new state of Jordan). Despite the partial erasure of difference between 
the various identities of Jordanian citizenry and the focus on what people can contribute 
personally to the development of the country (cf. ‘We are all Jordan), any ‘incapacity’ to 
contribute especially in economic terms may be translated in cultural (ethnic) terms.  
 
In the last part of this chapter, I elaborate on this culturalisation of development in the 
present era of neoliberalism, when the ambiguous position of the Bedouins becomes once 
more visible. On the one hand, the Bedouins are (depicted as) the last of the inhabitants of 
modern Jordan to be connected to the global market, while on the other, they are the last 
carriers of the authentic Jordanian tradition. In a peculiar way, one position does not exclude 
the other in neoliberal strategies.  
 
3.3 Culturalisation of development 
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The development of Jordan as an independent state has been an uneven one, undoubtedly 
influenced by a range of regional dynamics, including the emergence of strong national 
movements and advent of wars (civil, Arab-Israeli and the Gulf) – as well as, more recently 
the Arab Spring and Syrian conflict. While the various nationalisms have affected Jordanian 
political dynamics, as outlined (above), the wars have resulted in successive influxes of 
refugees, along with the return of émigrés, leading to a host of economic and social 
pressures, together with, of course, attendant political repercussions. During the 1970s, the 
booming years of the oil business in the region that had been so crucial in defining external 
state and private interest and influence, started to slow down. Just as Jordan had benefited 
from the regional prosperity, so also was the country hit by the economic slowdown. Finally, 
Jordan agreed with the IMF to commence an SAP.  
 
The 1989-93 SAP I aimed at ‘correcting the main structural imbalances in both the balance of 
payments and general budget while maintaining a reasonable growth’ (bint Talal, 2004: 71). 
For the first time, poverty assessments were conducted in the country and development 
funds installed. Around the same time, the restrictions on political liberties that had been in 
force since the mid-1950s were eased. It was, no doubt, hoped that budget management 
would bring Jordan back on the track of internal fiscal stability and economic prosperity. 
Unfortunately this did not occur. The Gulf war interrupted the process and the rigid focus on 
cutting, privatisation and competition (bint Talal, 2004: 81). Economic development 
stagnated and went even into reverse. Reactions by the people occurred in the form of riots 
due to cuts in wheat, oil and fodder subsidies (Pfeifer, 1999: 26; Lucas, 2003: 139). Thus, 
ascending to the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II determined to extend Hussein’s steps to 
liberalise Jordan, and it is in this context that attention is focused specifically on the Bedouins 
from the southern area Wadi Araba.  
 
The southern portion of Wadi Araba is a very particular Bedouin area, and it would be 
misleading to present it and people as representative for other Bedouin areas. It is 
undoubtedly, a fascinating setting in which to observe the interaction of the historical role(s) 
of the Bedouins in the creation of Jordan within the context of the current neoliberal push for 
socio-economic development. Most interesting here is that the interaction has resulted in a 
double discourse on ‘the Bedouin case’. What to do with a people that is still living remote 
from ‘modernity’ but also embodies the national (living) heritage? This general tenor 
observed among (development) actors concerned with Wadi Araba is not unique to this case.  
 
After periods of colonisation and imperialism and the urge to civilise and then modernise the 
rest of the world, there seems to be an increasing need from the West now to conserve what 
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is referred to by words such as ‘local’, indigenous’, ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’. This creates an 
almost schizophrenic situation: everybody should be as modern as ‘us’, but it would also be a 
pity to lose the exotic features and abundant variety of the world. It reminds one of the 
creation of zoos or world exhibitions (Mitchell T., 1991), but now the spectators travel to view 
on location, in the authentic environmental setting rather than bring the samples and 
specimens to the (colonial) homeland. And certainly also, it recalls the nineteenth century 
origins of anthropology, impelled by the (perceived) necessity of cataloguing the types of 
Man before the natives were extinguished (and when, indeed, ‘primitives’ were brought back 
for viewing at world fairs and anthropological society meetings).  
 
In a popular Belgian magazine published in 2012 one could read an interview with an ethno-
photographer who travelled the world to capture the world’s last traditions on film in a project 
entitled Before They Pass Away.  
 
Before They Pass Away is a tribute to what almost doesn’t exist anymore. Not the 
people… they are still there. But their traditional way of living is disappearing visibly. 
Eighty percent of the people I visited have a cell phone. The world is moving, those 
peoples move along. In that transition everybody wants to become like us. They don’t 
realise that their traditional appearance is unique and exceptional. (DM Magazine, 
2012: 36)29 
 
This whole magazine article is repeating what Mamdani (2005) would call ‘culture talk’.30 It 
places ‘us’ outside of culture and beyond tradition, implying that ‘we’ are somehow no longer 
traditional or cultural. Robbins (2001) similarly illustrates the current interest of international 
donors ‘in the cultural survival of vanishing cultures and languages’ (quoted by Sylvain, 2005: 
362). This illustrates, as Mallki points out, ‘wildlife’ and the indigenous as an object of inquiry 
and imagination, in which that of the anthropologist is but an expression of a more 
generalised cultural relationship, expressed for the naturalist, the environmentalist, and the 
tourist (Mallki, 1997: 59) – a list that also includes, of course, the development agency. 
 
Returning to the case at hand, we recall that in the creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, the Bedouin population has served variously as a protection force against cross-
border invasions (by Glubb), as a mirror of the traditional Jordanian (in respect to 
modernising nationalism) and as the last ‘backward’ population (in respect to the recent 
                                                      
29 Author’s translation. 
30 The core assumption [of cultural talk] is that we can read some people’s politics – the politics of 
those who are not “modern” – from their culture, for culture is not something that they make; rather, it 
is their culture that makes them (Mamdani, 2005: 96). 
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move to neoliberalism). The representation of the Bedouin population has moved between 
‘wild man’ and ‘noble savage’. Besides their discursive deployment as definitional symbols, 
the Bedouins are also today pushed further towards a mainstream way of living by concrete 
measures. The following sections will illustrate this with and for Wadi Araba, where mainly 
small but also larger scale socio-economic and infrastructural initiatives have been and are 
being implemented to enhance this socio-economic ‘progress’. Without condemning the 
projects, the main argument presented is that these initiatives are always situated in a 
specific landscape – here, that of Wadi Araba – and are never purely technical interventions. 
The idea of culture is strongly merged within the discourse and practices of development for 
socio-economic purposes that are inevitably framed in the political and, as such, in and by 
the governance of targeted development areas. 
 
3.3.1 More bang for the buck 
The development projects related to Wadi Araba are designed to bring progress into the 
target area, which is described predominantly in terms of ‘lack’. Unsurprisingly, the projects 
have not always been perceived as successes in remedying this lack. Often the slow 
progress of a project to alleviate the situation is charged on ‘the Bedouin culture’. Simply, the 
backward culture is not sufficiently amenable to modernisation, at least not at the single 
project level of input (a much more profound and extended intervention is necessary if these 
people are going to be able to be helped to help themselves). The association between 
culture and progress is not unique to development planners’ of course, and nor is it new; 
indeed, this linkage also goes back to early colonial times. And although one could argue 
that this theme is as such is somewhat outdated, not to say obsolete, I would contend to the 
contrary that this theme is still present, and that it still needs to be addressed.  
 
Samuel Huntington is probably the best-known political scientist concerned to relate 
(political) progress and culture. For Lisa Wedeen, Huntington embodied a division of the 
political sciences that uses culture as an analytical concept to underpin the cause of 
‘differences in political and economic development’ (Huntington, 1993, quoted in Wedeen, 
2002: 715). Huntington has been very outspoken in his perception of the role of culture in the 
formation of the different civilisations and their stages of development, but one can also find 
more subtle literature with the same rationale. An article entitled ‘Cultural Context: Explaining 
the Productivity of Capitalism’ (Mathers & Williamson, 2011) is an example. Starting from the 
premise that economic institutions, such as private property, rule of law and contract 
enforcement are critical for economic growth and development, and focusing on 
incorporating the role of culture into an understanding of the success and failure of economic 
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institutions, the argument is made that ‘there are certain cultural attributes that either 
encourage or discourage institutions associated with economic freedom’, and that ‘the 
success or failure of formal economic institutions depends on the preexisting informal rules, 
or culture’ (Mathers & Williamson, 2011:232).  
 
The more interesting part of this article addresses the way in which economic freedom and 
culture are quantified. Specifically, the categories derived from the Economic Freedom of the 
World Index and the European and World Values Surveys comprise size of government, 
legal structure and security of private property rights, freedom to trade with foreigners, 
regulation of credit, labour and business and access to sound money; culture is downsized to 
trust, respect, individual self-determination and obedience (Mathers & Williamson, 2011: 
235). These components, the authors argue, create the legitimacy for capitalism: ‘Capitalism 
may be more productive in countries with cultures more compatible with capitalistic values, 
meaning that we get “more bang for the buck” (Mathers & Williamson, 2011: 247). 
 
A similar argument is employed as a rationale for development interventions. One could 
expect that it is almost obvious that the different contexts in which people live –culture’, we 
may say – have an influence on how certain forms of economics’ like capitalism and 
neoliberalism, evolve. The push for economic development in Jordan, especially after the 
SAPs agreed with the IMF, represents a further extension of the neoliberal path.31 The 
capitalist model generally is not only a macro-economic framework, but also an approach 
wherein personal development or success becomes a personal matter and within which the 
development imperative affords little space for the communal (the localised specifics of 
political history or social context).32 Thus, the neoliberal model to which King Abdullah II 
currently aspires affects the inhabitants of Wadi Araba; they ‘meet’ neoliberalism mainly in 
the shape of projects that encourage entrepreneurship preceded by programmes that 
stimulate ‘mentality change’.   
 
3.3.2 The participating Bedouin 
Worldwide, it may be argued, the withdrawal of the state in the neoliberal regime has led to 
the creation of a vacuum, especially with regard to socio-economic issues. This has been 
particularly noticeable in non-rich countries, unblessed by a historically embedded skein of 
                                                      
31 The different SAP moments started from a reducing of state budget, creating investment climate, 
increasing domestic revenues to structural reforms, reducing macroeconomic imbalances further into 
rearranging tax system and increasing privatisation. (Knowles, 2005: 92-102) The  
32 For interesting insights into the culturalisation effect of the international development machinery 
generally, see Watts (2006). 
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charitable foundations. In these states, NGOs were ‘conceptualized as a viable alternative’ to 
take over some of the socioeconomic functions previously fulfilled by central government 
(Wiktorowicz, 2002: 79). 
 
In Jordan, a special kind of NGO primarily fulfils this role, the royal NGOs (RONGOs) – 
NGOs, that is, with a member of the royal family as president.33 Several RONGOs are 
currently active in Wadi Araba, notably the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development (JOHUD, headed by Princess Basma), the Jordan River Foundation (JRF, with 
Queen Rania as president) and the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN, no 
royal president since the death of King Hussein), of which the latter, the JRF and the RSCN, 
have the main presence in the area. The RSCN and implications of its presence are 
elaborated on in Chapter 5; here, the JRF is briefly discussed, as an interesting case (JRF 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4 and 5).  
 
The JRF is what may be termed a ‘supply’ NGO, one that fulfils those functions – some, at 
least – from which the state has withdrawn (Clark, 1997; Wiktorowicz, 2002: 83). The JRF is 
active in projects related to children (supporting kindergartens, play areas, schools), women 
(schooling, handcrafts), and ‘the poor’ (agricultural projects, water provision, cooperative 
support). The target groups of the JRF are actually those most affected by the neoliberal turn 
taken at the end of the 1990s. After a nationwide poverty assessment conducted by the 
Jordanian government with the World Bank in 2002, twenty parts of the country were 
designated as ‘Poverty Pockets’, areas in which the rate of poverty was measured at above 
25%. Many questions can be formulated about the method of the assessment and its aims, 
but the result was the provision of extra financial resources for the selected areas, to be 
redistributed through appointed NGOs. With poverty assessed at over 53%, Wadi Araba was 
designated as one of these Pockets (Personal communication, 2011), and with 
administration of the extra budget to be managed mostly through the JRF.  
 
This is top-down approach to aid, an old way of imposing projects on people that has, 
according to the organisations involved, been challenged by internal criticism. As an outcome 
of these struggles, the JRF has adopted a new method of participation (personal 
communication, 2010). Now, the JRF tries to capture the needs and challenges faced by 
communities through participatory practices. The following two chapters (4 and 5) devote 
more space to the idea of participation; here, of more importance is the perception of Wadi 
Araba as a starting point for project implementation and evaluation.  
                                                      
33 Clearly, these NGOs may be criticised on several grounds, including their less than ideal standards 
of independence and transparency, but this is not a matter considered here. 
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The JRF development interventions for Wadi Araba have been spread over different phases 
and according to the different needs of the three sub-areas into which the JRF divided Wadi 
Araba. In the different sub-areas of Wadi Araba, the JRF is active with a cluster program that 
employs certain aims and methods: 
 
This program aims to promote citizen participation in addressing critical needs for the 
economic and social revitalization of rural community life. (JRF, 2013) 
 
The inclusion of local community representatives in all project stages was excellent. 
This participation included needs assessment, planning, tendering and awarding 
contracts for services and goods and implementation. Such involvement has 
empowered communities and boosted their self-esteem, as well as enhanced their 
trust in and respect for the implementing organizations. (JRF/MC, 2013)34  
 
Community - within in the JRF program for Wadi Araba the communities are Gharandal, Bir 
Matkhour and Risha - needs are generally expressed in socio-economic terms and 
addressed in terms of a specification of something missing: a lack of vocational skills, job 
opportunities, income-generating projects, marketing skills, and so on. Implicit in this ‘lack 
marking’ is a call for the need to create awareness and self-esteem (in relation to the 
opportunities; projects’ skills’ etc. lacking). This rather unsurprising connection between 
economic productivity and self-esteem is also of some significance (see below).  
 
The JRF is not the only organisation encouraging people to step into the private sector, be it 
as an employee or as entrepreneur. Following the now well-established route of micro-
financing, various other organisations, such as JOHUD, offer loans or grants so people can 
start their own business. The idea is that this will make them less dependent on the 
government as people will make expend more time and energy to make a success of their 
own business. Despite these efforts, rather few people are applying for the money; they 
remain rather reluctant. According to one of the NGO interviewees, people continue to prefer 
governmental employment, which has certain guarantees. The ‘culture of shame’35 together 
with other cultural aspects are said to be important barriers that keep people away from the 
private sector (Personal communication, Amman, 2010).  
 
                                                      
34 ‘MC’ refers to Mercy Corps, an international development organization. At http://www.jordanriver.jo/ 
35 The culture of shame refers to the (assumed) unwillingness of Bedouins or Jordanian (men) in 
general to enact certain work (for example household or construction work) that is not recognised with 
a particular high standard.   
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Relating culture, economic progress and social development with self-esteem is fairly 
standard practice for the NGOs mentioned and their approaches to an area and its 
inhabitants, who are defined as ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘stagnated’ in time (Fabian, 2002). A 
rather cynical situation has been created. The (RO)NGOs are charged with tasks which the 
state has withdrawn from, but, at the same time, they need to keep on reinventing their 
raison d’être by integrating themselves and the ‘targeted’ groups into an economic system 
that has negatively affected those people in the first place.36 
 
I would argue that in the projects enabled by development agencies external to the area 
(national or international), the local people tend to experience the limitations of participation, 
empowerment and economic liberation. Historically, for decades, and into the present, there 
have been restrictions on cross-border and intra-national movement in Jordan generally, 
settlement has been encouraged to the point of enforcement and there remains only limited 
access to land and water for agriculture. More recently, the SAP agreements brought poverty 
assessments, but also accompanied by many austerity measures (for example, cuts in 
subsidies to vital agricultural materials, like animal fodder), which again have negatively 
impacted on existing economies, such as the Bedouins. Without completely abandonment of 
traditional (nomadic related) herding related activities, the Bedouin populations of Wadi 
Araba have arranged their lives accordingly. Most people now mostly actively seek 
agricultural employment in farming activities organised in the form of (mostly) NGO-
supported cooperatives. The details of how these function are thus vital.  
 
Each village in Wadi Araba has at least one functioning agricultural cooperative, and some 
also have a touristic one. On the one hand, agriculture is organised in the form of a 
cooperative that installs a direct form of local management and redistribution of profits; but 
on the other hand, a cooperative is also the only way for people to access agricultural land, 
since individuals are not entitled to cultivate land in Wadi Araba. Some of the (agriculture and 
tourism) cooperatives receive support from the JRF as part of the Wadi Araba Community 
Cluster Development Program, while others do not. Clearly this has been to the 
disadvantage of some of the locally self-established cooperatives, thus replacing the 
undesired dependency on the state that central provisioning nurtures against people’s best 
interests, as it is argued by the anti-command economy approach of neoliberalism, with a 
new, officially sanctioned dependency, on the development agencies ([RO]NGOs).  
 
On the ground, meanwhile, the development programme framework for cooperative-based 
agriculture and tourism has enhanced existing local power relations (see below), while for the 
                                                      
36 On the relation of NGOs and uneven development, see Bebbington (2004).  
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NGOs involved it has functioned as a way to compete with other organisations active in the 
area. As small illustration of this competition, an occurrence during an interview in Amman 
with Jordan River employees may be related. The workers were explaining how they helped 
some of the cooperatives by giving, for example, 4x4 vehicles to the Rashayda tourism 
cooperative of Feynan village. This piece of information was nothing special in itself, except 
that the interviewee underlined that we should make sure to tell this to the RSCN, since they 
were not keen on the tourist project planned by the Rashayda tribe themselves close to the 
protected area of Dana37. The reasons why the RSCN took such a view are less important 
here than the disheartening implications of this for locally based initiatives and communal 
solidarity at the institutional level. Indeed, observation and interviews in the area indicated 
very clearly that movement for change taken by individuals is routinely watched and in 
various ways co-opted, controlled and contained. 
 
During visits to Wadi Araba, one certainly hears that people are not passively waiting for 
opportunities to come to them. Initiatives are also coming from the people themselves, and 
they are actively taking part in the (RO)NGO projects – and if they do not, it is not because 
they do not want to, but because experience has taught them to be careful before allowing 
promises to become hope and expectations as so many surveys and interviews have passed 
that have led to nothing concrete. Nevertheless, the capacities of the people in Wadi Araba 
are not valued very highly. Becoming a farmer or servant is seen as the limit of what can 
reasonably be expected of them (personal communication, 2012). From this perspective 
again, there is considerable room for NGOs and government departments to properly 
legitimise their presence in the area. 
 
3.3.3 The Bedouin as commodity 
As illustrated (above), the ‘Jordanian Bedouin culture’, as it may be termed, has served as a 
national symbol in the creation of an independent Jordan. This was effected in an artificial 
framework where nation and population needed to be adjusted to fit the shifting requirements 
of changing circumstances. Begun in colonial times, these processes of culture construction 
are still at work: 
 
Jordan’s living cultural past carried to the present by the Bedouins is observed not 
only by foreign, mostly European and American tourists, and by other Arabs, but also 
by modern Jordanians themselves. Although on the face of it, Bedouin and modern 
                                                      
37 The Dana reserve, located at the border of Wadi Araba, and its effects for Wadi Araba inhabitants 
will more elaborated in chapter 5 
On the issue of culture 
 69 
Jordanians are living in a synchronic time and in a homologous national space, in 
reality they are not. The Bedouin is produced as a desert tent-dweller living far away 
from urban modernity, and as living in a past time, a traditional time, another time, an 
allochronic time. Her or his geographic location, although nationalized, signifies the 
past history of the nation, which is contrasted with the urban location of modern 
Jordanians where the modern nation is always located. The evolutionary implication 
is that at some point all those who are today identified and identify themselves as 
Jordanians must have lived like the Bedouins in their evolutionary childhood before 
they became modern urban adults. (Massad, 2001: 77) 
 
The most visible way to illustrate this process of culturalisation is in its expression through 
the Jordanian tourist industry. Eco-tourism was established in the Wadi Araba area with the 
implementation of the Dana nature reserve. In the Wadi Feynan (‘old’ Feynan), part of Wadi 
Araba, tourists can spend the night in an eco-lodge, experiencing ‘the most diverse flora and 
fauna in Jordan, where you can unearth the history of an ancient land, and unlock the 
mysteries of native Bedouin life through the warm welcome of this humble native community’.  
 
Among the strategies to promote tourism in Jordan, the staging of Bedouins is indispensable. 
Two of Jordan’s main touristic attractions, Petra and Wadi Rum, are designed to give the 
tourist a sense of living (a performed) ancient history, and the development of it in these 
places only emerged through a complex process of struggle. Some of these struggles seem 
to repeat themselves in Wadi Araba as it grows into a new (eco-) tourist destination. Frictions 
arise between national and local actors, for example, but which are not purely ‘state versus 
society, but involve dynamics in which also aspects of localised strategies of adaptation, 
accommodation and collaboration as dynamic interaction acting both at the local and global 
levels’ (Chatelard, 2005: 197).  
 
This is a key observation related to how a complex of multi-level discourses converge and 
conflict in the developmental synthesis. It indicates, for example, that in these dynamics, the 
Bedouins are not just passive victims of the tourist destination that has been created in their 
areas, and that this introduces the element of localised politics. For example, the few tourist 
cooperatives present in Wadi Araba are working with the eco-lodge or trying to organise their 
own tourist projects, such as campsites; one of them is the aforementioned new campsite at 
Feynan, which has not been encouraged to proceed (for example, by the eco-lodge and the 
RSCN, for reasons about which one might speculate to range from low appraisal of the local 
Bedouin abilities to a simple desire – not without irony – to stifle competition). Nevertheless 
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the people keep on trying to obtain funding for their project, so an ongoing dynamic is in 
motion. 
 
The inhabitants themselves are indeed taking an active role in the development of tourism in 
desert areas, working in staged environments, usually segregated from their own homes 
(village or tent). Of course, we have to be careful not to reduce Bedouin life in Wadi Rum to a 
play: certain things tourists get to see are part of the ‘real’ Bedouin culture, while other 
aspects are displayed to please tourist expectations (Chatelard, 2005).38 While the type of 
tourism stimulated and simulated in the areas of Wadi Araba or Wadi Rum is called ‘eco-
tourism’, it is also a form of ethno-tourism, which has ‘tourists seeking a cultural encounter of 
the anthropological kind’ (Sylvain, 2005: 356). The constructed colonial image of the 
Jordanian Bedouin culture has been reinforced by international donors and organisations, 
(Ro)NGOs, and the state, and is now employed as part of the marketing strategy for tourism 
in Jordan. This strategy is formulated to answer a growing demand to experience ‘the last 
cultures’ before they disappear.39  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The realm of development as a very de-politicised but deeply political practice has been the 
subject of research over recent decades. It has been looked at from very different 
perspectives and approached with a variety of analytical concepts. Here, the (old, little used, 
obsolete even) notion of culture has been invoked and reworked in an analysis of 
development and its historical background. In sum, I argue that culture matters. It is by 
looking at the history of Jordan in its development as a state that the political employment of 
culture comes is exposed. This has been shown most clearly in the institutionalisation of 
development in Jordan.  
 
This chapter has also considered how difference between people is expressed in terms of 
culture and instrumentalised as a governmental tool. Cultural differentiation in a society such 
as Jordan has led to a rather Huntingtonian perception of culture as the key for political and 
                                                      
38 This is sometimes referred to as a ‘strategic essentialism’, whereby imposed identities/cultures are 
employed to ‘secure resources and social, economic and cultural rights’ (Sylvain, 2005: 357). In the 
case of Wadi Araba, the recall of tribal territories has been recently used as a tool to demand access 
to the land (see also Robins, 2001).  
39 In 2012 I was present at the Dana +10 workshop in Jordan where a revision of The Dana 
Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation was worked out. The general tone towards the 
indigenous people was one of ‘purity’. The aim of the workshop and the declaration was  ‘ultimately 
aimed to continue to raise and maintain awareness of the special vulnerabilities and needs of mobile 
indigenous peoples’.  From my perspective this involves a potential to reinforce a conception of mobile 
cultures that pushes recognition rather further into cultural essentialism instead of getting it away from 
it.  
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economic development. Although ‘the Bedouin culture’ has been perceived as a barrier to 
economic development in the badia, it is now incorporated into the neoliberal market ‘as a 
set of material objects and distinctive behaviours’ that can be commodified (Radcliffe, 2006: 
234), and is hence able to contribute to the further economic development of the country and 
enhance its position in the global market. The following two chapters illustrate concerns 
introduced at the end of this one, namely, how attempts to ‘improve’ a population through 
various techniques will always encounter a response from the target population. Just as 
Glubb experienced it during the Mandate period, so do institutions like the Jordan Valley 
Authority and approaches like nature conservation organisation meet this in the present day.  
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 IV. Spatial fantasies and techno-government: rearranging landscape 
and community in Wadi Araba 
 
The desert is landscape degree zero.40 
Will the valley become the prototype of a successful rural development strategy that is 
applicable in other parts of the country, the region, or the world?41 
 
4.1. Imagine Wadi Araba 
It was while driving towards the antique site of Palmyra in Syria in 2010 that I was again 
introduced to the development perspective of this desert landscape. To reach the site, we 
had to pass through a small part of desert, upon entering which, one of my fellow taxi-
passengers expressed her excitement at all the real estate opportunities presented by this 
desolated area. My idea of spatial fantasies42 grew from this, seemingly innocent utterance. 
The discourse on the economic opportunities that a place may offer is typically invoked in the 
language used to describe development in Jordan.43  
 After the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, also known as the Wadi Araba Treaty, ‘opened’ 
the sub-district Wadi Araba. This semi-arid area had previously been a military area. The 
combination of a desert-like place and being part of the Jordan Rift Valley, the idea of making 
the valley bloom regained a place in several planners their imagination. For the whole of 
Jordan, but especially for its southern border area of Wadi Araba, issues related to water 
trigger the fantasies: where there is water, life can arise in an area currently perceived as 
dead.44 
 
When talking about ‘spatial fantasies’ in relation to landscape and community, many different 
notions are at play and need to be taken in consideration, including relations between the 
                                                      
40 W.J.T. Mitchell (2000) referring to R.G. Barthes, Writing Degree Zero (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1967). 
41   Rami Khouri (1981:19)  
42  Homi K. Bhabha also uses the notion of spatial fantasy. The idea introduced here is not inspired by 
this but it definitely relates closely to it. In Bhabha’s conception, there is an attempt to ‘universalize the 
spatial fantasy of modern cultural communities as living their history “contemporaneously”, in a 
”homogeneous empty time” of the People-as-One that finally deprives minorities of those marginal, 
liminal spaces from which they can intervene in the unifying and totalizing myths of the national 
culture’. 
43  Jordan has a strong history of economic zoning, with Qualified Industrial Zones, Special Economic 
Zones and Development Zones. See e.g. Pascal De Bruyne (unpublished doctoral thesis, 2013). See 
also, on zoning technology, Aihwa Ong (2004) 
44  E.g., the ‘Valley of Peace’ project connecting the Red to the Dead Sea.  
See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EzjiYUY82E8 (January 30th, 2013) This project will be 
elaborated in the final chapter 
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two (i.e. landscape and community). Without taking the notion of community for granted and 
with respect to the existing literature, I refer to it here in the context of a critique on its de-
politicised usage with special reference to Nikolas Rose (1999) and Tania Li (1996). The 
issue of ‘landscape’ refers as well to the aligned concepts of space and place whereby the 
latter has gained a central position in anthropological research, mainly in terms of place-
making (Appadurai, 1988; Escobar, 2001; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). Space, on the other 
hand, has been introduced into the (mainly Marxist inspired) human and political geography 
to focus on the idea that a place is more than bounded territory, and that it has political 
relations with other (bounded and unbounded, literal and metaphorical) locations and the 
(human and non-human) constituent parts that inhabit and construct these (Massey 2005; 
Swyngedouw 2001).  
 
Starting from the notion of landscape offers an opportunity to engage with a more profound 
intertwinement of a spatial dimension and its components. The intertwinement that I explore 
relates to Timothy Ingold’s (2000) insight on the relation between landscape and humans.45 
Ingold defines his relational conception of landscape as follows: ‘I believe that such a focus 
might enable us to move beyond the sterile opposition between the naturalistic view of the 
landscape as a neutral, external backdrop to human activities, and the culturalistic view that 
every landscape is a particular cognitive or symbolic ordering of space. I argue that we 
should adopt, in place of both these views, what I have called a “dwelling perspective”, 
according to which the landscape is constituted as an enduring record of – and testimony to 
– the lives and works of past generations who have dwelt within it, and in so doing, have left 
there something of themselves’ (Ingold, 2000:189). I embrace this perspective as very value, 
but with the aim of the chapter I want to develop the range and underline the importance of 
this intertwinement of landscape and community as an arena of power. Ingold expresses his 
perspective on dwelling as an ‘empowermental’ way to achieve a better understanding of, in 
his case, hunters and their environment. In the realm of development, but not restricted to it, 
one can also observe a certain relational idea of people and their environment, but one in 
which the representation of landscape involves also a further representation of its 
inhabitants, as the community. In the case of Wadi Araba, the poor state of the infrastructure 
in the area represents in a development perspective also the people’s state of being. The 
idea goes further that by bringing infrastructure, people’s life will be better. The use of this 
mutual representation as a measure to intervene creates friction, as it does not take into 
                                                      
45 Many other authors also refer to landscape in terms of a relational understanding, but tend to 
maintain a nature-culture distinction and not go beyond this as Ingold does. For example, Moore 
approaches landscape as a mix of what he calls ‘historical sedimented practices’ with an 
‘environmental milieu’, which, in my view serves to reify the nature-culture binary (Moore, 2006). 
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account other perspectives on the relation between landscape and ‘community’. The main 
argument of this chapter, therefore, is that these mutual representations – of community and 
of landscape as an arena of power – should also be introduced into developmental 
intervention, in this case, with regard to Wadi Araba.  
In this chapter, I explore this mutual representation from a perspective on the intersection 
of governable spaces46 and representational spatialisation. The idea is that in development 
practice, actors do not just work with imagined communities but with fantasised ones. The 
difference is that a fantasised community in its relation to landscape (equally fantasised) is 
based on the thought of how it (i.e. nation, culture, community, individual etc.) should be and 
not how one think it is. These fantasies are often expressed through interventions in 
landscape. It is here that we can observe the effects of the triangle of community, landscape 
and power. The component of power will be explained in terms of techno-government. 
Techno-government is a way of governing (not exclusively by the state) by which political 
dilemmas are translated in technical obstacles that require technical solutions; hence, the de-
politicisation of existing realities. This process of de-politicisation has the potential to mute or 
select certain voices to be heard. Accordingly, the creation and re-defining of power relations 
brings Michel Foucault again into the picture.  
 
Despite the amount of existing literature on rural development, the topic of this chapter has 
also grown out of a concern for a trend whereby it is urban areas that are primarily 
addressed in relation to development. Processes of gentrification or upgrading are often – 
entirely correctly – linked up to a simultaneous process of uneven development and its 
(detrimental) effects on a societal level.47 Certainly, the speed of urban transformation is 
profound. I would contend that such theories about improvement or development apply also 
to what are defined as rural areas.48  
                                                      
46 With reference to Nikolas Rose (1999); Mainly his ‘irrealism’ (which is a reality) is ‘technical, not 
psychologistic’. ‘It is technical in so far as it asserts that thought constructs its irreal worlds through 
very material procedures. Thought, that is to say, becomes real by harnessing itself to a practice of 
inscription, calculation and action (Rose, 1999:32) 
47 See for example David Harvey (2006), Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven 
Geographical Development or Neil Smith (2010) Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the 
Production of Space  
48 An interesting debate has been developing on the rural-urban distinction, problematizing, for 
example, the tendency for the rural to be understood in terms of the urban, defined as that which the 
urban is not. An investigation of the category ‘rural’ is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it seems 
clear that we do have to go beyond the inherent rigidity of the simplistic urban-rural distinction to be 
able to grasp the more complex dynamics occurring on the ground. See M. Ozürk, A. Hilton and J. 
Jongerden (forthcoming) ‘Migration as Movement and Multiplace Life: Some Recent Developments in 
Rural Living Structures in Turkey’ 
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The main arguments for the formation of the chapter are abstracted from several field 
visits to Jordan, Wadi Araba between 2009 and 2012. The data related to these is mainly 
derived from interviews with the actors involved and inspection of official documents.  
 
The chapter consists of three parts, with the notions of landscape and community addressed 
separately in the first two before being brought together as a single nexus in the third. In the 
first part, I introduce and develop the idea of spatial fantasies, which refers to the imagination 
of spaces and how, at the same time, this can be reified. The central question here is, ‘How 
are these fantasies visible in certain development theories and practices?’ Then, in the 
second part, I elaborate on fantasised communities. Here, I look at some of the existing 
literature on the issues of community to address the (problematic) usage of this concept. In 
the third and final part, the meeting of landscape and community as described is facilitated 
through a Foucauldian perspective. From this Foucauldian point of view I emphasise further 
the power and government that a mutual representation of landscape and community 
contains. This is again not in the idea of Ingold who asks for recognition for a intertwined 
existence of human and landscape, but about the rationale that by rearranging landscape 
inhabitants will change accordingly (i.e. reduce their deviances).  
 
Ultimately, this chapter highlights struggles over the representation of landscape and its 
inhabitants, or people and their landscape. By approaching these as co-existing entities, we 
can think about how representational discourses of place and people are deployed in the de-
politicizing process of the development praxis. 
 
4.2 A fantasised landscape 
4.2.1 Landscape, development and power 
Wadi Araba is a semi-arid area in the south of Jordan stretching for over 130km between the 
Dead Sea and the Red Sea. There are about 7000 settled inhabitants living the area, a figure 
that rises to 9000 when the nomadic population is included (DOS, 2011). Wadi Araba 
remains relatively unexplored area by social scientists, although it has been the subject of a 
fair amount of archaeological and geological research.  
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Seeing a landscape and its people through the eyes of development planners has formed a 
substantial literature. In the case of Jordan, Mauro Van Aken has done excellent work on the 
transformation of the Jordan Valley49 landscape and its inhabitants north of the Dead Sea:  
 
The ways of representing this place [the Jordan Valley] by development engenders a 
set of discourses and images that [have] had a major impact in the patterns of 
understanding the inhabitants of this area: the definition of the place, in terms of 
representation, has been in fact the medium to define local communities. (Van Aken, 
2005:165)  
 
Although the Jordan Valley area is different in many aspects from Wadi Araba, we can draw 
significant parallels when comparing the two at the level of discourse and the worldview that 
development actors there exhibit. From many perspectives of national and international 
governmental and non-governmental actors, the Wadi Araba appears as 2400 square 
kilometres of vacant territory, a place that is empty except for a few people and meagre 
infrastructure:  
 
This is a virgin area, in which little has happened for decades, other than the arrival of 
the absentee landlord and the partial settlement of the Bedouins. Tribal relations are 
relatively in-tact. The needs are tremendous, and some major decisions and 
investments will be needed to bring this area into the mainstream of Jordanian life. 
(Dajani, 1979) 
 
The consent that Wadi Araba is merely another out-of-the-way place (Tsing, 1993; 1994) at 
the southern border with Israel, the last frontier (Khouri, 1981), or a white spot on the land-
use plan for the Jordan Valley only makes this place even more fascinating for research 
about landscape and people, as in reality people do live there. I will take this perception of 
empty lands as a representation of the area to further illustrate the idea of spatial fantasies.  
 
                                                      
49 Use of the term ‘Jordan Valley’ for the areas both north and as well as south of the Dead Sea 
invokes a conceptualization generally used by governmental institutions, notably the Jordan Valley 
Authority. Initially responsible mainly for the area north of the Dead Sea, in 1977 the Jordan Valley 
Authority was given the mandate for the southern parts part of the Jordan Valley, in addition to the 
northern by the Government of Jordan (Dajani et al., 1980:20).   
 Inhabitants of the different area would generally refer to the Ghor (the northern part) or Wadi Araba 
(south). In this chapter, I refer to the north as the ‘Jordan Valley’ and the south as the ‘Southern 
Ghors’ and ‘Wadi Araba.’  So, when further notion is made in this chapter to the Jordan Valley it 
always refers to the area on the Jordanian side, east from of the River Jordan.  
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The notion of landscape has been elaborated on many times. W.J.T. Mitchell’s work, Holy 
landscape: Israel, Palestine and the American Wilderness is especially illuminating on this 
issue. As he remarks landscape – referring to a human-nonhuman habitat – is ‘often 
explored as a place of amnesia and erasure, a strategic site for burying the past and veiling 
history with “natural beauty” (Mitchell W.J.T., 2000: 195). In concrete terms for the Jordan 
Valley, Van Aken points out that this landscape has long become an object of transformation, 
represented ideally, as a tabula rasa, to be shaped according to exogenous and culturally 
determined ideas of habitat and space (Van Aken: 2005:154). Piotr Bienkowsi (2006), an 
archaeologist working cross-border (Jordan/Israel) in Wadi Araba, makes the following 
observation: 
 
Wadi Arabah is a paradox: it was never a boundary, it became a political border by 
default, but now it has been renamed, reconfigured and redefined as a barrier 
separating two mutually exclusive historical and cultural identities, in the past as well 
as in the present.50 (Bienkowski, 2006 :20) 
 
The selectivity in perception and the recognition of the existing realities of Wadi Araba can be 
related to remarks made by the two aforementioned authors attesting to the fact that there 
never really was an integrated development scheme for the Wadi Araba, unlike in the case of 
the northern part of the Jordan Rift Valley. In the many socioeconomic surveys of the Jordan 
(Rift) Valley, Wadi Araba and the Southern Ghors are referred to as the mere southern 
extensions of the Valley.  
 
The Jordan Valley became the focus of the ‘unified development’, an external 
planning intervention and modernization process in agriculture presented as a holistic 
approach, integrating the entire area and different aspects of [a] farmer’s life. (Van 
Aken, 2005:152) 
 
                                                      
50 Bienkowski has an important point about the role of Wadi Araba in antiquity, particularly in ‘Biblical’ 
periods, especially in respect of the impact of the border that has been drawn between what is known 
today as Negev and Wadi Araba on our present understanding of this broader area: 
‘The Wadi Arabah and the Negev were re-made as part of a modern Land of Israel to create 
ideological continuity between the past and the present – or rather, there was an iterative relationship 
between past and present, one substantiating the other … Wadi Arabah is a paradox: it was never a 
boundary, it became a political border by default, but now it has been renamed, reconfigured and 
redefined as a barrier separating two mutually exclusive historical and cultural identities, in the past as 
well as in the present’. (Bienkowski, 2006:20) 
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When the massive displacement of Palestinians after 1948 created an influx of refugees into 
Jordan, implementation of the (already existing) idea of an integrated development scheme 
for the Jordan Valley received further impetus, as the refugees became interesting targets for 
vacancies of farming. The difference in historical background is to be taken into 
consideration also for the difference in approach of the Jordan state towards the different 
areas of the Jordan Rift Valley, such as Wadi Araba. 
 
This chapter will not be a plea for integrated approaches in the ‘ideology’ of the dominant 
international development discourses of development, but it should be noted that the 
absence of or failure to implement such approaches has consequences on the ground. In the 
end, although there were initiatives for a Jordan Rift Valley development-overarching project 
for Wadi Araba and the Jordan Valley was, in fact, executed. While the Jordan Valley 
became a main object of development for Jordan, Wadi Araba remained a southern outskirt. 
Since 1994, this has implied that different governmental (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Planning, Jordan Valley Authority, etc.) and nongovernmental (Jordan River Foundation, 
JOHUD, Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature, Hashemite Fund for Development of 
the Jordan Badia, etc.) actors now individually plan for the same territory.  
 
In the Wadi Araba case, all the different projects are described as seeds for empowerment 
and progress. A whole range of initiatives has been implemented, from conventional farming 
inputs to organic agriculture, and renovation of schools and provision of bus shelters to 
nature conservation and tourism promotion. These initiatives can be seen from a planner’s 
perspective as both individually feasible and, taken together, complementary. But on the 
ground each of them works in its own way.51 During the course of this research, the actors 
involved in directing these initiatives raised the issue of cooperation, stating that there was 
no or only limited cooperation and, moreover, that there was no direct need for more. The 
different development actors may have the best of intentions and possess clear visions of 
how the civic spaces they are working toward should look and function; nevertheless, may it 
be that, as Tania Li obverses in respect of the mountains of Indonesia, in the margins of 
Jordan too, a lack of a cooperative structure is problematic: 
 
                                                      
51 Paul Kingston refers to similar trends during the 1950s. Due to a weak central power and the 
absence of an opposition, foreign donors could easily find a position in the realm of development in 
Jordan. ‘This had an interesting impact on the Jordanian state,’ he explains, since ‘each actor in the 
development field created its own administrative apparatus,’ referring to Point Four for the US and the 
UK’s Jordan Development Board (Kingston, 1994:194). 
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The multiplicity of power, the many ways that practices position people, the various 
modes ‘playing across one another’ produce gaps and contradictions. Subjects 
formed in these matrices … encounter inconsistencies … Further, powers once 
experienced as diffuse, or indeed not experienced as powers at all, can become the 
subject of a critical consciousness. (Li, 2007:25-26) 
 
Such a critique and its political implications are of less immediate concern here, than the 
construction of the planning ideology itself. Nevertheless, this citation does illustrate well the 
setting wherein the politics of development are at play and how this is not to be regarded as 
if it exists in a vacuum.52 Crucially, the group of people most directly targeted by the 
development initiatives are not the people who live there, the Bedouins, but rather the 
fantasised Bedouins of the various project proposals. The visions of development neither 
emanate from nor start with the different realities that people actually experience, which are 
thus not successfully envisioned, if at all. The process in Wadi Araba is rather similar in this 
respect to that of the Jordan Valley:  
 
[S]ince this region has been delimited, planned, designed, transformed as a ‘Project 
Area’, the people living in it have been assimilated in the set of problems, needs, 
strategies of solutions of development: refugees have become ‘farmer operators’, 
notwithstanding their cultural practices, [and] their effective and multiple needs and 
problems. (Van Aken, 2005: 165) 
 
To clarify the fantasies for Wadi Araba as a landscape, I will briefly describe two initiatives 
that are representative of the imaginations from the past and the present with regard to the 
area. These two examples are intertwined on many levels, including what I would term the 
inter-causal relationship of settlement and agriculture (when people engage in agriculture, 
they settle, and when they settle – or are settled – they begin doing agriculture). The first 
example sketches the housing projects aimed at the Bedouin population of the Jordan badia, 
and the second the (state-sponsored) development of agriculture there. 
 
4.2.2 Housing provision 
The idea for the settlement of the (semi-)nomadic pastoral population in Jordan started 
effectively during the British mandate period (1918-1948) up to the end of the 1950-1970 era. 
This new development scheme for settlement was envisioned for the greater region of the 
                                                      
52  See below. 
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Middle East and supported by international heavyweights such as the UN, Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and International Labour Organisation (Bocco, 2006:305). 
The sedentarization philosophy was based on the presumption that Bedouin nomadism is a 
‘primitive social state’ (Bocco, 2006:302-304). The settlement of the Bedouin was 
orchestrated around wells, dams, or (existing) water infrastructure, and planned to 
‘encourage the development of agriculture and the constructions of villages’ (Bocco, 
2006:315). 
 
Whether or not the settlement of Jordanian Bedouin has been imposed on the nomadic 
population is a disputed issue. Abu Jaber and Gharaibeh (1981) argue that there was never 
an issue of forced settlement by the state of Jordan and that the efforts to settle Bedouins 
brought more humane and lasting results (Abu Jaber & Gharaibeh, 1981:294). Nobody can 
deny people the right to educate their children in schools or to have access to proper 
healthcare, but one might wonder which new power relations were enhanced by the 
implementation of these efforts. As Bocco remarks, regardless of whether the 
sedentarisation process was forced or voluntary, it certainly was perceived in terms of social 
and economic integration as a ‘veritable cure-all’ (Bocco, 2006:311) 
 
The search for official documents on housing projects specifically in Wadi Araba is not an 
easy task. Knowing that for example the Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) had an 
important stake in the settlement of the Bedouin population, I could hardly find a single MoA 
official able to explain how the distribution of houses either today or in the past came about in 
the different badia areas. Especially when asking about Wadi Araba and housing or land 
distribution, the general answer is ‘Wadi Araba is a special case’. Nevertheless, houses with 
small plots of land have been effectively distributed there. The decade between 1970 and 
1980 brought significant changes, among and an important catalyst for which was the 
construction of the Dead Sea Highway extension from Ghor Safi to Aqaba. Running straight 
through Wadi Araba, this was one of the main things that had vivified the area, as local 
interviewees testified.  
 
The locations where people in the end settled and made villages were mainly places that had 
functioned as seasonal resting places or close to their tribal areas. Interviews with people 
there gave a sense of mixed reasons for settlement. As mentioned, the extension of the 
highway was a focal point (or line) around which to settle in order to better access services, 
but most importantly education along with medical care: where the government organised 
schools, people would go and settle to send their children to them. As such, one could think 
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of their settlement as a strategy employed by the state to exert control over the nomadic 
segment of its population. However, it is also reasonable to suppose that the people 
themselves were looking for a fixed place. Conditions in the desert were getting tougher 
every year, due to other restrictive policies on nomadic lifestyles. Well-known examples 
include the establishment of national boundaries53 and the abolition of fodder subsidies and 
grazing restrictions. Alan Rowe (2006) illustrates both of these aspects of the issue with his 
research on the Bedouin inhabitants of the north-eastern badia, referring to the same period 
of ‘transition’ from tents to permanent housing:  
 
The reasons for this transition are complex, but certainly include the establishment of 
state borders and the extension of state infrastructure and services into the badiya 
area. (Rowe, 2006:603)54 
 
The fixed villages located within Wadi Araba were all established between the mid 1970s and 
early 2000s. Of interest in the deployment of each is its relation to the institution of the 
monarchy. The connection is mostly with one specific member of the royal family. Sharif 
Nasser, Princess Basma, the late King Hussein or Abdullah II, all are perceived as patrons of 
parts of the area. By surprise visits or promises made on television, the monarchy seems to 
be at the doorstep of Wadi Araba.55 Regardless of whether or not the bond with the royal 
family may be stronger in the people’s minds than it is in reality, it does give people a tool to 
speak up and claim their needs at the higher echelons. And since the uprisings in 
neighbouring countries and the tensions in Jordan itself, there is more space for such claims. 
So far, people in Wadi Araba have not turned against the king, but they are aware of the 
value of their loyalty to him and the monarchy.  
 
Development planners emphasise that the distribution of houses in Wadi Araba occurred as 
part of the civilisation/pacification of the area. One informant working with a development 
institution in Wadi Araba described a bathroom and a kitchen in terms of ‘civic space,’ a type 
of space that is simply not available in a tent; hence, a tent is not a civic space. Tents are 
clearly recognised by all development actors as a symbol of the Bedouin culture and should, 
it is accepted, maintain a place in their lives – but one next to a house of bricks.  
                                                      
53 The Hida’ agreement in November 1925, concluded that Hijazi and Transjordanian tribes could no 
longer cross the borders between the two countries without proper documents. See Massad (2001:52)  
54 With reference to R. Dutton ‘Population, environment and development’ in R. Dutton, J. Clarke, A. 
Battakhi (eds), Arid Land Resources and their Management: Jordan’s Desert Margins (London: Kegan 
Paul International 1998).  
55 Linda Layne for example points to the late king Hussein as the ultimate Jordanian gift-giver as he 
distributed gifts before others could offer him a gift. (Layne, 1994:146 in Van Aken, 1999:19). 
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Initiatives related to housing not only connect people to a fixed place but also to a power 
system of costs and obligations. During one of my field visits, I observed how the first 
electricity bills entered the village of Feynan for the people who received houses in the early 
2000s. For 50 months, the Jordanian electricity company had not collected any payments 
from the inhabitants. Now that the company was mostly in private hands, employees were 
sent to gather the money from the outstanding accounts, some of which had accrued as 
much as 800 Jordanian dinars (over 1100 USD). After all this time, people had thought that 
the electricity supply came with the house, for free. The distribution and collecting of the bills 
I experienced happened in the tent of one of the informants. In the tent several other men 
had gathered to meet the money collector. One of the men present, who never moved from 
his tent to a concrete house, remarked that they could all go back to living in their tents so 
they would not have to worry about bills anymore – a suggestion which was not taken up, 
however.  
 
4.2.3 Agricultural development 
Agriculture has always played a key role in the history of development for Jordan and the 
region. Issues related to land, such as access and allocation, were decisive, for example, in 
the construction of the Hashemite Kingdom as we know it today. Michael Fischbach (2000) 
has described this in his fascinating work on the relationships of land to people and power:  
 
To no small degree social forces in modern Jordan have been linked to land and land 
tenure. Despite the image sometimes propagated that it was a ‘Bedouin’ society, 
Jordan from the 1850s – 1950s remained at heart a country of small-scale, settled 
cultivators for whom private control of land defined life. (Fischbach, 2000:1) 
 
Again, it was during the mandate period that the focus on agricultural development came to 
the fore. The mandated authorities set up a development department, financed by the British 
Colonial Development Fund, to administer and plan projects (Bocco, 2006:315). Moves 
toward agricultural development not only encouraged agriculture but also took their place as 
part of a sedentarisation policy, in the manner referred to as ‘intercausal’. In many ways it 
seems that agricultural investments were specifically intended to transform the nomadic 
Bedouin into settled farmers.56 The process of turning Palestinian refugees into farmers in 
                                                      
56 The incorporation of Bedouins into the Desert Patrol in the early years of 1930 was another strategy 
to connect them to the central powers and hence settle them. See for example Bocco & Chatelard 
(2009) or Massad (2001) 
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the Jordan Valley to contribute to Jordan’s ‘Green Revolution’57 paralleled the 
sedentarization projects designed for the settlement of Bedouin tribes in the Middle East 
(Van Aken, 2005:152). The designation of the Palestinian refugees as future farmers has 
been a clear example of the depoliticisation of the presence of the refugees. The 
transformation of the Jordan Valley was based on an intensive approach of development, 
mainly based on the input of technology. The agricultural projects for Wadi Araba are rather 
small scale, but reflect - as Van Aken points out in relation to the Jordan Valley - a pure 
technical understanding of Wadi Araba.  
 
The Jv is looked upon only as economic reality, where production becomes the main 
criteria of judgment and evaluation. The definition of a region through implicit 
indicators and value has determined also the way in understanding the local—
although often dislocated—populations ‘farmers’ and ‘peasant community’. This 
technical understanding of the Jv and its inhabitants has been a major pattern in 
neutralizing refugees’ political context and hiding the social environment and local 
strategies that lie behind the effective management of resources. (Van Aken, 1999:7)  
 
As Michael Fischbach illustrates, agriculture has always been an important activity in Jordan, 
included in which is that of the Bedouins, who often had small-scale agricultural side 
activities. The sizes of the agricultural projects in the Jordan Valley or in Wadi Araba are 
extremely different. The scale of Wadi Araba is small and local, while the Jordan Valley is 
grand scheme and (inter)nationally oriented. What I want to emphasise, however, is the 
overlap in rationale and method of a depolitisation of a social environment as Wadi Araba.  
 
In 2007, a very large grant was received from the Arab Fund from Kuwait for a special Wadi 
Araba Development Unit. Pushed forward by King Abdullah II, this project has had a 
management or regulatory authority that moved between different institutions, including the 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) and today’s Jordan Valley Authority (JVA). 
Besides small-scale initiatives for the improvement of the different villages (bus shelter, 
restoration school walls, play grounds etc.), the project also includes the development of 
about four agricultural model farms, which is accompanied by the distribution of land to 
inhabitants. People will thereby become owners of the land, which, as mentioned before, is 
                                                      
57 Sharif Elmusa offers a detailed insight in the role of agriculture in the development of the Valley. 
Most interestingly here is that Elmusa places agriculture not only in an economic but also a 
(techno)political context. In addition to the multi-perspective approach, he also draws attention to the 
multiple scales of analysis (regional, state and international) with which agriculture can be 
approached.  
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rare in the area to date. Most of the land in Wadi Araba is formally state-owned land, 
although there are tribal customary land claims on it. While there have been practical 
concessions regarding customary claims, they have largely been ignored in legal terms 
(Palmer et al., 2007:52).  
 
The access of people from Wadi Araba to employment and land is very limited. The land in 
Wadi Araba has been effectively frozen since 2005, when further steps were taking for the 
construction of a water conveyor between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. This freezing 
means a hold on land between the two bodies of water to prevent its sale/purchase.58 The 
agricultural part of the Wadi Araba project comprises four fields in the surroundings of four 
villages. At the moment of writing, one field in the Wadi Fidan, close to the village of Gregra 
and measuring 1940 dunums59 (194 hectares), is prepared for agricultural activity. A total of 
97 potential farmers from the villages could apply for a piece of land of 20 dunums, with the 
selected people/families entitled to use of the land and the harvest. Here, the distribution of 
the farms created Li’s ‘critical consciousness’ (above), since this created a lot of friction 
about who was rightfully entitled to the land. The allocation criteria were well thought out – 
tribes with already limited access to land would get priority, the same idea being used for 
employment at the water station, etc. – but were challenged in such a way that the JVA had 
to place the distribution of the fields at Wadi Fidan on hold, even though it was ready for use.  
  
Changes in a landscape are often related to total makeovers through megalomaniac 
development projects. During conferences one can see and be amazed by the (critical) 
research done on the planned transformations of for instance Beirut, Damascus, or Rabat 
into new Dubais as it were. I have used Wadi Araba at those conferences as an example for 
planned makeovers to argue that these transformations or developments tend to assume 
space as a given. My point would be that large-scale or small-scale infrastructural initiatives 
in a place like Wadi Araba also come with certain reflections about the place and its 
inhabitants. The difference could between a plan for Beirut or Wadi Araba could be that a 
new design for cities are regarded as representations of modernity while the plans for Wadi 
Araba are rather written as a design for a ‘descent life’. The description of the Arab Fund 
supported project is here illustrative  
The project falls under the Wadi Araba Region Development Program, which aims at 
transferring the region from a poor, low density populated area into a more attractive 
                                                      
58 See below in chapter six.  
59 Dunum: Middle Eastern unit of measurement for area for land. 
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residential area that provides a hospitable environment for business activities and 
investments. (website MOPIC 2013)  
 
In the next part I explain how the design of a descent life is channelled through adaptations 
in a landscape.  
 
4.3 A fantasised community 
Community is a fundamental modality for the conduct of modern politics.(Watts, 2004:195)  
 
As Tania Li remarks, ‘community development programs also initiate the creation of a new 
collective subject, a community… [that] will have to engage into certain activities that lead [it] 
to [become] the right community in the right place’ (Li, 2007:15). Wadi Araba might be such a 
right place. The development agents I talked to and the surveys that document the situation 
of Wadi Araba all emphasise the potential of this place and its inhabitants. At the same time, 
however, the potentials of both place and people are routinely described as limited.  
 
The idea of Wadi Araba as a forgotten place and thus in need of ‘development’ is also a 
reflection of the portrayal of its people. The human cultures in Wadi Araba are associated 
with a lifestyle and mentality located in a different time, in the human developmental or 
evolutionary past. To have them enter the 21st century, the area needs the right injections of 
development. Johannes Fabian’s (1983, 2007) ‘denial of coevalness’ is of much use in 
grasping the rationale behind certain development initiatives.  
 
The notion of a denial of coevalness refers to the effect of representation in ethnographic 
work, that when ‘ethnographers represent their knowledge in teaching and writing they do 
this in terms of a discourse that constituently places those who are talked about in a time 
other than that of the one who talks’ (Fabian, 2007:22). It might be a little blunt to simply 
replace ‘ethnographers’ with ‘development planners’, but one cannot help but observe the 
similar patterning of discourse. It is illustrated, for example, in one of the 2004 preliminary 
land use studies for the Valley:  
 
The Southern Jordan Valley Study Area (SJVSA) is the Southern Ghors and Wadi 
Araba, an arid environment graced by the unique desert environment of Wadi Araba, 
including the living heritage of ‘Beduoin’ tribes, that is forming the basis under RSCN 
for a nature based tourism industry’. (Chesrown, 2004:142) 
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An example of this nature tourism and representation of the people of the Wadi Araba area is 
to be found in the Dana protected area. Partly located in Wadi Araba, this was established by 
the Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature (RSCN) in 1994.60 The ‘pristine’ area of the 
Dana reserve offers modernity a window on Bedouin traditional life. No building is permitted 
for the local population who live in the reserve, and the areas of the Wadi Araba where 
tourists are mainly guided are those in the Dana reserve populated by inhabitants living in 
tents. The idea is to offer tourists an authentic experience. In addition to its status as small-
scale agricultural hub, therefore, Wadi Araba is currently designated as an eco-tourism 
destination, and the local population hence transformed into either farmers or ethnological 
décor.  
 
The idea of turning Bedouins into farmers is certainly not new in Jordan. Pilot settlement 
projects for Bedouin families began in the early years of the 1960s, organised by the MoA 
and the World Food Program (WFP). A settled Bedouin area in the south-eastern badia of 
Jaffa near the city of Ma’an was one such. It is no coincidence that this happened in Jordan 
at that point in time. As Bocco states, it was in this same period that the FAO in cooperation 
with the WFP initiated for the greater region of Jordan a ‘series of projects to set up 
agricultural colonies in the steppe areas (Bocco, 2006:305). 
 
Most people today in Wadi Araba are indeed settled in villages, mainly in brick houses. 
Although they appear to have generally either asked for settlement or built their houses 
themselves, the general settlement process has been structured by a discourse around brick 
house ownership. Used for housing projects and infrastructural development in general as 
well as in specific regard to Wadi Araba, this discourse does not just refer to the necessity of 
bricks. At the same time, it reveals views on the candidate ‘target group’ or community for 
whom the houses are intended. In the denial of coevalness, the living conditions previous to 
the settlement programs and as such also the people living in those conditions are 
approached as entities located in an essentially past time. The area and its inhabitants are 
not described as ‘savage’ anymore, but as poor people living in a ‘remote’ time or ‘neglected’ 
by time. The key focus for development planners has been to guide these poor communities 
into modernity through infrastructural injections of capital, primarily in the form of housing and 
agriculture as an economic opportunity. 
 
                                                      
60 The RSCN and its relations and interventions in the area will be more elaborated in next chapter.  
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Whether on the issue of housing or agriculture, the actors involved certainly do take ‘tradition’ 
and ‘community’ into consideration nowadays. However, this is still often expressed in very 
culturalistic terms. Many ideas about ‘community’ that are used today in the development 
plans or initiatives for social, political or economic progress are not, in fact, very different 
from the colonial schemes for modernisation. The relationship between development 
discourse or practice and historical colonisation is not new, and is well documented.61 It is 
very interesting also in this respect to note the similarities to what is happening on a smaller 
scale in Wadi Araba with, for example, the work of Victoria Bernal (1997) on the Gezira 
scheme in Sudan. Bernal describes what ultimately became the largest centrally-managed 
irrigation project in the world after starting operations in 1925 and continues to operate today 
under the management of the Sudanese government thus: 
 
While treating the Gezira region in practice as a cultural and agricultural tabula rasa, 
the British selectively drew on local ‘tradition’ as a rationale for colonial policy. Even 
as they represented the Gezira Scheme as ‘modern, scientific’ agriculture, colonial 
authorities sought to legitimate some of their policies by locating their origin in 
Sudanese ‘tradition’. (Bernal, 1997:455) 
 
The approach towards the people of Wadi Araba is not one of an invention of traditions but 
rather a reduction to a one-size-fits-all that fails to differentiate between, for example, the 
Bedouins in Feynan and those in Rahme, a nearby village. The tribes that are living in those 
two villages are different families and relate to other areas inside and outside Jordan. The 
locations of the agricultural projects directed by the JVA come under the banner of scientific 
determination with regard to soil quality or water availability, but they divide the different tribal 
groups into almost hermetically sealed formations, each fixed to its space. Unfortunately for 
the project, however, these groups have also their relations outside the area. In the case of 
the field developed by the agricultural project referred to, which has been prepared for use 
through a lot of effort with regard to road access and water supply, people from other villages 
and even outside Wadi Araba have come to claim a share, perceived as their part of the 
land. Despite having grown considerably in its knowledge of and approach towards Wadi 
Araba and the inhabitants, the JVA remains predominately technocratic in its ways of 
thinking and implementation.  
 
                                                      
61The relationship between the colonial past and development strategies today is not to be understood 
as a linear continuum, however. Hewitt and Duffield point out very clearly that ‘it is rather [that] the will 
to power that shaped it (i.e. colonialism) lives on through new institutions and actors’ (Hewitt & 
Duffield, 2009:14). See also Escobar (1995), Cooke (2003), Kothari (2005) 
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While it stands as no justification for the continuation of such an approach, it is true that little 
documentation exists on the social and economic structures in Wadi Araba.62 Since the 
beginning of the present century, generalised surveys have been performed and nearly 
always in relation to a particular development scheme, and which then are kept behind the 
closed doors of the institutions involved.63 The gap in knowledge on the area and people of 
Wadi Araba is another point of resemblance to the Gezira scheme:  
 
The realities of economic and social life in the Gezira region prior to the irrigation 
scheme were not well documented. Thus colonial actors could alternatively ignore or 
invent the local past and Sudanese ‘tradition’ as it suited them. (Bernal, 1997:455) 
 
The notion of community in both colonial and development policies has been well 
documented by social scientists since Benedict Anderson (1983) wrote his ideas on 
Imagined Communities in the early 1980s. Tania Li and Nicolas Rose are two examples 
among many of those who have shed light on this ubiquitous concept. In their first critical 
analyses almost 15 years ago, these researchers reached out for ways to understand the 
concept of community from a political perspective. They made the use of the concept of 
community in (development) discourses as a tool for power. Michael Watts (2004) also 
remarks:  
 
There does not exist a simply genealogy of the modern deployment of community. 
But throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the idea of the community was 
‘a fundamental political institution within European colonial systems’ … and 
constructed as part of the construction of the modern. Community, not just of the 
modern imagined nation … but all manner of local community, are ‘political’ … and 
‘represented’ … communities to be read against the modern state, the nation and 
history. (Watts, 2004:197) 64 
 
                                                      
62 Interesting existing literature see Palmer et al. (2007), Lancaster and Lancaster (1999), Bienkowski 
(2006) 
63 By way of a personal experience, the most remarkable reason for not giving a printout of a survey 
report was the possibility that we, as researchers, might be critical of it (Personal communication with 
MOPIC employee, Jordan, 2012). 
64 With reference to J. Kelly and J.M. Kaplan, Represented Communities (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), p. 5 ; G. Pandey, Some Notes on the Modern Political Community, Paper 
presented to the School of American Research, Santa Fe, Workshop on ‘The Romance of 
Community’, April 2003; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
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The term ‘community’ in places such as the Jordanian badia is often employed in 
combination with the adjective ‘traditional’. Especially during the beginning of the formation of 
the state of Jordan, many questions were raised in respect of what to do with the wild tribes 
that ruled the steppe areas and terrorised villages. The pacification and assimilation of the 
Bedouins seemed a reasonable answer. The name of J.B. Glubb, also known as ‘Glubb 
Pasha’, has today become synonymous for this process in the country. The idea of 
pacification and assimilation seems not to have emerged from a dislike of the Bedouin tribes, 
but rather from certain empathy, as Kamel Abu Jaber (1981) informs us:  
 
Raised among the tribes of Saudi Arabia, as was the tradition of his family, he [Emir 
Abdullah I] developed a fair amount of sympathy for, and empathy with, the Bedouins 
and their needs. Under his guidance and direction, the commander of the Jordanian 
army, J.B. Glubb, too, developed a technique for dealing with the Bedouins, slowly 
but surely acculturing them to a more disciplined life with a more sophisticated 
hierarchy and a central national authority. (Abu Jaber & Gharaibeh, 1981:295) 
 
In his Colonial Effects, Joseph Massad has illustrated the incorporation of the Bedouin 
population as part of the construction of the country. Before 1976, Bedouins were actually 
considered as aliens in Jordan: 
 
These laws governing the Bedouins as a separate category of nationals and citizens 
were viewed as transitional, facilitating the integration of the Bedouins within the 
framework of the juridical nation-state. This, the Jordanian government felt, was 
achieved in 1976. That year, a law canceling all previous tribal laws including the Law 
of Supervising the Bedouins was enacted, thus ushering the Bedouins into the world 
of the nation-state as equal to and no longer a distinct species of citizen-nationals. 
(Massad, 2001:52) 
 
In legal terms, Bedouins are part of the state of Jordan, but on the ground and especially in 
the case of Wadi Araba, the idea of the inhabitants as still not completely integrated into 
modernity is very present and powerful.  
 
The general opinion (of officials, NGO staff and others) is that it is fine to stay a Bedouin at 
heart, but now it is time to look for alternative lifestyles. Becoming a farmer is one of the 
options. This recalls Van Aken’s idea mentioned above with regard to a purely technical 
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understanding of a place and its inhabitants. Wadi Araba is perceived as an economic reality 
but not quite as in the case of the Jordan Valley. The economic reality of Wadi Araba is 
rather expressed in terms of poverty: the local infrastructure is poor, as is its population. In 
2008 around 69% of the population were categorised as living in poverty. Wadi Araba has 
been designated as part of the Poverty Pocket Program since its inception in 2002/2003 
(Personal communication with Department of Statistics, 2012). The list of places in Jordan 
that are defined as Poverty Pockets has been re-evaluated so there is movement of places 
on and off the list. Extra funding is provided for development in the enlisted places. Wadi 
Araba is one of those places since the beginning. In the Poverty Pockets program, royal 
NGOs such as the Jordan River Foundation have constructed community development 
programmes to enhance progress. The area of Wadi Araba as a Poverty Pocket is under the 
umbrella of the Jordan River Foundation to enhance development initiatives.65 As already 
stated, there is a certain belief in the potential of the area, a limited but nevertheless real 
potential.  
 
Important here is the way in which community has become ‘both a means of 
problematisation and of solution’ (Rose, 2004:173). This is exactly how Rose describes the 
sense of community that is so dominant in the development rationale of the various actors 
involved in Wadi Araba. As it is a place physically remote from the central government in 
Amman, the best option for change in the area from a developmental point of view depends 
on the will or the morale of the people. The people of Wadi Araba are discouraged from 
waiting for the government to act or from hoping for state employment. The idea is that it is 
partly because of the unwillingness of the local community to initiate action themselves that 
they are in a deprived situation. This rationale has two sides. On the one side, it are the 
people themselves who can turn the tide to become a successful community – albeit, of 
course, steered or managed by present institutions as the NGOs. The other side is that when 
projects fail or people take a different direction, it proves again that it is due to the (lack of) 
will or morale of the community that they do not move forward. The ultimate responsibility for 
what is happening today with the agricultural projects steered by the JVA or the nature 
conservation projects managed by the RSCN is mainly laid on the culture of the area. This is 
again very similar to the response of the British colonisers to the resistance of the Sudanese 
resistance towards the Gezira scheme:  
 
Rather than acknowledging Sudanese resistance, however, colonial discourse 
represents Sudanese farmers as lazy and incompetent… The refusal of the 
                                                      
65 http://jordanriver.jo/?q=content/jrcep/poverty-pockets-programs (28th January 2013)  
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colonizers to officially acknowledge tenant resistance to the imposed (cotton) regime 
reinforced the British view of Sudanese farmers as incapable of responsibility, and 
this in turn helped to justify the authoritarian structure of the scheme. (Bernal, 
1997:464&466) 
 
Keeping this perspective in mind, it will be interesting to see how the JVA or RSCN adapt 
their strategies when challenged by opposition in the future.  
 
Even though there is already a large amount of literature written from multiple disciplinary 
perspectives on rural development, I would still argue for a continuity of research. I have 
referred (above) to Tania Li and Nicholas Rose to illustrate the point that the notion of 
community in a political reflection about its conceptual use is not new. Nevertheless 
representations of people as homogenous communities are still activated in specific realities. 
These realities are often (artificially) translated into bounded spaces wherein the fantasised 
communities are supposed to neatly fit. How these target people come to interact with the 
notion of community and its effects should prove instructive. We can see in Indonesia – as 
illustrated by Li – or even in Wadi Araba that the community construct has become a tool for 
political claims from a local perspective.  
 
4.4 Representational spatialisation as an art of government 
Whilst the term ‘community’ has long been salient in political thought, it becomes 
governmental when it is made technical. (Rose, 2004:175) 
 
Following Foucault‘s idea of constructed visibility, of ‘how spaces were designed to make 
things seeable, and seeable in a specific way’ (Rajchman, 1988:103),66a major issue here 
becomes that of how Wadi Araba might be approached similarly to the way that Foucault 
analyses structures like prisons, psychiatric institutions, poorhouses and museums. Foucault 
pays attention both to the purely architectural issues of the physical construction and also to 
how these spaces provide evidence of the ways in which we see one another and ourselves 
(Rajchman, 1988:103). He introduced the notion of heterogeneous space to point out that 
‘we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things … that 
could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates 
sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not super imposable on one 
                                                      
66 With referrence to M. Foucault, ‘The Eye of Power’, in C. Gordon, ed. Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp.146-165. 
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other’(Foucault & Miskowiec, 1986:23). This reads as common sense, and so he goes further 
with the idea of ‘sites that have the curious property of being in relation with all other sites, 
but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to 
designate, mirror, or reflect’ (Foucault & Miskowiec, 1986:24). Foucault terms two of these 
‘utopias’ and ‘heterotopias’. It is especially this notion of heterotopias that can view the 
landscape-community nexus in an interesting perspective.  
 
As opposed to utopias – although Foucault does not completely oppose them – heterotopias 
comprise sites that are created ‘outside’ a societal reality. Heterotopias of deviation make 
this clear: a psychiatric hospital is an example of a structure into which people are placed 
whose behaviour is defined as deviant in relation to the required or norm (Foucault & 
Miskowiec, 1986:25). These sites have relations with real space in society, but they are 
constructed in such a way as to downscale the focus on a single subject and are actually 
placed in relation to wider structures – which, however, are themselves erased from the 
picture. We could say that heterotopias are governable spaces in the extreme. Wadi Araba 
or even Beirut (as a new Dubai) is targeted via development planning to be cleansed of 
deviation. This is a process quite opposite to the idea of bringing these places and their 
inhabitants into the ‘real world of modernity’. On the contrary, it discards these existing 
realities from their connections with a broader context. Whatever a place without deviation 
may be exactly, it is certainly a utopia. This thus becomes a matter of whose fantasy is more 
legitimate than others, or rather, which is most legitimised by the structures of power.  
 
The way that, living in a shared reality, we create or experience a heterotopia reflects also 
how we see ourselves and others in relation to this. In returning to the notion of constructed 
visibility, therefore, among the other senses of environment and political space, that of 
spatialisation operates as ‘one technique in the exercise of power (Rajchman, 1988:104).  
 
Power can become infrastructurally integrated into a landscape without too much notice. 
Roads, electricity networks, housing and the like are subtle ways of integrating people into 
power networks. As Foucault remarks, ‘power conceals itself by visualizing itself’ so ‘[i]ts 
outcomes become acceptable because one sees of it only what it lets one see, only what it 
makes visible’ (Foucault, 1990:86). Techniques of power are not just about re-arranging 
landscape through filling it with a physical spatialisation, but also about making governable 
spaces wherein, for example, populations are governed. It is at the meeting point of 
spatialisation and governable spaces where techno-government takes shape. We can see 
techno-government being applied in development schemes to capture a targeted landscape 
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and population in a single action. In the case of Wadi Araba, this is not to be understood only 
in the physical capture of geographical space but also as an expression of the 
representational: people intimately related to the area through their cultural histories, their 
movements, residence and subsistence are similarly but ‘captured’ representational, as if 
fixed elements of the landscape. It is exactly this rigid designation of people with place and 
vice versa that is so characteristic of development thinking today. Moreover, these places, 
these artificially bounded spaces, are not seen as dynamic and related to other sites and 
people, but as isolated, fundamentally disconnected entities (and which therefore need to be 
integrated through development into the hegemonic flatscape of modernity)67.  
 
Crucially, we have to be aware of the fact that development schemes themselves do not just 
materialise, they do not come into existence ex nihilo. They are manufactured, of course, and 
behind the schemes there are practitioners working to formulate them. In the format of 
institutions, practitioners have a power to draw people into their schemes and (re)draw 
‘communities’ accordingly. The ‘eye of power’ embodied by, for example, the JVA, sees Wadi 
Araba as an entity of deficiency; hence it creates schemes to dissolve this (Rajchman, 
1988:104). It is just these representations of Wadi Araba that establish it as a heterotopia of 
deviation in structural opposition to (normative) modern society (Whatmore, 2002:13). 
 
Again, an analysis of the Gezira scheme in Sudan is relevant. Here, Victoria Bernal (1997) 
offers another insight in the power aspects of the development projects in both countries 
from a Foucauldian point of view: 
 
In Foucault's terms, the Gezira Scheme must be understood as a ‘disciplinary 
institution’. For this and its implications to become clear, however, requires us to 
decenter the ostensible economic purpose of the scheme and to attend to its cultural 
qualities, viewing economic interaction as merely one medium through which complex 
social relations are enacted and negotiated. Recognizing the agricultural project as a 
disciplinary institution reveals the role of the Gezira Scheme in inscribing colonial 
social relations, most particularly relations between rulers and ruled (Bernal, 
1997:447).68 
                                                      
67 Andy Hilton introduced me to this concept of hegemonic flatscape of modernity. With this notion he 
refers to that which does not distinguish or particularise, that what raises the undualitions of locality 
(cleanses it of deviation). I think this notion has interesting potential to underline that the imagination of 
‘modernity’ orders particular places and its inhabitants in as more or less modern, and hence more 
power to the ones pointed out as more modern. This ordering is arbitrary and cleanse indeed all 
existing variation out.  
68 With reference to M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 139. 
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In the projects of institutions like the Jordan River Foundation, ‘the people’ and ‘the 
community’ are centred in their representations as that which needs to (be) develop(ed) and 
at the same time portrayed as themselves key actors for the change of their situation. 
Nevertheless, a (intentional?) gap between the target group and the development 
practitioners continues to exist. Just as Bernal placed the colonial scheme for Gezira in a 
broader frame of discipline, thinking in governmental(ity) terms about the development 
schemes for the Wadi Araba makes its implications more visible and thus clarifies 
understanding.69 
 
In the political framing of this representational spatialisation, community is transformed into 
technique and landscapes likewise are approached in purely technical (primarily economic 
commodity) terms. Foucault’s renowned idea of governmentality, as ‘the conduct of conduct’, 
here translated as ‘techno-government’, is institutionalised in the badia area of Wadi Araba. It 
thus becomes clear how, through the different interventions of development (social, 
economic and/or political), relations are rearranged between people and the landscape, 
between people and the development agents, and among the development agents 
themselves. This is not mere top-down power functionality, but one that operates in multiple 
directions.70 The unexpected outcomes of implemented projects are thus to be understood 
through this dynamic of a representation of people and landscape translated into a 
development scheme that anticipates (is premised on and dedicated to) a community-defined 
transformation of people’s lives. A development scheme can be a very powerful de-
politicising tool to conduct the conduct of the subject of development – and equally as weak 
in its inability to comprehend the realities it is acting upon. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Representations of people/’community’ and landscape that are translated into development 
schemes are often based on a fantasised nexus of community-landscape. The image of 
Wadi Araba as a rather empty place that has been ignored by time is projected 
simultaneously onto the inhabitants of Wadi Araba who are in turn constructed as a single, 
undifferentiated unit, considered (as if) a community. Van Aken expresses the point thus: 
 
                                                      
69 Governmental in the way that Rose states (above), which is in line with Foucault’s notion (below). 
70 Similarly, Nicolas Rose states that ‘governable spaces are not fabricated counter to experience; 
they make new kinds of experience possible, produce new modes of perception, invest percepts with 
affects, with dangers and opportunities, with saliences and attractions’ (Rose, 2004:32).  
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The ways of representing this place by development engenders a set of discourses 
and images that had a major impact in the patterns of understanding the inhabitants 
of this area: the definition of the place, in terms of representation, has been in fact the 
medium to define local communities. (Van Aken. 2005:165) 
 
The simplicity of visual imagery obscures the social and historic relations of the valley 
transcending it in a natural scene. This way of ‘looking at’ the Jordan Valley is a way 
of imagining a community rooted in a place, in fact an ‘imagined community’ through 
an imagined landscape. (Van Aken, 2005:165) 
 
The representation of Wadi Araba and inhabitants is also composed as a snapshot, inviting 
comparisons (again) with the static representations of colonial ethnographies. By divesting 
Wadi Araba of all its political and social dimensions present and active in and beyond its 
geographical borders, development planning becomes a technical procedure for a technical 
problem. In these plans, people and the landscape are projected as objects of development 
(Mitchell T., 2002). As an archaeologist himself, Piotr Bienkowski is very honest and critical 
in describing the approach of archaeologists towards archaeological sites, such as in Wadi 
Araba. The standard approach within Levantine archaeology involves, he explains, is that of 
 
…relating environment and resources to demographic patterns, territoriality and 
social organization, and producing neat, two-dimensional maps which encapsulate 
and bound our understanding of this past landscape. (Bienkowski, 2006:16)71 
 
Such a mode of investigation, Bienkowski continues, 
 
…privileges the visual and the ‘viewpoint’ of the archaeologist as a notionally 
objective observer and interpreter. Information and analyses in this format are 
meaningful to us as archaeologists precisely because it is ‘rational’, it can be 
measured and verified, and this something we value above all other considerations 
as professional ‘scientists’ and ‘academics’. It is obvious that such an approach has 
nothing to do with how landscape was experienced by those living in it: it tells us 
nothing about landscapes as relational webs of meaning and material. (Bienkowski, 
2006:16)  
                                                      
71 With reference Tilley C (1994), A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments, 
London: Berg 
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However, constructed fantasies of Wadi Araba and its inhabitants do tell us a lot about those 
who construct the fantasies. Wadi Araba and especially the local people are separated from 
and indeed placed in structural opposition to the development planners. Insights into the 
relations between landscape, people and power have become ever more important for a 
better understanding of the impact of development schemes. When Wadi Araba is analysed 
from a Foucauldian perspective as a place of constructed visibility, the different power 
relations come into focus. For example, the relations between the different actors are 
constantly challenged during project planning and implementation. This ‘constructed visibility’ 
is not merely about the physical space – in this case Wadi Araba – but also about the people 
related to this space. The fact that Wadi Araba has the features of a undeveloped place par 
excellence, where the people themselves are perceived as incapable of taking the initiative 
for improvement, appears to offer ‘an aesthetic alibi’ (Mitchell W.J.T., 2000:198) for external 
intervention.  
 
The Bedouin population of Jordan has been targeted for transformation schemes since the 
beginning of the creation of the modern state of Jordan, their nomadic lifestyle in particular 
appearing as an obstacle to full integration in the modern society – or, and more pertinently 
perhaps, the very claim of that society to modernity with such a deviation in its midst.  
 
Wadi Araba as home for some of the southern badia inhabitants seemed to be a 
godforsaken place further marginalised by its position on the border with a rival in Israel. With 
the peace treaty in 1994 opening Wadi Araba to initiatives for a better future, the vision for a 
Valley of Opportunities came again to the foreground and has since remained always 
present, a latent potential. Today several development agencies provided with surveys, 
images and good intensions are trying to find roots there to work towards the blooming valley 
ideal, but Wadi Araba is certainly not envisioned as a new part of the Promised Land, as has 
been the case for Palestine and the Jordan Valley as a whole.  
 
More lyrically, W.J.T. Mitchell opines that ‘the empty landscape, the waste or wilderness or 
void, is an iconoclastic icon; it throws down the high places and smashes the traces of 
indigenous or aboriginal dwelling’ (Mitchell W.J.T., 2000:210-211). This certainly counts for 
the general depiction of Wadi Araba. Ironically in relation to the Bienkowski’s critique on 
archaeological methods, it is precisely the archaeological research in Wadi Araba, which 
proves that the area has always been linked to activities and people in the wider area. W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s phrasing may be rather dramatic, but it does effectively highlight the erasing of (the 
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recognition of) people’s presence. Against this, though, it is very difficult now for 
development actors to ignore people. This is certainly partly due to the specific context of the 
uprisings in the region that have offered a space for resistance. More fundamentally and 
more widely, however, it is grounded in the fantasised ideas about communities and their 
landscape that cause agents to run into problems and find their projects blocked and drying 
up, or else unfolding in unexpected directions steered by the local target group. 
 
The final chapter will illustrate again how the distinction between nature-culture is applied to 
intervene with a technological intervention that is presented as a-political project that can 
contribute to solve and prevent political problems. The next chapter looks deeper into the 
arena of power between landscape and community that was earlier described, illustrated by 
an analysis of nature conservation initiatives related to Wadi Araba. 
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V. The ambivalence of local knowledge: Strategies of intervention in 
Wadi Araba, Jordan72 
 
‘RSCN believes that conservation and economic development can go hand-in-hand, 
seeing the potential in Jordan’s nature to provide an alternative economy for members of 
poor rural communities that currently have few opportunities to improve their livelihoods.’ 
(Webpage Wild Jordan) 
 
5.1 Participatory development 
When framing a development intervention these days, one cannot but talk about 
participation, partnership and local knowledge. Since the mid-1980s, participatory 
approaches to development have gradually transformed from a marginal perspective to the 
mainstream of development thinking. On a policy level where it has shaped donor 
conditionalities, government and organizational strategies as well as project rationales 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2005). The participatory turn came as a corollary of growing frustrations 
with top-down and technocratic approaches to development. Subsequently, a search 
emerged for ways to let marginalised people, who nominally constitute the targets of 
development initiatives, gain a voice in the development businesses. The objective was to 
incorporate those 'voices' into programme or project planning. According to participatory 
development logic, building on people's articulated knowledge, needs and preferences in 
planning and implementation would make development a more inclusive and more 
successful endeavour.  
 
Although advocates of participatory development such as Robert Chambers (1997) initially 
imagined participatory techniques like the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) to completely 
reverse hierarchies of program planning and implementation, the mainstreaming of those 
approaches into the operations of development agencies like the World Bank has raised 
many questions about such optimistic scenarios. After twenty years of 'including the locals', 
critics have pointed out that participation often merely serves as a vague signifier, obscuring 
more than it reveals, and analysed numerous shortcomings of participatory approaches 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Harrison,2002; Korf, 2010; Mosse, 2005). The most problematic 
aspect, and at the same time most relevant for this chapter, is that taking the operation of 
participatory development for granted actually neglects complex settings of power relations, 
                                                      
72 This chapter is based on a co-authored (unpublished) paper with Katharina Lenner.  
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where actors in very different social, economic and political positions encounter each other 
(Büscher, 2010; Harrison, 2000; Mohan and Stokke, 2000).   
 
This chapter explores the complex setting of Wadi Araba in the current tradition of 
participatory development. Among various strategies of intervention with more or less 
participatory components, the main focus lies on the recent attempt to establish new 
protected areas under more participatory conditions than before. The outright rejection of this 
attempt by a vocal part of the originally envisaged partners forms the basis for a critical 
reflection about the relation between participation, the relevance of local knowledge, and 
politics. 
 
The overall argument in this chapter is that development and conservation are Janus-faced 
when it comes to local people and the incorporation of their knowledge. On the one hand, the 
current suggestions for participatory conservation and development show the limitations and 
contradictions of such an approach. Only a specific kind of local knowledge can be 
productively integrated in a field shaped by previous and simultaneous interventions, the 
rationales and objectives of the implementing agencies. Neither can the wider political 
context in which projects are embedded be neglected. On the other hand, the participatory 
framework can still serve as a basis for appropriation and re-politicisation of development by 
those who are addressed as 'partners'. Pointing out the contradictions of participatory 
approaches can have a significant mobilizing impact. The outcomes of such forms of 
participation- resistance if you will- however, can diverge significantly from what planners 
have in mind; it is not necessarily productive and hard to be channelled back into 
preconceived participatory methodologies. In sum, whereas the 'local knowledge' identified 
by intervention agencies - whether through participatory methods or not - is often merely a 
corollary of predefined intervention objectives, there are also forms of local knowledge which 
disrupt those preconceived forms. This 'other' form of knowledge though does not stand 
outside of the dynamics of intervention and improvement efforts, but is intimately connected 
to them.  
 
First, Wadi Araba is introduced as a laboratory of development, subject to different, often 
competing interventions, and focus on two agencies; the aforesaid JRF and the (JVA). Both 
operate with very different procedures regarding the place of 'local people'. Tracing their 
operations will show that project implementation does not always follow a standardised 
model. How and to what degree inhabitants are included in such schemes is as much subject 
to different approaches (participatory or not) as to the exigencies of implementation and the 
necessity to compromise. Subsequently, we trace the twists and turns of conservation and 
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development thinking in Jordan by looking at the strategic development of the RSCN, and 
explore the role accorded to local people in this process. Two issues stand out as bases for 
the current unwillingness of local inhabitants to comply with the participatory methods RSCN 
is offering to them. One is the cautious and contradictory participatory turn of the 
organisation; the second is a deep-seated limitation in truly conceiving local populations as 
knowledgeable 'partners in conservation'. Directing the focus on the conflicts around the 
establishment of protected areas in Wadi Araba, we argue in conclusion that participatory 
approaches such as RSCN have led to an opposing dynamic of 'project fatigue versus 
people fatigue', which, for the time being, has brought these initiatives to a standstill.  
 
5.2 Multiple Wadi Araba 
By now I think it has become already more clear that Wadi Araba has evolved as an 
ambiguous place through history. Forming the border to Israel, security measurements in 
Wadi Araba have had a notable impact on social relations. This concerns, for example, the 
status of land ownership. Private land ownership is not very common (Palmer et al., 
2007:52), which enables the government to keep a degree of control over the border area. 
The security regime also has an impact on ‘outsiders’. As a researcher from the capital 
Amman, but even more so from outside Jordan or the Arab World, you are easily detected on 
the radar. Officials are also less accessible than in Amman due to ‘security reasons’.  
 
A second representation of Wadi Araba is that of a marginal place. In spite of established 
ways of life and usages of space by its inhabitants, who mostly identify as Bedouins, farmers 
and /or pastoralists, the area is, according to the current land use plan, ‘designated for future 
studies’ (Chesrown, 2004), whatever this might mean. The JVA, the regulatory authority 
charged with land distribution and infrastructural development in Wadi Araba, has worked its 
way down from north to south since the 1977. Wadi Araba, the most Southern part of the 
Jordan Rift Valley, was only reached in 2001 and is still not entirely covered; land distribution 
and infrastructural provision efforts are ongoing. At the same time, Wadi Araba has become 
increasingly interesting for development projects of different types, and recent years have 
witnessed a mushrooming of developmental agencies, programs and projects, pushing 
forward different agendas of development. This is particularly the case since 2007, when the 
Jordanian King visited Wadi Araba and issued the order that there should be a 
comprehensive strategy for the development of the Wadi (Jordan Times, 5/4/2007). This 
initiated a trail of development: it led to the creation of a ‘Wadi Araba Development Unit’ and 
the proliferation of strategy documents and different initiatives. It has done a lot to turn Wadi 
Araba from a blind spot to a hotspot.  
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Both the high poverty rates and the low population numbers seem to have developed quite 
an appeal for development practitioners – after all, you cannot do much harm in a place as 
desolate as this one. One reflection of this, which we have repeatedly heard from local 
inhabitants as well as organisations active in Wadi Araba, is the impression that the area has 
turned into a laboratory for different injections of development. The head of one such major 
organisation quoted a wide-spread sentiment as ihna haql tajaarub [we are a testing ground] 
(Personal communication JRF, Aqaba, 2011). This is connected to another very 
characteristic feature of the area, which is the vague regulation of authority and the frequent 
shifting of responsibilities, accompanied by disruptions in planning and implementation: the 
Wadi Araba Development Unit for example, a unit supposed to develop and implement a 
comprehensive development strategy / Master Plan for the area, was shifted around between 
three different agencies since its initiation in 2007. One corollary of this regulatory blurriness 
is that you have a great variety of agencies pursuing different initiatives, but without really 
cooperating or coordinating between them. 
 
5.3 Blueprint vs. process development: two sides of the same coin?  
When it comes to the kind of knowledge considered relevant for development in Wadi Araba, 
two differing approaches can be discerned at first sight: Blue prints for large-scale 
infrastructural, environmental or business development are provided by experts positioned in 
the capital Amman or in transnational/glocal networks of expertise. In those, the area tends 
to be imagined as an empty space, local inhabitants are at best included in the planning as 
(indirect) beneficiaries and are supposed to adapt their livelihoods accordingly. One striking 
example of this would be the planners involved in the design of a water conveyor linking the 
Read and the Dead Sea73, thereby helping to save the constantly shrinking Dead Sea and at 
the same time providing water for the inhabitants of Amman. When asking about consultation 
of the inhabitants in the planning process, one of the project representatives told us that 
‘They will be happy, because they will get economic and social benefits. This does not mean 
that we will ask them if they agree’ (Personal communication MWI, Amman, 2009). On the 
other hand, the area is also subject to development projects with participatory components. 
In such strategies, local knowledge and participation are perceived as basic ingredient of a 
successful development dish. When looking at specific organizations or projects, however, 
there are many shades of grey. A brief look at two of those organisations and their projects 
can illustrate how and why different development agencies in Wadi Araba relate to the 
                                                      
73 The proposed conveyor is further elaborated in the last chapter. 
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question of local knowledge and its integration into their systems of operation. The 
organisations/institutions JRF and JVA are mentioned above. Their programs are in this part 
of importance because their approach on knowledge of how to manage environment, land or 
farmers. 
 
5.3.1 Jordan Valley Authority 
The first example is the ‘Wadi Araba project’, which – as already mentioned in previous 
chapter - has been under the management of the (governmental) JVA and/or Aqaba Special 
ASEZA, the regulatory body in charge of the Special Economic Zone of Aqaba, bordering on 
Wadi Araba to the South. JVA was formally responsible for development of Wadi Araba since 
the 1970s but ASEZA was actually put in charge of most components of this major project 
between 2009 and 2011 - a corollary of the already mentioned blurriness of authority, as well 
as the previous relative neglect of the area, and the sudden rise of interest after 2007. By 
now, responsibility has been switched back to JVA.  
 
When talking to JVA or ASEZA representatives about the input of the inhabitants of the area 
in the project, you can notice an ambiguous discourse. On the one hand their procedures 
represent a techno-political approach, which reflects the infrastructural, trickle-down focus of 
the 50s, 60s and 80s: Any problem or need comes with a clear-cut and straightforward 
scientific or technological solution in line with their plans and schemes. A typical response to 
questions about cooperation with locals was that ‘this is about engineering; working with a 
standard model’ (Personal communication, Aqaba, 2010). Plots for the model farms are 
decided on the basis of examining soil samples in the lab and classifying them; alternative 
suggestions and different rationales (like tribal land claims, or the experience of flooding in a 
designated area) fall on deaf ears if there is no adequate scientific proof according to their 
methodology. As a JVA project manager made clear, adapting the project to people’s wishes 
will cost money and time, so they should just stop complaining and be grateful for what they 
get (Personal communication, Wadi Araba, 2011). 
 
But there is another side to the Janus face. Towards inquisitive outsiders like us, but also in 
interaction with local people involved, project managers would present themselves as 
responsive and inclusive - caring about job creation, even distribution of benefits, and 
seeking to react to any articulated needs of the locals. This does not go as far as 
systematically inquiring about any of those needs before the start of the project; it is much 
more ad-hoc and after the fact. It is, however, based on an idea of projects only being 
successful with some kind of local buy-in at some point. When JVA faced strong complaints 
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about the uneven distribution of guard jobs (for the agricultural stations set up in the course 
of the project) between the local 'asha'ir for example, they subsequently decided to increase 
their number in order to secure a more even distribution and avoid more conflicts (personal 
communication, Wadi Araba, 2011) In the practice of project implementation, compromises 
are thus being struck, and some locals do get some kind of say (Li, 1999). But most of all, it 
seems to be about setting yourself off against other agencies by appearing ‘more in tune with 
the locals’, even if it is against the other agency working on the very same project. 
Questioning the sincerity and success of other agencies during field visits to local 
beneficiaries (or in conversation with visiting researchers) is an important part of this game.  
 
5.3.2 Jordan River Foundation 
At the other end of the continuum stands the aforementioned Jordan River Foundation. As a 
Royal NGO, it provides an interesting example of an organisation whose interventions are 
nominally based on the philosophy of participation. It can thus stand in for the participatory 
turn that has become so prominent on a global scale since the 1990s, which has also 
increasingly seeped into Jordanian development organizations. In line with the non-
governmental sector spearheading this approach on a global scale, it has especially been 
picked up by the Jordanian Royal NGOs. Reasons for this might range from improved 
access to donor funding to changed organizational philosophies, or a mix of those.  
 
The presence of JRF in Wadi Araba since 2002 has greatly expanded since their 
involvement in Poverty Pockets Program in the last few years. While working under the 
national umbrella of poverty alleviation, the overall goal of JRF as an organisation is to 
empower, build capacities and create partnerships in and with local communities. The 
Foundation's doctrine of participatory development becomes visible in statements like ‘Do 
not make promises you can’t fulfil' or ‘They (i.e. locals) have to see you as their 
representative’ (Personal communication, Aqaba JRF September 2011). In project 
development and implementation, their focus lies on cooperation with charitable or 
cooperative societies (engaging in agricultural or tourist activities). JRF perceives these 
organisations as the perfect candidates for empowerment - local structures that are already 
there, showing some kind of entrepreneurial spirit or community responsibility, and ready to 
be empowered. Their interventions in Wadi Araba and elsewhere are based on what people 
ask and what is feasible for the Foundation. The know-how they bring into the process 
seems, at first sight, to concentrate on getting a process of knowledge-building and local 
engagement going.  
 
The ambivalence of local knowledge: Strategies of intervention in Wadi Araba, Jordan 
 105 
While most of their cooperation partners in Wadi Araba confirm and commend their ‘people-
centred orientation’ (Cleaver, 2001:36), the question remains how this approach is translated 
in practical turns into the socio-political reality of Wadi Araba. It is in this translation that we 
can find fissures on the ground. An example, which the Foundation perceives as a ‘success 
story’, is the agricultural cooperative in Risha. JRF helped to establish the cooperative, built a 
dam for irrigation, offered (separate) work opportunities for women in the cooperative and 
established an agricultural project. But there is also another side to the story. A cooperative 
as recipient of substantial donor funding also shapes power relations on the ground. The 
Risha cooperative’s president has not changed once since its inception ten years ago; 
people who cannot afford to buy a share of the cooperative cannot become members, and 
women are excluded from membership.74 The idea of cooperatives as equal partners is to be 
encouraged in theory, but in practice often results in a perpetuation of power relations within 
the cooperative or the locale of intervention itself. This is, of course, not unique to Wadi 
Araba's or Jordan's cooperatives, but relates to local institution-building and attempts for 
decentralisation in other parts of the world as well. More often than not, they reify rather than 
alter local power relations (Al-Husban, 2005; Cleaver, 2001; Mosse, 2005:81ff.). Another 
question was raised in the context of participatory approaches like JRF's is about the actual 
effectiveness of such interventions: who from among the local inhabitants actually benefits, 
and do they serve the professed goal of poverty alleviation? (Harrison, 2002). Project 
beneficiaries have evaluated JRF and its (and others) previous interventions of the last nine 
years in Wadi Araba positively, but the poverty rate still went up in the last years (cp. DOS, 
2010). Apparently, working with cooperatives and local government does not a priori mean 
that this will improve the lives of the 'really poor'.  
 
So – participation to what end? And where are the concurrent limits to the participatory 
methodology? One limitation is certainly set by the organization's overall orientation in the 
development business of Jordan. A program manager in the JRF headquarters for example - 
when describing the integrated approach JRF was following - stressed the need to start 
activities awareness at the schools, even if this was not requested by local communities. This 
was because JRF felt the need to start with youth, in order to change their minds towards 
becoming more business-minded.75 The long-term goal of instilling a sense of 
entrepreneurship (instead of having people continue demanding government and army jobs) 
seems to entitle project managers to go around articulated needs or add to them according 
to their own philosophy. The organisation's ideas for what is feasible and in line with the 
needs of the area thus structures the type of activities offered by field staff and affects the 
                                                      
74 Interview with inhabitant of Risha Wadi Araba, Apr. 2011 
75 Interview with JRF manager; Amman, Apr. 2011 
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strategies of those locals who get involved. Potential project beneficiaries tend to learn fast 
about the kind of participation and needs articulation that can be realistically answered by a 
specific agency or project and adapt accordingly (Mosse, 2001; 2005). 
 
Looking at the broader context of JRF's position within the political landscape of Jordan, its 
participatory focus also sheds lights on another objective. Recent years, especially the last 
one, have witnessed an increasing amount of informal talk, but also of public criticism of JRF 
as the brainchild of Queen Rania. The Queen herself, a controversial figure particularly for 
many inhabitants of Southern rural Jordan has been accused of strengthening the neoliberal 
trend in Jordanian politics, interfering in executive decision-making without formal authority, 
squandering public money and ‘building centers to boost her power and serve her interest 
against the will of Jordanians and Hashemites’, as a well-known statement of 36 tribal 
leaders in February 2010 read (Bouziane & Lenner, 2011:158). JRF has thus come under 
increasing scrutiny within Jordan. Stressing its participatory credentials can thus be regarded 
as a strategy to counter a crisis of legitimacy by demonstrating care for its beneficiaries. One 
of the cooperative heads in Wadi Araba confirmed this by saying that people were angry with 
the JRF, but that it made successful efforts to improve their services recently (Personal 
communication, Wadi Araba, 2010). At the same time, the participatory framing of operations 
has become a question of upward legitimation (Mosse, 2001:27ff.), showing that JRF is (still) 
worthy of receiving a large part of the funds earmarked for cooperation of the Jordanian 
government with Jordanian NGOs.  
 
Reviewing those two initiatives in Wadi Araba and their respective approaches regarding 
local knowledge shows that even though they markedly differ in their approach towards local 
beneficiaries, they do not neatly follow either the blueprint or the processual approach. 
Especially the mixture of participatory and technocratic approaches points to the fact that the 
integration of people, their ideas and demands does not always happen according to a 
standardised model, but also on an ad-hoc basis. It is as much based on a specific approach 
(which might or might not include an explicit participatory methodology) as on the attempt to 
set themselves apart vis-à-vis other, seemingly competing agencies in the field, and thereby 
to defend their raison d’etre in the struggle for funding, support and maintenance of 
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5.4 Twists and turns of conservation and development in Jordan 
The incorporation of participation and local knowledge in project descriptions is not restricted 
to the more 'typical' (infrastructural, culture and economic) development-oriented programs 
or projects. Of course, development as a meta-discourse does not have a clear boundary - 
as such it can't be separated from other types of intervention. These days almost all 
governmental, NGO or PPP (private public partnership) initiatives taken in Wadi Araba - from 
the construction of roads to the shifting of administrative boundaries - come under the header 
of development. One such initiative, which currently forms one of the major strategies for 
developing the area, is nature conservation. This form of intervention will constitute the focus 
of the remainder of the chapter. 
 
As authors like Birkenholtz (2007:466) point out, the conflict between expertise and local 
knowledge in relation to nature conservation is central to the question of development. Since 
their inception in the late 19th century, conservation policies have been based on the 
assumption that 'pristine' nature - uninhabited and physically separate from humans - needs 
to be conserved for the benefit of mankind. This has tended to exclude those who happened 
to inhabit those particular areas. It has provided an occasion not only for evicting and 
relocating them, but has also placed them outside the realm of legitimate knowledge about 
nature conservation (West et al., 2006: 256).  
 
The increase of nature conservation initiatives in the course of the previous century and their 
increasing connection with questions of development, however, went along with a 
reorientation of the place of people in these initiatives. Chatty and Colchester (2002) indicate 
a shift in the assumption that human activities cause degradation of the biological 
environment - a deeply entrenched assumption of conservationists for decades - to an 
awareness for the need to involve local people in the implementation of conservation 
initiatives. In ideal terms this would mean that nature conservation is given a 'human face' 
(Bell, 1987, cit. in Chatty and Colchester 2002:9). A quick look at existing literature on the 
(limited degree of) inclusion of local inhabitants into programmes of nature conservation 
suggests though that the 'human face' is still far from reach, or at least questionable in its 
current state (Belsky, 1999; Brechin et al., 2003; Colchester, 2003; Pimbert and Pretty, 
2009).  
 
As an example for these often very ambivalent processes, we now focus on the conflicts 
around the set-up and management of protected areas in Wadi Araba. By reconstructing and 
deconstructing the discourse and praxis of conservation of the Royal Society for the 
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Conservation of Nature (RSCN), we want to open up space to explore the actual role and 
place of local inhabitants in conservation and development. What role is envisaged for them 
in the conceptions of conservation planners, and how do those supposed to be included 
adopt or - in this case - rebuff this conception? 
 
5.4.1 The Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature 
RSCN was established in 1966. As in other cases, the idea of protecting nature in Jordan 
came into being in order to preserve hunting grounds for the elites. Gradually, the 
organisation adopted the role of conservation agency, focusing its work on Protected Areas. 
Since 1973, RSCN is in charge of managing all protected areas in the country (Chatelard, 
2012: 7-8).  
 
Global paradigmatic shifts regarding nature conservation, the development of new 
techniques as well as institutional learning processes have left their mark on Jordanian 
conservation thinking. In the course of its institutional development, the place RSCN has 
given to local inhabitants in or around its reserves has undergone significant changes.  
 
While the period between the 1970s and 1990s was dominated by the idea that protected 
areas need to be fenced and policed in order to prevent human intrusions, the early 1990s 
witnessed a major change. This was connected to the development push in global 
conservation thinking. It came in parallel with the ‘greening of aid’ and the increasing 
prominence of the concept of ‘sustainable development’ since the late 1980s, which 
promised to unite conservation and development objectives under one banner. (Hicks, 2008). 
By the 1990s, this new thinking arrived in Jordan, and RSCN subsequently redirected itself 
towards development by piloting the approach of ‘Integrated Conservation and Development’ 
in the Middle East. The occasion for this shift was provided by a major project funded by the 
World Bank’s and UNDP's jointly established Global Environment Facility (GEF). In its 
course, a protected area in the South of Jordan called Dana reserve, part of which is located 
in Wadi Araba, was initiated as a pilot project for a new way of managing conservation and 
has been serving as a blueprint for other reserves until today (Johnson, 2007).  
 
The new philosophy was directed towards managing instead of fencing off protected areas. 
Conservation was supposed to be made beneficial for local communities by addressing 
their social and economic needs, and by offering them economic alternatives to their 
otherwise ‘harmful’ practices (such as hunting, wood cutting, and grazing of livestock). The 
most common alternatives established through the project are employment in the reserve 
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(e.g. as ranger), ecotourism activities (e.g. as guide), and so-called ‘socio-economic projects‘ 
(mostly handicrafts). While providing local inhabitants with economic benefits, ecotourism 
and socio-economic projects were simultaneously supposed to and also succeeded in 
funding a substantial part of RSCN operations. The search for new financial resources for 
RSCN (in the absence of major government funding), helped by an extensive infusion of 
international expertise, has turned RSCN into a highly market-oriented organisation. This, in 
turn, has made it an organisation that is sought after by the donor community because it is 
perceived as accountable, transparent and highly visible, particularly through its ecotourism 
projects76 (Chatelard, 2012). 
 
Local knowledge and participation were, however, not a big issue in this approach. 
Community involvement was equated with providing employment and benefits, and not 
regarded as a base for the further development of conservation approaches.77 Cooperation 
happened individually, with certain key figures in the area, but not in a grounded structural 
way.   
 
Over time, Dana has always been used as test case for new initiatives. These ranged from 
changes in engagement with inhabitants inside or close to the reserves to management 
issues. Some compromises with local inhabitants were struck; for example in developing a 
seasonal grazing scheme, which came as a reaction to community pressure for opening up 
parts of the Protected Area for grazing, or a goat-fattening project in Wadi Araba. The latter, 
focusing on the core livelihood strategy of local pastoralists, constituted a significant, albeit 
only temporary deviation from the standard approach of developing alternative livelihood 
options in order to ease grazing pressures (Johnson and Abul Hawa,1999; Rowe, 2006). But 
experiments also went in a different direction, with the recent concession of an eco-lodge (in 
Wadi Araba) to a private investor, who now runs the lodge and provides the RSCN with an 
annual fixed return. In this highly acclaimed pilot project, management as well as tourism 
development are outsourced to the private sector due to its supposed superior knowledge 
about these issues. In monetary terms, this strategy has paid off; visitors' numbers, financial 
returns and also salaries of local staff have significantly increased; the outcome in terms of 
'ownership' is, however, much more ambivalent. 'Local knowledge' has not played any 
significant role in this effort to improve the efficiency of RSCN's tourism endeavours; in fact it 
has been sidelined through the focus on handing over management of tourism facilities to 
                                                      
76 Personal communication, Amman, April 2011 
77 This was not by default, but was the outcome of strategic considerations. At the time it seemed to 
project representatives that without providing economic benefits in the first place, local people, often 
impoverished and neglected by government authorities for decades, would not buy in to the idea of 
conservation. 
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outside experts (Personal communication, Wadi Araba, 2010). People's participation is again 
reduced to employment of locals in and around the eco-lodge, albeit under more insecure 
working conditions than before. 
 
5.4.2 The last resort? 
Conforming to the turn of the tides in global conservation thinking and based on some 
lessons learned from established protected areas like Dana, RSCN has also put new models 
of conservation on the table, which give attention to more participatory ways of conservation 
and development. On certain aspects, it has thus moved further away from classical models 
of ‘fortress conservation’ (Corson, 2010:581. With a new round of GEF funding, the RSCN is 
currently piloting a model called Integrated Ecosystem Management' (IEM). Next to the more 
participatory establishment of protected areas in consultation with local communities, it 
introduces the concept of ‘Special Conservation Areas’ (SCAs). Corresponding to global 
conservationist emphasis on incorporating sustainably utilised environments into the system 
of protected areas, SCAs are regarded as a type of conservation site that is locally managed 
and promotes more sustainable forms of natural resource use (Zimmerer, 2006). Based on 
the confidence that these tools will make development more participatory, more empowering, 
and more collaborative (Korf, 2010:714), Social Assessments (SAs) and site-specific 
Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) will precede the further development of this new 
model. Additionally, the management of both protected areas and special conservation areas 
is supposed to happen in cooperation with Local Co-management Committees, Community 
Based Organizations and representatives (World Bank, 2006). It should be stressed though 
that this approach has not become the new standard operating procedure of RSCN; it is a 
pilot model that has been added to the existing repertoire of protected areas management. 
The Dana approach of Integrated Conservation and Development with its focus on socio-
economic benefits also still lingers in the background as a model to replicate.  
 
The limited degree to which such a perspective has taken hold in the organisation can be 
seen in a parallel strategic revision, which is still ongoing. Since around 2008 RSCN, 
encouraged by an external consultancy, is starting to realise that it has overstretched its 
capacities. Especially in relation to local inhabitants, there is a feeling that the organisation 
cannot stand up to the expectations of being a provider of employment, services and other 
benefits. Contrasting the estimated number of inhabitants directly affected in their livelihoods 
by the establishment of protected areas with the limited resources of RSCN has led to the 
realisation that community involvement needs to be seriously reconsidered. The overall idea 
of the envisaged institutional transformation is to redirect RSCN from the role of a provider to 
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that of a facilitator. As such, it is supposed to represent the respective communities and their 
unresolved problems, for example by developing and presenting reports about the state of 
the community to responsible government agencies. While details of how exactly this should 
work are yet to be fleshed out, the idea so far represents an attempt to deflect demands for 
social provision, let alone compensation for the loss of livelihood options, to the government 
and thereby reduce RSCN's role to its original mandate as a 'pure' conservation agency 
again. Moreover, the 'transformation strategy' so far seems to be based on a relatively 
unproblematic notion that RSCN, due to its long-term experience in the respective localities, 
can gauge communities' needs and adequately (re-)present them to the outside world. 
Besides general questions about the bases on and ways in which their needs would be 
assessed, the recent admission of RSCN managers that its relations with local communities 
in some places have faltered or even broken down, makes it hard to imagine an 
unproblematic switch of roles towards acting as a 'facilitator'.78 In addition, it remains an open 
question whether or how the role switch would be linked to its pilot attempt to integrate local 
voices into conservation planning and administration.  
 
In summary, the last 20 years of strategic development reveal three different approaches to 
the question of local knowledge and participation: In Integrated Conservation and 
Development, locals primarily appear as beneficiaries; there is little use of their knowledge, 
and the establishment of Protected Areas doesn’t depend on them. In Integrated Ecosystem 
Management, locals are an essential part of the process from the start, and their knowledge 
is to be included for conservation to succeed. In the Transformation Strategy, locals feature 
as marginalised communities that need lobbying for them, but cannot be satisfied with 
RSCNs limited resources for distribution, so RSCN better stops trying and turn into a 
facilitator for their needs. While this development on the one hand represents a gradual 
rethinking and strategic shift, the three approaches are on the other hand still equally valid 
and informing practices of protected area management and establishment. High-level 
managerial staff also frequently switches between them, depending on the context, 
audience, or project.  
 
In spite of those strategic changes, there is one aspect in the relation between RSCN and 
the local inhabitants that has stayed remarkably constant over time. Since its establishment, 
RSCN's operations have been based on the assumption that local practices constitute a 
threat to the conservation of biodiversity in and around (potential) protected areas. These 
practices are considered an important cause of environmental degradation. In the area we 
are focusing on, RSCN refers especially to the effects on the environment through grazing of 
                                                      
78 Powerpoint presentation of RSCN manager, April 2010 
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livestock and hunting by local inhabitants. The idea of an incompatibility between 
conservation and pastoral land use, which up to the 1990s still reflected contemporary 
conservation thinking, has withstood shifts in the latter since then and still dominates the 
thinking of senior RSCN management (Rowe, 2007:770). This becomes visible, for example, 
in a paper about desert tourism, which reiterates the familiar narrative of deficiency when 
discussing the role of the population of Wadi Araba that lives close to Dana Reserve:  
 
Several thousand people from nomadic and settled communities live in 
and around the Reserve, many of whom are partially or entirely dependent on the 
reserve for their livelihood. Their use of the reserve, however, is causing serious 
ecological problems, stemming from excessive livestock grazing, hunting and fuel 
wood collection. These activities had little detrimental impact in the past, when tribal 
populations were smaller and Bedouins could practice their nomadic lifestyles without 
issues of national borders, settlement policies and major infrastructure developments. 
But now the pressure of these traditional livelihoods is concentrated in the last 
remaining areas of unspoiled landscape and is the major threat to their ecological 
integrity. (Johnson, 2007:3) 
 
The assumed causal relation between local practices of resource use and the degradation of 
nature has thus firmly remained in place. As the above quote illustrates, it is based on the 
premise of pastoral ecosystems as stable equilibrium, which become threatened by 
overstocking and overgrazing - an assumption which has been strongly questioned since the 
beginning of the 1990s (Chatty, 2003:91). International conventions by now stress the 
contribution of 'mobile indigenous peoples' to sustainable resource use. The 2002 'Dana 
Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation' for example, hosted and supported by the 
RSCN and a network of researchers, politicians, International Governmental Organisation 
(IGOs) and INGOs International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGOs), holds that 
‘through their traditional resource use practices and culture-based respect for nature, many 
mobile peoples are still making a significant contribution to the maintenance of the earth’s 
ecosystems, species and genetic diversity and explicitly recognises "mobile peoples” rights, 
management responsibilities and capacities’ (Refugee Studies Center et al. 2002). Such a 
perspective, however, is hardly reflected in RSCN strategies and institutional practices to 
date.79 
 
                                                      
79 An exception to this is the IEM strategic document. Rather than local practices of resource use, this 
document points to development interventions as main environmental and cultural threat to the area of 
the Jordan Rift Valley. (World Bank, 2006:1) 
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As we will point out in the remainder of this chapter, the basic assumption of locals as 
predators of nature and the invalidation of their knowledge and ways of life is felt by the 
'objects of intervention', and forms a base for their resistance. In addition, they pick up on the 
contradictions of the different presented strategic approaches, which are all currently in use 
within RSCN, and all also applied to Wadi Araba. This inconsistent use of strategies has 
caused significant frictions on the ground in Wadi Araba, which we now turn to.  
 
5.5 Project fatigue vs. People fatigue: Frictions in Wadi Araba  
Besides agricultural development and megaprojects like the already mentioned Red-Dead 
canal, conservation cum (eco-)tourism is currently perceived as one of the best paths to the 
development of the Wadi Araba. Many planners and practitioners agreed upon this new 
strategy for the area, which makes RSCN a crucial actor in the area. Looking at RSCN’s 
current role in Wadi Araba, it is possible to see its institutional evolution, and at the same 
time the contradictions and struggles associated to it. 
 
The area currently contains one established protected area (Dana, since 1994), two 
protected areas that are yet to be established (Qatar, Jabal Mas'ouda), plus one Special 
Conservation Area (Rahma). Dana, still seen as the blueprint, works according to the 
‘Integrated Conservation and Development Model’, i.e. the philosophy of ‘making it pay’ (Irani 
& Johnson, 1998), with little involvement of inhabitants. The new proposed protected areas 
and the Special Conservation Area come under the framework of the current GEF project. 
Based on the new philosophy, they are supposed to be established in a more participatory 
mode. While the proposed new conservation sites were initially met with friendly curiosity by 
involved inhabitants, the last two years have seen the development of staunch resistance 
against any kind of involvement of RSCN in the area.   
 
A number of different issues have led to the recent cancellation or freezing of all of the new 
initiatives. The reasons for this are disputed, and raise the question of the relevance of local 
knowledge. Most of the opposing arguments do not fit neatly with the language of 
participation and its problematiques, but rather with one of resistance. As we will illustrate 
though, resistance does not imply that there is an untainted 'indigenous' subject endowed 
with a knowledge that stems from a time and space 'beyond' development interventions such 
as RSCN's. Rather, it is shaped by current as well as previous interventions and builds on 
their contradictions, gaps, broken promises or diagnoses of deficiency, which are re-
appropriated and strategically used (Li, 2007; Olivier de Sardan, 2005). In this case, the 
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resistance to any new form of nature conservation in the area of Wadi Araba is intricately 
connected to the cautious and ambiguous participatory turn of RSCN.  
 
This intertwinement becomes apparent, for example, when tracing the cancellation of the 
proposed protected areas of Jabal Mas'ouda and Qatar. There are some ambiguities in 
reconstructing how the cancellation of the proposed protected area of Jabal Mas’ouda came 
about: At RSCN, the main reasoning you will hear is that Jabal Mas’ouda was part of the old 
suggested network of protected areas but that a new ecological survey revealed such a high 
level of degradation that RSCN decided to leave it and switch to another area.80 There is 
some acknowledgement of the fact that there were conflicts (with the adjacent Petra 
Regional Authority, as well as with local people, who wanted to use that land for agriculture, 
and are waiting for a recognition of collective or individual land claims), but those are not 
considered as the main underlying reason. On the other hand, accounts by different 
agencies (e.g. JVA) as well as those of local people focus much more on the aspect of 
rejection by the prospected future inhabitants of the area, and point to agencies other than 
RSCN as responsible for the cancellation81,82 Whereas RSCN thus gives conservationist 
expertise as reason for cancellation, most others refer to local opposition. It is of course not 
unique for this particular area that conservationists' expertise is pitted against local 
opposition. Similar issues are at play when looking at the freezing of operations in the 
second proposed protected area (Atyyat, 2011; Namrouqa, 2011) and have occurred in other 
cases as well (Brechin et al., 2003; Li, 2007).  
 
Rather than engaging in a futile search for who is actually wrong or right, it seems more 
fruitful to explore what the stories told to us about the cancellations or freezing of the different 
areas in Wadi Araba can reveal about the relation between the different versions and actors. 
Of particular interest for this chapter is how the idea of participation, present in almost any 
development initiative proposal, plays out with regard to the proposed conservation areas. 
While there are influential factors that go well beyond RSCN and its past and present role in 
Wadi Araba, the current dynamics coalesce around the 'offer' of participatory conservation 
and development it has put on the table. 
 
We would argue that the baseline for implementing their initiatives is an implicit technocratic 
one, aiming to solve predefined problems: 'Not enough nature is protected? Let's establish 
more protected areas. People are not happy with this prospect? Let's do it with more 
                                                      
80 Interview with RSCN manager, Sept. 2011 
81 Informal talk with RSCN and JVA project representatives, Sept. 2011  
82 Interviews with local representatives and inhabitants of Risha, April and Sept. 2011 
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participation'. Reacting to complication from such a solution-oriented perspective is to silence 
any political dimension related to the projects. At the same time, the adoption of a 
participative framework represents an attempt to be more attentive to local needs and 
concerns. The intertwinement of these seemingly paradoxical objectives is not surprising, as 
organisations like RSCN have to be accountable towards their mission as well as their 
donors and at the same time find root in the field. But this ambivalence can create a lot of 
friction on the ground, where they are supposed to root. While others (e.g. JVA and JRF) 
seem to do fine so far, RSCN has become subject to resistance. One could summarise the 
different ongoing dynamics as ‘project fatigue vs. people fatigue’.  
 
5.5.1 Project fatigue 
On the ‘project fatigue’ side, people have been listening to the same talk of participation, 
partnership and local benefits and answered the same questionnaires about needs for years, 
but they have not seen their situation improve noticeably. Now they are claiming what has 
been promised to them for years; not necessarily and exclusively by RSCN, but by the 
variety of competing agencies, each posing as people-oriented in their own way. Local 
objection to projects has too often been invalidated as ignorance, local stories or myths and 
has rarely been taken serious as based on knowledge and experience. Although most new 
project proposals describe local people as partners and an inclusion of their knowledge as an 
important prerequisite for the success of projects, people themselves do not feel like they are 
really treated as such.  
 
Asked about the basic problems with RSCN, one of our interlocutors in Wadi Araba for 
example stated: "The problem is that they come with the attitude that people know nothing, 
they think that people are primitive, and they want to develop them into modern people".83 
 
Based on this impression, they are now confronting the participatory rhetoric head-on and 
exposing its limits, and RSCN provides a rewarding occasion.  
 
Although the perspective described in this quote tends to imagine people in Wadi Araba as 
living at the end of the world, they are connected with each other in the region and beyond. 
They exchange information and integrate this into their own strategic choices. In particular, 
people have gained knowledge by observing RSCN and its projects over the last decades. A 
lot is based on perception, and as information about established protected areas and 
previous experiences with RSCN gets spread over the country - through delegations, family 
                                                      
83 Personal communication Wadi Araba/Rahme, 2011 
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connections and rumours - perceptions get sharpened and suspicions rise. What is often 
conceived as 'local' or 'indigenous' knowledge thus presents itself in a way which differs from 
the cherished conceptions of development planners: it is not spatially confined and fixed, but 
shaped through interaction with the outside world.  
 
The simultaneity of approaches within RSCN, which was explored in the previous chapter, is 
irrelevant to people; it rather serves to undermine the credibility of the current ‘pilot 
participatory approach’. For locals, RSCN is RSCN. When you ask about the refusal to 
cooperate with RSCN regarding the new conservation sites, people will refer to the 
concession of the eco-lodge in the adjacent Dana reserve to the private sector. This transfer 
is perceived as proof that RSCN cannot be serious about local management of protected 
areas and tourism. They also stress that RSCN takes the huge majority of the funding for 
them anyway, and not for developing the area of concern. If they were serious, why did they 
not give the lodge to the local community to manage? (Interview with cooperative member in 
Rahma, Sept 2011) What makes sense to RSCN managers in Amman as an institutional 
evolution is taken by locals as reason for suspicion. 
 
Institutions of development tend to have difficulty imagining the effect of their own operations. 
As Timothy Mitchell reminds us, ‘international development has a special need to overlook 
this internal involvement in the places and problems it analyses, and presents itself instead 
as an external intelligence that stands outside the object it describes’ (Mitchell T., 2002:210-
11). Our analysis shows that it's not due to an inherent logic of development discourse that 
the consequences of RSCN’s own contributions to local conflicts are neglected. Rather, one 
can pinpoint specific institutional and processual exigencies, like the need to think about the 
generation of revenues, which is prioritised over the question of the effects in the respective 
localities. This prioritisation is not unchallenged though; it is subject to questions and critique 
even by some at RSCN who are more connected to ‘the field’.  
 
The project fatigue is also related to the fact that core issues and demands of local people 
are left unaddressed in the participatory framework. As mentioned before, development 
initiatives tend to have a depoliticising effect in their efforts of social improvement (Ferguson, 
1994; Li, 2007; Mitchell T., 2002). Factors external to a specific project scope, such as 
climatic aspects, modes of state intervention and regulation, or previous or simultaneous 
development actions can significantly determine the reaction of local populations to an 
incoming project. But it is exactly those local histories of socio-economic and political 
interventions that tend to be neglected and silenced in the project logic (Olivier de Sardan, 
2005:139). We argue that it is through this erasing that the causes of friction are not 
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recognised. This most prominently concerns the issue of land. Land claims, which are a 
crucial part of local demands these days, are either ignored (JVA) or placed outside the 
scope of the project (RSCN). This is not surprising, as they are connected to much more 
powerful interests and agencies (among them the Jordanian government as well as the 
Royal Court), which even RSCN does not have very good access to. For that reason it is 
also rather irrational for people to concede land for conservation to RSCN, which implies 
giving up any claims the local inhabitants might have on it. The current situation, inspired by 
Arab uprisings elsewhere, puts those land issues very much on the table and makes people 
voice their unrecognised land claims more loudly.  
 
5.5.2 Local knowledge in flux 
When analyzing resistance to the protected areas in Wadi Araba, it becomes clear that local 
knowledge is neither timeless nor homogenous. We should not romanticise Wadi Araba prior 
to the entrance of ‘development agents’. Much like other supposedly remote rural places, 
Wadi Araba has long been a connected place, where knowledge has been influenced and 
shaped by different outside forces and previous interventions seeking to 'improve' the 
respective populations. As such, it is neither clearly local (as in: locally bounded), nor would it 
be appropriate to label it 'indigenous', with all its concomitant associations as being 
‘unincorporated, resistant, incommensurable, originary, authentic, or simply, an alternative’ 
(Gupta,1998:180).   
 
Local people are not isolated from the world outside, and are also well aware of how to use 
their knowledge and connections. This could be illustrated with an example related to land: 
While land registration in Wadi Araba was quasi non-existent before independence, these 
days people are very keen to register and have private ownership.84 This limited access to 
private land is an important reason for refusing RSCN interventions. Local people, 
particularly those with access to land and resources, are as much aware of the value of land 
today as any other actor interested in the area.  
 
Also with regard to land use, there is no unchangeable, locally confined knowledge. Instead, 
land use practices of inhabitants need to be historically and contextually situated (Schareika, 
1997:19). With regard to agriculture as a way of land use, Jordan has always been pushing 
its limits of becoming the 'bread basket' of the greater region. Whereas the northern valley 
constituted the agricultural focus point from the establishment of the Kingdom, today also the 
                                                      
84 In other parts of Jordan, inhabitants would voluntary register already under the Ottomans for 
different socio-economic or political reasons. The willingness to have land officially registered - and 
thus pay taxes - differed significantly from place to place. (Fischbach, 2000) 
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southern part, Wadi Araba, has come into the green picture. There certainly exists an 
agricultural knowledge based on social interaction and engagement with the land in the area. 
But knowledge and practices of land use are as much shaped by the "politics of agricultural 
operations" (Gupta, 1998:181). Within these politics, the different practices of local 
agricultural knowledge are constantly adapted to the setting offered by the changing and 
competing agencies intervening in the area, and therefore subject to change. They are 
shaped by forces such as prices for saplings, the type of traders or merchants they have 
access to, government approval for the usage of wells, and many other factors.   
 
Local knowledge also does not only constitute a base for resistance, but also for alternative 
strategies and alliances. In relation to RSCN, personal employment or benefit, as well as the 
conviction that the protected area is in fact a good idea, have been mentioned as motivations 
for supporting them (Interviews with inhabitants of Risha, Sept 2011). Those who do not 
approve the presence of RSCN in the area also create alliances with other agencies active in 
Wadi Araba (such as JRF, JVA or the governor of the province).  
 
To conclude, all the different orientations are part of a heterogeneous set of dispositions that 
constitute knowledge and inform practices and strategies of local inhabitants 
(Gupta,1998:183). At the same time, various types of knowledge and practices are 
concealed from an outside perspective like ours, or that of development agencies. The 
articulations of knowledge used with or against RSCN (or development projects in general) 
come from specific individuals. They mostly tend to stem from local elites, rarely from 
women, poor people and other marginalised groups who are nominally the main target group 
of development (Mosse, 2005:81ff). The silencing of the latter voices does not happen 
coincidentally in processes of project implementation as well as in a context of contestation.  
 
5.5.3 People fatigue 
On the other side of the equation, you can find an increasing ‘people fatigue’. Obviously the 
local knowledge/critique coming out of the consultations and negotiations of the last months 
does not correspond to what the planners had in mind when designing a new participatory 
approach to conservation. The outcome is too unruly, too fundamental and too political to be 
contained by participatory tools like PRAs and co-management committees, or to be 
productively included in the project. This has lead to internal discussions about the 
usefulness of participatory approaches. 
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At the moment, you could distil three different reactions to this impasse, which roughly 
correspond to the three different strategies outlined in the second part. A small minority of 
RSCN staff thinks that the local opposition has a point. They still see the need to include 
locals in the management of any new protected area in recognition of their rights, and 
advocate an entirely new formula of sharing of benefits. They are not finding much sympathy 
among decision-makers within RSCN though. Other voices, more significant in number, 
overtly or implicitly opt for withdrawal from participation mode. Frustrated with the lack of 
local enthusiasm about the opportunities offered, they fall back on the national mandate of 
RSCN as to legitimate operations in the last instance. Reacting to our remark that there is a 
lot of opposition to the establishment of protected areas in Wadi Araba, one senior manager 
commented:  
 
'It is like this all over the world, it’s the story of conservation. In this regard Jordan is 
quite advanced. It’s a matter of two different viewpoints regarding the value of the 
site; they are conflicting. The communities do not want to have any negative elements 
from out of the area, but the nation has the right to conserve and protect 
biodiversity'.85 
 
Here the old conservationist mantra of having superior knowledge reasserts itself - but it 
doesn't by itself provide an answer to the question about alternative ways to deal with local 
communities. The third reaction, and the one that attempts such an answer, comes from 
those voices (particularly in the senior management of RSCN) who see the way out of the 
‘community trouble’ in the idea of RSCN as facilitator. The facilitator's role implies that RSCN 
goes back to the essence of its mandate - nature conservation - and helps out inhabitants 
only in a mediating manner. In this way RSCN dissociates itself from the local expectation of 
being a provider. To mediate, one needs to be able to address the concerns that came to the 
surface together with the refusal of the new proposed protected areas, but RSCN has not 
really accomplished that. 
 
As a conclusion to the intricacies of participation and local knowledge on both sides of the 
equation, we can state that in the case of RSCN's operations in Wadi Araba, participation 
has failed to serve as a referent, which can unite the interests of multiple stakeholders. In 
other cases, the 'banner of participation' has not necessarily solved underlying conflicts, but 
made it possible to establish and carry out projects. Like 'empowerment' or 'poverty 
alleviation', it constitutes a label, which is sufficiently vague to provide room for interpretation 
and translation between different interests. It is exactly this vagueness, which brings in the 
                                                      
85 Interview with RSCN management Sept. 2011 
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possibility to build temporary alliances around it. In successful cases, vague referents like 
this can contribute to establishing a relative coherence of development interventions (Mosse 
and Lewis, 2006). In our case, however, previous experiences, obvious contradictions and 
conflicts of interests have precluded the emergence of this relative stability. The empty 
signifier of participation has not succeeded to provide a sufficiently large amount of imagined 
coherence; it has proven to be too contentious and resulted in 'project fatigue vs. people 
fatigue'.  
 
5.6 Conclusion: The Frankenstein of participatory development 
 
The turns taken in development thinking in the last few decades have brought us today to a 
critical point. Not only do (social) scientists raise questions about the notion ‘participation’, 
but so do the so-called ‘target groups’.  
 
With this chapter we zoomed in on the remote area of Wadi Araba to illustrate some of the 
contradictions that lay base for frictions between the RSCN and local inhabitants. In the 
evolution of RSCN, one can easily detect the parallel evolution of the global environment 
governance agents (e.g. the World Bank). RSCN has to twist and turn its policies and project 
implementations to stand up to the expectations from donors and local inhabitants. By 
adopting the participatory approach to get a stake in the area - where they have to compete 
with several other development agents - RSCN has put itself in a very complex position. 
Several provocations for this situation have been pointed out in the chapter. Mainly the 
double standard that is applied by RSCN - but again not exclusively by RSCN - towards 
people and their knowledge has led to a significant distrust between both parties. RSCN has 
overstretched its capacity as development agent by making empty promises to people who 
have been promised so much, but only have seen little happening. Without romanticising ‘the 
locals’, people have learned over the past decades how development agents work and how 
to deal with them. Also the opposite happened; RSCN doesn’t know anymore how to deal 
with people. This is what we called in the end; a people fatigue.  
 
There is actually one crucial thing RSCN particularly has failed; it has neglected all the time 
that like any development intervention, conservation projects are deeply political forms of 
intervention. With every intervention in the area, where there is already an existing political 
reality – or even several realities if you want - new forms of conflict arise around control of 
land, resources etc. As a strategy as many others, RSCN reaches out to the participatory 
toolbox, hoping that a PRA will smooth up sensitive issues. Notwithstanding its efforts, we 
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can witness an attempt of people in Wadi Araba to re-politicise social relations through for 
example refusing cooperation to the efforts for more participatory conservation.  
 
The participatory turn of RSCN, which has been very ambivalent and limited, has created its 
own Frankenstein. Over time this way of operating with people has turned its ugly head 
towards RSCN.  
 
Similar to other container concepts in current development and conservation discourse, such as 
'indigenousness', 'empowerment' or '(local) community', the notion of 'participation' could provide an 
entry point for advancing political projects of disempowered groups. Only until today not rarely these 
concepts run counter to their actual objectives (cf. Gupta 1998, Olivier de Sardan 2005:144ff.), in the 
case of RSCN: Helping Nature, Helping People. 
 
But the field of participatory approaches in development is wide. 'Participation' inside 
development approaches, as Hickey and Mohan (2005) illustrate, is not a fixed notion. It has 
been subjected to different interpretations and thus bears the potential to be repoliticised. 
The resistance that came to the fore in Wadi Araba could open doors for a different, broader 
and more political understanding of participation. It could actually be regarded as 
engagement, not as withdrawal. If RSCN wants to adopt a new role as facilitator under these 
conditions, 'faciliation' can only be based on allowing social and political conflicts to enter the 
frame. But this would mean having to engage with uncomfortable issues that are often rather 
suppressed: the legacy of decades of blueprint development for example, as well as broader 
issues affecting the 'governance beyond the center'. 
 
Much like development interventions overall, conservation projects are a deeply political form 
of intervention which produce new forms of conflict centered on control of land, resources, 
etc. (Duffy, 2006) At the same time, they attempt to defuse such conflicts, for example by 
including schemes from the toolkit of participatory development, such as PRAs. The case we 
have looked at in Wadi Araba demonstrates that such depoliticisations are not always 
successful. More interesting is that we can witness an attempt to repoliticise social relations 
in Wadi Araba through refusing cooperation with efforts at (more) participatory conservation.  
 
To conclude, we can say that when local knowledge is not articulated according to plan, it is 
made invisible or bent to suit planning requirements rather than used as a base for rethinking 
strategies of intervention. However, as ambivalent and limited as the participatory turn of 
RSCN and others may be - it has created a Frankenstein; i.e. it has developed a life of its 
own and rears its ugly head now. Much like other concepts in current development and 
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conservation discourse, such as 'indigenousness', 'empowerment' or '(local) community', the 
notion of 'participation' can thus provide an entry point for advancing political projects of 
disempowered groups, which more often than not run counter to the actual objectives of a 
project (cf. Gupta 1998, Olivier de Sardan 2005:144ff.)  So the ‘participation approach’ as 
adapted by RSCN now goes against RSCN itself and blocks the business as usual.  
 
The following chapter will approach Wadi Araba as a landscape formed by human and non-
human elements. This approach enables to understand why the implementation of a nature 
reserve causes friction as it starts from the dichotomy nature-culture in its project planning.  
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VI. Techno-politics in concrete: The Red Sea Dead Sea water conveyor 
 
Since ancient times the Dead Sea has been a centrepiece to the history and development 
of three cultural and religious traditions. The Dead Sea and its unique environment are 
changing. The water level has been dropping at an alarming rate for decades. If no urgent 
action is taken to remedy the situation, the decline is likely to cause severe environmental 
damage. (TOR World Bank, 2005) 
 
6.1 Ceci n’est pas une pipe 
In 2005, the governments of Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority86 announced an 
enquiry into a new potential megaproject with potential benefits for the three parties. This 
project is a water conveyor that would run from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. The outcome 
derived from the implementation of the conveyor was presented as a win–win situation for 
three reasons. First, it will salvage the shrinking Dead Sea. Second, it will desalinate the 
water and generate energy that will be distributed to the three parties. Lastly, the conveyor 
will symbolise cooperation and peace in the region (World Bank, October 2010). 
 
At first sight, the proposed conveyor seems to be a classical example of a grand scale 
development project. In the Terms of Reference, a comparison is drawn to similar projects in 
the world with regard to their magnitude (World Bank, October 2010). This is certainly not a 
unique enterprise. The idea of building the Red Sea Dead Sea water conveyor has had a 
wide range of predecessors with the same objectives87. Water related concerns in Jordan 
have been on the national and international agendas since early 1900s Different designs 
have been produced but then cancelled, revised or put on hold. Today, the scarcity of water 
in Jordan is a high priority and, more than ever, it is connected to the rapid increase in the 
population (by birth or migration88).  
 
                                                      
86 Although in international terms the areas of the West Bank and Gaza are referred to as the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), previous studies have generally referred to them as the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Furthermore, the general naming of the three initiators of this project has 
been an issue. Israel did not want to have to recognize the OPT/PA as a fully autonomous (national) 
entity.  
87 In the further outline of this chapter, I will also refer to this conveyor as the Red-Dead Conveyor  
88 Recently the influx of Syrian refugees is heavily emphasized in the media. Similar trend as in 2003 
when a Iraqis migrated to Jordan.  
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As stated, the reports published by the World Bank alone indicate that the Red Sea Dead 
Sea water conveyor is an enormous construction, but, as all other gigantic water projects in 
the world, it is a necessity.  
 
The aim of this final chapter is not to deny the actual problems with water in Jordan and more 
specifically with the Dead Sea, nor is it a question of being in favour of or against the Red-
Dead project. In this part of my dissertation, I will argue that in the realm of mega 
infrastructure projects, one can question the a-political cover wrapped around the conveyor. 
The connection between expertise, infrastructure, development and power has also been 
made before. Authors such as Ribeiro (1994), Mitchell T. (2002), Van Aken (2003) and Kaika 
(2006) analysed rather similar case studies. They examined projects which have been 
implemented and whose impact can be empirically observed. The new proposed water 
conveyor in the south of Jordan has not been implemented, and it is doubtful if this will 
change. Therefore, this chapter actually concerns a future case study. Nevertheless, it is a 
case study that has already been a subject of research. Specifically, technical analyses have 
been done on this future project or similar projects that have never been carried out (Scott et 
al., 2003; Abu Qdais, 2002, 2008; Gavrieli et al., 2005; Murakami & Wolf, 1995).  
 
The idea to study the water conveyor emerged three years ago. In those three years, not 
only did the project take different turns and shapes; my approach for analysing this case 
study also changed. It sometimes seemed like it was almost too complex or useless to frame 
it in the existing literature. By keeping an eye on the progression of the project for three 
years, the meaning of the conveyor project did not become crystal clear, but it made me 
realise that this project is an example par excellence of current ‘progressive’ thinking. 
Progressive is not to be understood in a radical political and emancipatory way, but rather in 
teleological terms.  
 
Since the project has yet to be implemented, there are no empirical facts and effects 
resulting from its construction. Hence, the main part of the chapter will be based on the 
published (pre-)studies of the conveyor and interviews with informants who are part of the 
different study groups and representatives. Nevertheless, the most neglected, but from my 
perspective most interesting, aspect of the case study is the effects of the mere idea of 
developing a mega-project on the ground, i.e. in the social reality of Wadi Araba (and 
beyond).  
 
The image of Jordan as the backyard of the old greater Syria or the buffer zone of the 
Ottoman Empire has been one that the current rulers of the state prefer to counter with the 
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image of modern nation-state. However, Jordan ranks fourth concerning water scarcity and 
at the same time Jordan has absorbed several great refugee influx what increased the 
pressure on the available water supply. Images that Jordan describe have been very 
influential, with regard to the water conveyor the picture strongly emphasises strongly the 
connection between geography and demography. Timothy Mitchell describes in the case for 
the Nile delta in Egypt a similar image that focuses on the river, the packed population living 
on the riverbanks, the surrounding desert to analyse the delta ‘in terms of the tangible limits 
of nature, physical space, and human reproduction’ (Mitchell T., 2002:210). Within the 
description of the Nile delta or Jordan as obstructed by natural boundaries, answers for 
solutions to overcome those boundaries are ‘ a more scientific management of resources, 
and new technologies’ (Mitchell T., 2002:210). As Mitchell also concludes, the solutions (i.e. 
the Aswan Dam or the Red Sea Dead Sea water conveyor) are not merely about 
management and technology, but also about the social and politics.  
 In the attempt to approach the water conveyor from a techno-political angle, I hope to 
avoid the traps of a single technocratic management discussion and succeed to illustrate the 
interconnections of such powerful notions as necessity, global development and opportunity. 
As the last chapter of this dissertation it illustrates how Jordan (or more concrete the ruling 
actors) is continuously working on the form the Hashemite kingdom should take. In the vision 
of Huntington Jordan will need values as thrift, investment, education, organisation and 
discipline to enhance human and economic progress. One could say that a multi billion water 
project is quite an embodiment of those values.  
 
6.2 Historical context 
Water projects are never just about the provision of water. Jordan’s past and future water 
projects are no exception to it. The international, or rather transboundary, water initiatives 
involving Jordan have been mainly within the framework of regional peace or the settlement 
of Palestinian refugees/nomadic populations. The existing literature on these matters is 
rather diverse; it ranges from a technological approach with a focus on, for example, the 
possibility of dams or desalination, to a more governmental, mostly one-sided, perspective 
(who benefits more or less), to a political one where the focus is on geopolitics. Especially 
regarding the Middle East, one can find an abundance of literature on the issue of water and 
conflict. All kinds of sources, academic and especially semi-scientific sources, refer to the 
possibility of water wars between and inside the countries of the region. ‘The next wars will 
be about water’ is a threatening message.  
The area that is now known as Jordan was populated long before it entered the geo-political 
scope, and people had to fend for themselves to obtain water. In the early years of the 
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twentieth century, although it was still under Ottoman rule, there was little Ottoman interest in 
Jordan. Predominantly foreign actors have been interested in the ‘potential’ of the Jordan 
Valley (Khouri,1981). A canal running parallel to the Jordan River was envisioned for 
(Palestinian) agricultural and energy purposes as early as 1910, but was never implemented. 
This is one of the ideas that would re-emerge in the 1960s in the shape of the East Ghor 
Canal (later re-named the King Abdullah I Canal). During the Mandate period, the regional 
water sources, such as the Jordan River, were centralised as the water and energy sources 
for Palestine89. 
 
As the British reaped geo-political benefits by having control over important regional water 
sources, the United States found similar ways to maintain a presence in the area as part of 
their containment policy towards the Soviet Union (Elmusa, 1994:37). Probably the best 
known plan for the settlement of water disputes is the Johnston Plan (1955) - named after 
American mediator Eric Johnston - between Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The plan 
itself was based on previous studies, which were conducted in turn to examine the possibility 
of settling Jewish settlers/colonisers in the Jordan Valley. The Johnston plan—shifting focus 
to options for settling Palestinian refugees—was rejected by both the Arab and Israeli 
parties, re-negotiated and in the end not implemented. However, it was perceived by Israel 
and Jordan as a step towards agreeing separately with the predecessor of the US Agency for 
International Development for support in the construction of two water conveyors (the Israeli 
National Water Carrier and the aforementioned East Ghor Canal)90. Jordan and Syria 
continued to negotiate the future Maqarin dam (referred to as the Al Wahda dam) on the 
Yarmouk River, which would not be completed until 2011.  
 
Jordan has a history of ever changing and some never implemented plans. Implemented or 
not the water related plans are interesting as they illustrate the equally continuous struggle 
for the Hashemite Kingdom to position itself in the region and towards its citizens. The 
purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that projects concerning water never are not isolated 
plans and projects. Moreover, the design of the Red-Dead water conveyor grew and was 
proposed especially in the last decades or even century91. Alternative water conveyors 
bringing water from the Mediterranean Sea (also covering the restoration of the Dead Sea) or 
from Turkey (freshwater) have remained options. The Red-Dead project was presented 
                                                      
89 In 1926, the British mandate conceded for 60 years the exclusive use of the waters of the Yarmouk 
and Jordan Rivers to the Palestine Electric Corporation, called the Rutenberg Concession after the 
Zionist investor (Mauro Van Aken et. al, 2007:52). 
90 The amount of water that the canal can channel is agreed with the other riparian parties.  
91 In the Zionist imagination, a water conveyor such as the Red-Dead could make the desert bloom 
and offer a Jewish home. 
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several times as a real option, for example, at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg and a year later in Kyoto at the Third World Water Forum. 
Finally, in 2005, the much-awaited agreement between the three beneficiaries materialised. 
With reference to Foucault’s notion of heterotopias and also Mitchell’s citation to the fact that 
the planners their job requires ‘ a constant work of imagination, but none of it precedes or 
stands apart from doing things in reality. There is no other, more real world’ (Mitchell T., 
2002:45), I think it is important to keep in mind that plans as the Red Dead conveyor are not 
up in the air but very much connected to reality.  
 
The reality that has been created and keeps on being moulded through time and events are 
also given shape through a variety of discourses. For a moment I follow Jan Selby (2003), 
who illustrates that we can distinguish three discourses that are used to explain a water crisis 
(in his case study, Palestine/Israel) and to offer solutions: an ecological discourse, a 
technical discourse and a political discourse (Selby,2003:21). Of course the different 
discourses are never found in a ‘pure’ form. It is this mixture of discourses that makes a 
project like the water conveyor and its context all the more interesting. Besides the discursive 
side, the project carries historical and local implications and has a future international scope. 
In the next two parts, the necessity and global view will be addressed.  
 
6.3 Needs discourses and the politics of necessity 
The mega-scheme is considered Jordan’s first step towards addressing its water crisis, 
while the strategic Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project will be the country’s 
radical and permanent solution to its water problems. (Jordan Times, 25/05/2013) 
 
We can all imagine that nobody wants to deprive people of water, nobody wants a historical 
world heritage to disappear and everybody wants world peace. If we think of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan as one of the most water-scarce countries in the world, sharing the Dead 
Sea can be a symbol of the cradle of human culture and civilisation (World Bank, TOR 2007). 
As a neighbouring country of Syria, Iraq and Israel/Palestine, Jordan remains a safe haven in 
the midst of conflict areas. Additionally, the proposed water conveyor would be able to bring 
extra potable water for municipalities, conserve an important symbol of history and contribute 
to regional peace. If it only takes a technological intervention to secure all of this, then what 
is the problem?  
 
When one goes the website of the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation, there is a 
message from a prominent figure about the water scarcity which Jordan is facing.  
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The water shortage has become of a permanent nature, meeting water demand is a 
challenge, and managing water resources is imperative. (Secretary General Sa’ad Bakri, 
mwi November 2009) 
Our water situation forms a strategic challenge that cannot be ignored. We have to 
balance between drinking water needs and industrial and irrigation water requirements. 
Drinking water remains the most essential. (H.M. King Abdullah II, mwi May 2013)92 
The numbers also illustrate that Jordan is facing a water shortage. According to Jordan’s 
Water Strategy 2008–2020, only 145 m3 per year is available per capita (estimated in 2008). 
By comparison, the water poverty line has been established at 500m3. In general terms, 
Jordan had, according to the same strategic plan, a water deficit of 565 MCM in 2007. After 
spending 11 months in Jordan, I quickly realised how precious water is, when the water tank 
on the roof was empty and the weekly refill was still a few days away. It was also possible to 
see that the Dead Sea is indeed losing its water at an average of one meter per year.93 As 
the pressure on available water sources will only increase, it is not surprising that the notion 
of a water crisis has become central to the measurements developed by the government to 
push forward certain projects (i.e. Red Sea Dead Sea Water Conveyance).  
 
The descriptions of and justifications for the Red-Dead project illuminate the cause of and 
solutions to the three discourses that Jan Selby mentions in relation to this project. The 
ecological discourse points at the scarcity of water due to overpopulation, the technical 
discourse relates to the inefficiency of water use (i.e. agriculture) and the political discourse 
relates to the unequal distribution of water (i.e. too much water for agriculture, too little for 
households or tourism). The overstretching of the water resources due to overpopulation is 
mainly explained with the different refugee influxes that Jordan has had to take in. Today, 
Syrian refugees are, according to officials, causing ‘a severe stress on the public water 
supply and wastewater networks, which now serve double the population in locations like 
Ramtha and Mafraq’ (Jordan Times, 25/5/2013). Fortunately, the Disi Project94 is almost to 
                                                      
92 King Abdullah had already stated this in 1999. 
93 Probably one of the clearest ways to see this reduction is to be in the swimming pool at the 
Mövenpick on the Dead Sea. This pool was created to give an impression of continuity with the sea, 
but due to the lowering sea level, this effect has disappeared as well. 
94 The Disi project is another (disputed) conveyor that carries water to Amman from 55 wells dug in the 
Disi aquifer at the border with Saudi Arabia. Disi is very interesting, as it caused considerable friction 
in Jordan. Some questions were raised about its implementation: for example, studies showed the 
possibility of contaminated water; Disi is a fossil aquifer, and once all the water is pumped, the aquifer 
is empty for good; the amount of money spent, i.e. 1.1 billion USD, could have been used for the 
restoration of the water pipe system of Amman; it is a Built-Operate-Transfer project managed by a 
subsidiary (private) company of the Turkish company Gama.  
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be completed in July 2013 to provide some of the necessary fresh water. The technical view 
explains it quite clearly: there is a water deficit due to bad water management and an 
increase in demand, and hence an augmentation in the water supply is necessary. In the 
same view, water should be differently distributed to a sector such as agriculture, as the 
balance of water consumption and economic profit is negative.  
 
6.3.1 Techno-politics of scarcity 
With respect to the facts on water just touched upon, I continue with a focus on the imagined 
role of water as a de-politicised source of conflict (Kaika,2003:919). In the same perspective, 
developing mega projects such as the Red Sea Dead Sea conveyor can prevent such a 
conflict. Authors such as Maria Kaika (2003) and Samer Alatout (2008) illustrate that a 
debate on the scarcity of water is mainly conducted in a technocratic frame supported by 
experts and adopted in political policies regarding water. A technocratic approach to the 
scarcity implies automatically that there is no space for social, cultural or political relational 
thinking. Although the World Bank is not (yet) a financial partner in the Red Sea Dead Sea 
project, it has facilitated the associated studies. The World Bank has learned its lessons from 
the past, when it was accused of exerting too heavy an economic/financial influence on 
projects.95Parts of the required studies are an environmental and social assessment, the 
results of public meetings and a study of alternatives. Without being too critical, and keeping 
an open mind because of the fact that decisions have yet to be taken, it is still necessary to 
ask questions about the project. Actually, it is especially the sheet containing the questions 
raised during public meetings that shows that the ‘inclusive approach’ towards potentially 
affected people and the environment are just a façade. Any question that hints at any political 
cause or effect of the conveyor is swept away by the answer that the question is outside the 
scope of the studies. The most ignored question is related to the Palestinians’ right to water. 
Furthermore, the Palestinians’ access to the Dead Sea is blocked due to Israel’s occupation 
of the Jordan River and Dead Sea area of the West Bank. The rescue of the Dead Sea is 
also seen as an opportunity for the parties to receive intangible benefits. One of the remarks 
made at a public meeting in 2008 pointed to the fact that it is a very political project in a very 
political area. The reply to this remark was as follows: 
 
The Study Program is a technical initiative, not a political initiative. Terms of 
Reference, section 8.2.2, “Intangible Benefits,” sets out the technical, not political, 
                                                      
95 Michael Goldman offers an impressive amount of literature on the methodology of the World Bank 
as a development institute (especially with regard to environmental projects).  
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basis for analysing and quantifying the various intangible benefits of any planned 
water related infrastructure. (World Bank, 2008) 
 
 
This creates a paradoxical situation. The technical problem of not having access to the Dead 
Sea is, in the Palestinian case, a very political problem and will remain so if those political 
issues are not raised. Furthermore, it is almost cynical is to address multi-lateral co-operation 
as a contribution to the understanding of the underlying causes of the conflict, whereby  
 
cooperation is much more feasible in the concrete than in the abstract; solving 
practical problems is easier than solving abstract problems and what is learned 
regarding working together can be translated into other spheres of endeavor. (TOR, 
2005) 
 
The general line in the project is to stay as far away as possible from politics (i.e. abstract 
problem).96 Even if it is a political problem, the solution has to be formulated in a-political 
terms. The perception of water as part of nature that can be tamed to ameliorate human 
culture elucidates what techno-politics is and how it can help for another understanding of 
the water conveyor: 
 
Techno-politics is always a technical body, an alloy that must emerge from a process 
of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional 
and not, and in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by 
the unintended. But it is a particular form of manufacturing, a certain way of 
organising the amalgam of human and nonhuman, things and ideas, so that the 
human, the intellectual, the realm of intentions and ideas seems to come first and to 
control and organise the nonhuman. (Mitchell T., 2002:42-43) 
 
The water conveyor project is often a news item informing about its current state and results 
from studies. As the project is concerning a reality, it also is confronted with unexpected 
(scientific) results, change of financial options or people’s (sceptical) responds. Those 
encounters will indeed be overruled with other numbers, the statement that there is no other 
option, opening space for alternative studies or adaptations to the original version. In its turn 
this will be reported in the newspapers (or at least in the English versions). Similar processes 
are observable in the implementation of the conservation projects. Twist and turns will be 
                                                      
96  Recently a Jordan Times article also titled 'Red-Dead project should be implemented away from 
politics' (Jordan Times, March 18 2013) 
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made and sometimes projects will not be executed but this will be a calculated adaptation of 
cancellation.   
 
6.3.2 Water as fluid friction 
Mega water projects are often connected to the idea of general progress (i.e. 
modernisation).97 I already stated that control over water resources is not just technical, but 
has other social and political implications. The most well illustrated fact is that water and land 
are very well interconnected, especially when it comes to having access to both. For the 
construction of dams98, villages often have to disappear or people are resettled. However, it 
does not have to be so dramatic to be a serious issue. Jordan experienced the effects from 
acting in a pure technocratic way when implementing the development scheme for the 
Jordan Valley, where water and the redistribution of land caused a social movement and 
rearrangements (e.g. wiping out existing water management, relation to land etc. but also the 
flexibility to change). (Van Aken 2003) The construction of the East Ghor Canal—to provide 
the necessary water—triggered land redistributions. Although it was done on the basis of the 
idea of breaking down the ownership of big landlords and allocating land to the smaller 
farmer, this created a whole land market, where the big landlords found ways to keep their 
property as it was.99 
 
The notion of tribal land is a sensitive issue in Jordan because it is not (for everybody) 
recognised as a key to accessing land. The roots of some of the tribes of Wadi Araba can be 
traced outside the current Jordanian borders, and some only came rather ‘recently’ to the 
area. Apart from the Azazme100 tribe, most of them seem to have found their place and 
recognise each other’s borders. Of course, conflicts happen, especially when land is officially 
appointed to some and not others. The (tribal) land claims have posed constant issues, but 
have been laughed away many times by related institutions, such as the JVA. The neglect of 
the importance of access to land and the frustrations related to access to land are reflected 
in the perception of the project by ‘the potentially affected communities’.  
                                                      
97 See, for example, Maria Kaika (2006) ‘Dams as Symbols of Modernization’ or Erik Swyngedouw 
(1999) ‘Modernity and Hybridity’. 
98 The Three Gorges dam in China is probably the most extreme case.  
99 See Michael Fischbach (2000) ‘State, Society and Land in Jordan’, Mauro Van Aken (2003) ‘Facing 
Home. Palestinian Belonging in the Valley of Doubt’ and Sharif Elmusa (1994) ‘A Harvest of 
Technology: The Super-Green Revolution in the Jordan Valley’. 
100 The tribe of Azazme ‘originated’ in Palestine/Israel and came to Jordan in the late 1960s. Other 
tribes have very clearly declared that Azazme are not from Wadi Araba, although where other tribes 
are allegedly from is much less spoken about. Especially between Rashayda and Azazme, there are 
difficult relations. The Rashayda had to move towards New Feynan village to make space for the 
protected area, although the Azazme were able to stay in the Wadi Feynan close to the Eco-lodge that 
had been built there.  
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The World Bank matrices of the public meetings include the denial of a future development 
plan for Wadi Araba that is directly connected to the conveyor. In theory, this means that little 
will happen to the land of Wadi Araba after the construction.101 I would argue that it makes 
the planning and the future implementation of the conveyor all the more interesting. I have 
mentioned it several times in this thesis; due to the 2005 agreement with regard to the 
conveyor project, land has been frozen in Wadi Araba.102 Already in its planning phase, the 
conveyor has had effects and has caused friction on the ground. In the Karak Ghor area, 
people asked to stop the freezing of the land as long as the project had not yet started. In 
Karak, people asked to use the land in the meantime for agriculture (Ammon 
News,27/2/2012). The rationale that we received when questioning the freezing of the land 
years before the implementation was that if people could buy land that will be later part of the 
project zone, the government would have to buy it back. ‘People know the value of land’ 
followed the explanation. It is true that people are very well aware that the desert has 
economic value. People are equally aware of the value of water and the economic profit that 
it could bring, whether it is environmentally sustainable or not. However, what they are 
seeing or hearing is that water will be pumped in a pipeline under the ground to Amman. 
Similar processes were implemented in the Jordan Valley. The statement in ‘Historical 
trajectory of a river basin in the Middle East: The Lower Jordan River Basin (in Jordan)’ that 
‘as a high awareness amongst the farmers that scarcity is not just a natural fact, but a 
political fact’, is very recognisable in the case of Wadi Araba (Van Aken et al.,2007:105). As 
mentioned before, the fact that water is not abundant in Jordan is not a point of discussion, 
but the allocation of the water is.103The perception of the uneven allocation of water heavily 
influences the social relations between people. Just standing at the side of the Dead Sea 
highway south at any point in Wadi Araba and looking to the west, one can see the literal 
green oasis in Israel. The aquifer under Wadi Araba is used to provide Israel the water it 
needs, due to the 1994 peace agreement (for a moment, the wells were Israeli while they 
occupied part of the area). Now, the water will be pumped up to Amman. This undeniably 
sharpens the relations between the people of Wadi Araba and those in the capital.104 
                                                      
101 In the early stages of the planning, there were references to possible small and major scale 
economic opportunities that might result from the conveyor, mainly at the open canal part (Initial 
Assessment Report, March 2010:158). 
102 While conducting the research, it did not become much clearer to me how the situation was before 
2005. The inhabitants who had received houses from a settlement program also received land, but 
this (and the house) could not be sold either at all or not until a certain number of years had passed. I 
understood that before the land in Wadi Araba was governable land or belonged to JVA, there was no 
entitlement to individuals or tribes unless they could prove differently with an official paper of 
registration. However, this remains an interpretation/question.  
103 What Van Aken might call ‘the political reality of water scarcity’ (Van Aken et al., 2007:121) 
104 From the King Abdullah Canal, water was transferred to Amman, where many previous emigrants 
returned after the first Gulf War (Van Aken et al., 2007:70). It generated the discussion about the 
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6.4 The Jordanian water loop 
In the case of the Jordan Valley, the construction of the East Ghor Canal contributed to 
an‘abundance’ of water that created optimism for progress in the Valley. By taming the water, 
the Valley could ‘bloom’. As Jordan is now in a situation of scarcity, new interventions are 
required. Whether it is about abundance or scarcity, the common assumption is that the 
human or culture can and should have control over the non-human or nature. Swyngedouw 
insists that we recognise that nature and society are deeply intertwined 
(Swyngedouw,1999:43). This rupture of culture–nature was addressed in previous sections, 
but it is also definitely part of the technocratic approach to the water scarcity situation in 
Jordan. The kind of relationship that people have with water, or the impact that water projects 
have on the existing relations, is rarely taken into consideration during the planning phase of 
such projects. In the early assessment of the proposed water conveyor, there were 
references to the concerns and hope that the local people expressed during the first 
meetings. It seems that in the last stages of the planning, there is little awareness about 
these concerns. The conveyor studies did include a social assessment panel based partly on 
qualitative research. Besides the meetings in the city of Aqaba, researchers with surveys and 
project presentations have visited some of the Wadi Araba villages. They have adapted the 
technology according to the level of ‘modernity’ of the audience. In Wadi Araba, they have 
used flip charts, although elsewhere (for example during visits in Israel), they have employed 
PowerPoint presentations supported by technical equipment. This is a small issue, but quite 
symbolic in terms of how the audience has been perceived. Furthermore, questionnaires 
have been administered, and they have left many questions, hopes and doubts behind. The 
visits served mainly to satisfy the criterion of participation. 
 
For the inhabitants in Wadi Araba, water is always a concern. Among the people who inhabit 
fixed settlements, almost everybody is connected to water, although we can question the 
quality of that water (I was told that it has a high salt content which affects the pipelines). 
Having access to water for irrigation is only possible via the existing cooperatives.105Also for 
the people asking for water it is not only an issue of water but it is at the same time strongly 
related to have access to land. The land is still not formally recognised as tribal land, and out 
of interviews chances are small it ever will.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
urban and agricultural water needs. Similar discussions concern the rise when water from the Red 
Sea will pass by Wadi Araba to flow to Amman.  
105 With the support of the Jordan River Foundation, the construction of a dam was fully completed in 
2004 at Kaa’ Al-Saedine, which the nearby villages and especially the cooperative next to the dam can 
make use of.  
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 As mentioned above and mainly in the introduction, also in the case of the water conveyor 
there is a clear distinction made between human-nature. The distinction is not just water 
versus conveyor, but is extended to related issues as land. All particles that actually consists 
the water conveyor’s idea and implementation are divided in the two categories and placed 
opposite each other. Bruno Latour indicates this distinction and the idea to overrule nature by 
cultures (human) as a typically western worldview to place itself into modernity. Actually the 
west has enjoyed so far the privileged access to nature that it is actually not to be perceived 
as a culture (Latour, 2002: 9).   
 
The idea of brining water to people is also a way for a central government to position itself 
towards its citizens. In the consulted literature with case studies on Greece, Israel and Spain, 
authors refer interestingly to how the provision of water in terms of abundance helped to 
shape the national identity in the formation of the mentioned states. It is no coincidence that 
the aforementioned countries initiated major water projects in moments of political ‘crisis’ or 
transition (Alatout, 2008; Kaika, 2003, 2006; Swyngedouw,1999).In the case of Jordan, we 
notice a similar movement, but also how the changing strategies for state formation are 
reflected in the water projects. The development of the Jordan Valley is the best example of 
the politics of water intertwining with the political formation and position of Jordan in the 
region. After the influxes106of refugees in the Jordan Valley, the central government 
represented by the Jordan Valley Commission (JVC)107 initiated the first integrated 
development plan 1973–1975. Without going too deep into the Valley, this plan encountered 
many delays and adaptations. Only in 1978, as the first phase was accomplished, could the 
people experience the changes. Or, in the very subtle words of Rami Khouri, ‘The residents 
of the Valley, traditionally the most backward segment of the Jordanian population, suddenly 
faced new opportunities’ (Khouri,1981:163). A more important remark that Khouri makes is 
‘that the JVC or JVA was in charge now of every aspect of life of the inhabitants of the 
Jordan Valley. They decided how and where to use the land, housing or other facilities’ 
(Khouri,1981:161). With the JVC in charge of facilitating, the government had the idea to 
break down the strong tribal powers in the area. The situation today is fascinating, as we can 
notice a mixture of historical trends. On one hand, the Red Sea Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance represents a very contemporary international institutional vision for 
development. The central governments are obviously key players, but they are surrounded 
by (international) experts conducting different studies and dispensing advice. Of course, the 
global development institution the World Bank has taken on the role of ‘watch dog’ and will 
                                                      
106 After the influx of Palestinian refugees in the Valley, there was also a movement from the Valley 
more inland, where Palestinians tried to find shelter. The government tried with an integrated plan to 
attract Palestinians back to the Valley.  
107 The Jordan Valley Commission became the Jordan Valley Authority in 1977.  
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be a possible future money source for Jordan. On the other hand, Jordan is opting for an 
alternative water project that corresponds more closely to the latest neo-liberal path that it 
has been choosing. The project named the Jordan Red Sea Project is a Jordan-only initiated 
water conveyor. It is, first of all, a very vague project; little information has been made public, 
but the main objective is bringing water to Amman by desalination and hence saving the 
Dead Sea with the brine. However, the most interesting and perhaps most expected aspect 
is that it will be mostly privately financed and managed by a ‘master developer’. The 
similarities with the Red-Dead Conveyor are rather obvious, except for the unmentioned 
studies concerning the Red Sea project and the extra economic developments that will arise 
in Wadi Araba from the pumped and desalinated water. The option of the latter 
developments requires developers to apply for the position of master developer. Although 
both projects are still very unclear about how they will proceed and what the effects will be, 
the Jordanian government seems very eager to start as soon as possible with the first phase 
of the Red Sea Project in particular.  
 
The option for the Red Sea Project is not very surprising. Lately, the Jordanian government 
and entourage have been subjected to criticism and experienced friction within the Jordanian 
society. A Jordan-only project gives the government, or particularly the King, the opportunity 
to stand up as the tamer of a natural phenomenon such as water scarcity to bring solace to 
the people. The media has been successful in the spreading the message that although the 
water scarcity is severe, help from the government is on the way. The Disi project is thereby 
presented as the forerunner of a much bigger design. Regardless of its ambitions, the Jordan 
Red Sea Project plan was recently downscaled due to financial issues. The international 
crisis has made donors in the shape of foreign countries or private companies reluctant to 
invest billions of dollars.  
 
Considering the situation of the presence of water in nature versus technocratic terms places 
Jordan in a loop that will require continuous technological intervention. It has become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. In Jordan’s current political situation, this pure technocratic perspective108 
on water could become another source of increased internal tensions.   
 
In the last part of this chapter, I shall illustrate further that the discourse on scarcity and 
related technological interventions are not a coincidental assemblage but belong to the idea 
that a ‘universal modern society’ is possible with the right techno-scientific tools.  
                                                      
108 We could also say from a neo-liberal perspective that these projects will open the door for the 
privatisation of water and hence water prices will rise. In the presentation of the conveyor, this is 
translated as ‘water at affordable prices’.  
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6.5 The fluid global connection 
When discussing ‘a universal process’, it is important to keep in mind what Timothy Mitchell 
argues in his work, ‘Rule of Experts’, and was I referred to in the introduction. The notions of 
universalism and modernity carry historical and geographical baggage that should be taken 
into account in an analysis and not employed as concepts of analysis. The Red Sea Dead 
Sea Conveyance is an example of a kind of mega project that materialises ‘universal’ 
assumptions about what is necessary to bring development to an undeveloped area.  
 
The Red Sea Dead Sea Conveyor and the Jordan Red Sea Project both remain in the 
planning phase and are thus also hypothetical. I referred to the effects that the Red-Dead 
conveyor has had in some parts of Jordan and on the future economic developments 
envisioned in the Jordan Red Sea project. The latter economic developments for Wadi Araba 
are similar to the (Israeli initiated) promotional movie that shows a blooming Wadi Araba. 
Although they are part of a very ‘fluctuating’ future plan, they are important because they are 
supportive of the discourse about turning scarcity into abundance. The idea of the blooming 
Wadi Araba through one of the projects has been left aside, but it can be brought back to the 
forefront at any point when (financial or political) conditions improve.  
 
The creation of the state of Jordan is a never-ending story. With the implementation, or at 
least the planning process of the water conveyor, Jordan places itself amongst the countries 
that deal with the vagaries of nature in a very dramatic way, especially in size and economic 
terms. One of the interviewees, a member of the boards for both the Red Sea Dead Sea 
water conveyor and the Red Sea Project, saw the mega-projects being implemented abroad 
as examples for Jordan. The detrimental social and environmental consequences due to 
these projects are not part of his picture. What did form his and the general picture of both 
projects was the connections to international funding (multilateral or private) and the 
international scientific experts (French and British study offices) and their know-how (Kaika, 
2006:288). Jordan does not have the financial capacity to implement these kinds of mega 
projects; therefore, only through connecting with (dominant) Western actors does Jordan see 
itself capable of leaving the wilderness of the so-called Third World.  
 
The heroes of modernity promised to dominate nature and deliver human emancipation 
employing imagination, creativity, ingenuity, romantic heroic attitude, and a touch of hubris 
against the given order of the world. (Kaika,2006:276)  
 
 




There are doom-laden prophecies on the pending ‘water wars’. The problem with such 
naturalistic neo-Malthusianism is that it is simply incorrect about the causes of water crises. 
Naturalistic discourse presents us with a world comprising just humans and nature, where 
nature is static and unyielding, where the human relationship with nature is limited to its 
consumption, and where there are consequently insurmountable limits to these 
consumptive—and indeed exploitative—relations (Selby,2005:332). 
 
Actually, Jan Selby perfectly represents what this chapter is about. In other words, at this 
moment, Jordan is failing to provide an amount of water to every citizen that places him or 
her above the water poverty line. The population growth by birth or migration is indeed an 
issue that Jordan has had to deal with during the last several decades, up until today. 
Another fact is that Jordan could earn a greater deal of its income from tourism. The Dead 
Sea is one of the attractive treasures that it offers to tourists. All of this (i.e. refugee influx and 
tourism) is very sensitive to regional stability. The construction of a water conveyor could 
relieve a lot of the pressure on Jordan, at least from a liberal-technical perspective (Jan 
Selby, 2005:333).109 
 
The Red-Dead water conveyor and the Jordan Red Sea project are not very different from 
any other water related mega project in the world, except that they have not been 
implemented yet. Both projects plan a rather limited vision of water demand and supply. The 
water use of people, mainly focused on the poorer segments of society, is defined in terms of 
inefficiency, a lack of awareness or water theft, in the case of farmers. The uneven allocation 
to Jordan and its inhabitants must be understood in a broader political and social framework. 
A pure technocratic injection of infrastructure will not dissolve the existing social and political 
problems. In fact, with the increased tension inside Jordan, including the relations with the 
King and the monarchy, it might only compound this friction.
                                                      
109 This refers as well to what Timothy Mitchell points out earlier that from the moment when the 
problems (in his cases, in Egypt) were defined as natural, social inequality and powerlessness were 
out of the picture. The main aim thus becomes ‘to overcome “natural” limits of geography and 
demography’ (Mitchell T., 2002:221-222).  









The dissertation started from a broad research theme that addressed the question of how 
‘culture’ is used in the formation of the state of Jordan and in the interrelated processes and 
politics of development. In this dissertation the focus was specifically on Wadi Araba, a so-
called out-of-the-way place.  
The analysis of the creation of Wadi Araba as a governable space within the broader 
formation of Jordan was based on three major points. First, the naturalisation of the notion of 
culture has created a dichotomy. Especially the notion of difference between cultures has 
found its way to other areas outside anthropological studies and reified in reality. It has 
contributed to a (imagined) division between a normalised perception of life and an ‘a-normal’ 
or a-civic/non-civilised way of living. The life of people in Wadi Araba is often indicated as a-
normal or a-civic. Second, development is an act of governmentality. Through development 
discourses and practices directions are given on how to organise one’s life. Although 
development is situated in an a-political sphere, it is (often) political driven and has political 
effects on the real ground. In the process to build Jordan as a political formation, the realm of 
development has played and is still playing a crucial part. It helps to govern the population 
into a certain direction that will contribute to the state formation. Third, places in the margins 
of the state, as Wadi Araba, are of crucial importance for an understanding of the process of 
state formation and the politics of development.  
 
The actual research project began with a closer look at the by Jordan, Palestine and Israel 
proposed and finally approved water conveyor between the Red Sea and Dead Sea. The 
conveyor will run through Wadi Araba and was initially presented as a pure technical 
intervention to save the Dead Sea and to provide in fresh water for the regional partners. 
However, the inhabitants of Wadi Araba were barely involved in the planning process of the 
water conveyor project. In the dissertation this is argued as a common way to deny or ignore 
the socio-political meaning of projects as the water conveyor. Although the project can be 
described as just a technical intervention in an empty space, it has provoked reaction in Wadi 
Araba (and outside, as in Kerak) from the population.  
 For the research project it was essential to avoid analysing the conveyor as an isolated 
case in the area of Wadi Araba. The water project that was represented as an economic and 
developmental push from the Jordanian government will be implemented in an area that is 
not an empty page. On the contrary, the area and its inhabitants have a history of so-called 
economic and developmental pushes by state and non-state actors. By bringing Wadi Araba 
and the water conveyor together in the picture, I was drawn towards other economic and 
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infrastructural development programs designed for the area. Besides the fact that the case 
studies share a common geographical destination, they also contain mutual ‘worldviews’ (i.e. 
ideas about how Wadi Araba and Jordan should look like within a globalised world).  
 
In addition to the emphasis on the ‘politics’ of development, the dissertation also highlights 
the ‘cultures’ of development that enable and are the raison d’être of ‘development’ 
interventions.  In this general conclusion I will recapitulate the argument that Wadi Araba is 
not merely an area in the margins in need for ‘improvement’. It is due to a culturalised 
perspective (or what I have called a ‘design for life’) of Jordan in general and Wadi Araba in 
particular, that it has been made possible to push specific development initiatives forward.   
 
The four main chapters present interrelated cases that illustrate past and current initiatives 
that have created opportunities for development planners and government to manage and 
control the targeted population (i.e. inhabitants of Wadi Araba). With the construction of a 
new road connecting the southern village with the capital, the organisation of agriculture, the 
distribution of houses to the nomadic population, instalment of protected areas etc., the area 
and its habitants are connected to a powerful system that steers their lives in a particular 
direction, mainly away from they one the currently maintained. As mentioned above, Wadi 
Araba is not an isolated area. The initiatives that are designated to the area are neither 
isolated cases, they all serve the formation of Wadi Araba as a ‘governable’ space with 
‘governable’ subjects.   
  
The elaboration of the process concerning the intertwinement between state formation and 
governable spaces for Jordan started in the first chapter. In the formation of Jordan there 
was a need to ‘create’ a political community that would identify Jordan as its nation and 
would help to represent Jordan towards the outside world. This process has been challenged 
several times and had to adapt accordingly. A returning strategy was to differentiate between 
those who are part of the political community and those who are not. Who was ‘in’ or ‘out’ 
has changed over time. This inclusion or exclusion was translated in a cultural differentiation. 
In a country like Jordan – that is increasingly moving towards strong neoliberalism - this has 
led to a rather Huntingtonian perception of culture as the key for political and economic 
development. The use of ‘the Bedouin culture’ as a national symbol has been replaced by 
the assumption that this culture is a barrier to economic development in the badia. In an 
ambiguous manner this culture is now incorporated into the neoliberal market ‘as a set of 
material objects and distinctive behaviours’ that can be commodified (Radcliffe,2006:234), 
and hence can contribute to the further economic development of Jordan and its position in 
the global market.  
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The cultural differentiation has been related in the second chapter to the representations of 
people/’community’ and their landscapes. I argue further that the representations, which are 
translated into development schemes, are often based on a fantasised nexus of community 
and landscape. The image of Wadi Araba as a rather empty place out of time (i.e. the denial 
of coevalness) is projected simultaneously onto the inhabitants of Wadi Araba. Through the 
representation of the spatial context, people are moreover represented as a single, 
undifferentiated unit, considered (as if) a community living in a different non-modern time. 
The representation of Wadi Araba and inhabitants is also composed as a snapshot. In the 
chapter the comparison with the static representations of colonial ethnographies is made.  
 To strengthen the a-political image of development, Wadi Araba needs to be stripped of 
all its political and social dimensions. To illustrate this, I introduce in this second chapter the 
notion of fantasised landscape and community. Inspired by Anderson I tried to go further 
than the notion of ‘imagined’. With the concept of ‘fantasised’ I want to point at the difference 
with ‘imagined’ by arguing that within the development projects that I encountered, it is not 
about ‘how Bedouins are’ but about ‘how Bedouins could and should be’. The point was not 
that development initiatives are outside reality, neither that initiatives are a priori a negative 
impulse. Within my observations I could notice the aim for a particular kind of Bedouin that 
fits in the modern Jordanian state. (Mitchell T., 2002). Development is as such not only about 
the ‘target’. The constructed fantasies of, in this case, Wadi Araba and its inhabitants do tell 
us a lot about those who construct the fantasies. Wadi Araba and especially the local people 
are separated from and indeed placed in structural opposition to the development planners. 
Insights into the relations between landscape, people and power have become ever more 
important for a better understanding of the impact of development schemes.  
 The relations between the different actors are constantly challenged during project 
planning and implementation. The notion ‘constructed visibility’ derived from Foucault is not 
merely about the physical space – in this case Wadi Araba – but also about the people 
related to this space. The fact that Wadi Araba has the features of an undeveloped place par 
excellence, where the people themselves are perceived as incapable of taking the initiative 
for improvement, appears to offer ‘an aesthetic alibi’ for external intervention. In this second 
chapter I referred to housing projects, or the implementation of agricultural fields. JVA or JRF 
work from a more or less participatory approach, emphasising the potential for the area and 
the inhabitants. Nevertheless, they start from the assumption that there is a limit to the 
capacities of the people. With regard to agriculture, people can be a farmer or maybe a 
ground supervisor but they cannot occupy the management function. With the projects that 
JVA or JRF encourage in Wadi Araba they implement instructions from the ‘absent state’ to 
push Jordan further into the ‘modern world’. The message, mainly from JRF, is quite clear 
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‘do not wait for the government to help you’. In this way, the non-state development actors 
help the government to take a step further on the neoliberal path by implementing projects 
that carry the ‘design for life’. The way to neoliberalism is supposed to be paved by people’s 
own initiatives to take care of themselves. People, as in Wadi Araba, do take initiatives, but 
are many times discouraged or opposed. Private initiatives are recommended, but they have 
to be implemented within certain guidelines.  
 
Despite a technocratic approach, it became clear that the local population could not (longer) 
be ignored. Over time, development actors ran into problems and find their projects blocked 
and cancelled, because their approach was grounded in these fantasised ideas about 
inhabitants and their landscape. Scepticism and resistance from local people towards new 
initiatives has grown intensively. The recent uprisings in the region have offered more room 
for resistance.  Amongst several actors, predominantly the RSCN is an example of an 
involved actor in the area that had to find a balance between international instructions 
concerning conservation, their own vision and local struggles. Although they developed new 
strategies to be in good relation with the local inhabitants, their approach is still from an 
economic and technical perspective. Social and political aspects that have caused friction 
are blinded.  
 
The RSCN in Wadi Araba has been the main focus in the third chapter. Within the strategic 
changes that RSCN has made in its approach concerning conservation one can read very 
well that despite the turn towards participatory development the struggles continue with local 
inhabitants. RSCN wrote a strategy based on partnership with the local people, but there is 
still a great gap between RSCN and the inhabitants based on the idea that they do not know 
how to take care of the environment. People are seen as destructive for nature. Damage has 
been done to the environment, but that is not due to ‘their cultural mentality’ but due to 
measurements that have been implemented during decennia. Locals are not without 
responsibility, but an understanding of why struggles keep on to continue requires a broader 
perspective.   
 In the evolution of RSCN, one can detect for example the parallel evolution of the global 
environment governance agents (e.g. the World Bank or IUCN). RSCN has to twist and turn 
its policies and project implementations to stand up to the expectations from donors and local 
inhabitants. By adopting the participatory approach to get a stake in the area - where they 
have to compete with several other development agents - RSCN has put itself in a very 
complex position. Mainly the double standard that is applied by RSCN - but again not 
exclusively by RSCN - towards people and their knowledge has led to a significant distrust 
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between both parties. RSCN has overstretched its capacity as development agent by making 
empty promises to people who have been promised so much, but have not experienced 
many concrete actions. Without romanticising ‘the locals’, people have learned over the past 
decades how development agents work and how to deal with them. Also the opposite 
happened; RSCN doesn’t know anymore how to deal with people. This is what we called in 
the end; a people fatigue.  
 
The Red Sea Dead Sea water conveyor as final case brings us back to the beginning of the 
dissertation. A water conveyor that will save a holy symbol from disappearing, bring fresh 
water to the region and might contribute to future peace between Israel and Palestine, might 
sound as a win-win project. The conveyor is described as a pure technical intervention and is 
supported by strong discourses that emphasise the (economic and symbolic) importance of 
the Dead Sea and the scarcity of water.    
 The shrinking of the Dead Sea or the limited fresh water sources are reduced to natural 
problems that can be overcome by a technical intervention. References to the next wars as 
“water wars” frame the project as a necessity. The influx of Syrian refugees served well as 
data to underline the necessity of implementation. The framework used to present the 
conveyor is often close to a neo-Malthusian approach of water scarcity. The emphasis on the 
need for such a project is so strong, that even a second project was formed into plans, a 
private funded conveyor. Despite critical voices from environmental experts, the project 
steered by the World Bank got approved.  
 Within this chapter my attempt was to bring the conveyor together with Wadi Araba. In the 
conducted studies for the water conveyor, Wadi Araba was a rather coincidental area where 
the infrastructure has to pass by or build. In this dissertation, the aim was to analyse it as a 
social and political reality. As already mentioned, by erasing this political and social 
component, the area is indeed suitable as a construction site. However, inhabitants have 
heard the project presentations and have formulated their questions but also have created 
expectations. Water is indeed crucial for a more comfortable life. Besides water, access to 
land is a very contested issue. Due to the water conveyor, since 2005 land has been frozen 
to sell or buy. Besides the inability to purchase land, the tribal lands are neither recognised in 
Wadi Araba. According to some officials, there is no such thing as tribal land in Wadi Araba. 
Recognition of tribal land would imply that the government or private developer would have 
to buy the land that is needed to build the conveyor from the tribe.  
 The water conveyor as a megalomaniac billion-dollar project is not much different from 
already implemented water related projects in the world. They are constructed on a limited 
vision of water demand and supply. The water use is described in terms of inefficiency, lack 
of awareness or water theft. The latter mostly refers to farmers. The (future) allocation of 
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water will be balanced according to economic contribution. Agriculture receives the major 
part of water, but contributes little to Jordan’s economiy, tourism should in this perspective 
receive more, as it contributes more in economic terms. The current water allocation in the 
region is, to say it simply, based on political decisions between them. The amount of water 
Jordan receives today is strongly influenced by the peace agreement with Israel. A future 
project as the water conveyor between the Red Sea and Dead Sea will not be different. 
Allocation will depend on economic potential and politics. A small (but significant) note in the 
media correspondence on the conveyor mentions that Palestine will have to buy water from 
Israel. Its political meaning and implications will be hard to ignore even with a thick layer of 




Renato Rosaldo (1988) gave an interesting insight on the notion of culture and its 
implications while he wrote about his time as a young American researcher. As a graduate 
student, Rosaldo was advised not to do fieldwork in the Philippines, because – as he was 
told – the people there had no culture (Rosaldo, 1988: 77). What his supervisor intended by 
this idea that the people in the Philippines have no culture is that ‘they’ were not so different 
from ‘us’. There was a lack of cultural difference, crucially between the other and the 
Western, such that the other was not sufficiently other to qualify as such. The notion of 
culture or rather the idea of culture can also create a distinction between people within 
modernity and the ones with culture (i.e. non-modern). As Bruno Latour (2002) points out, 
the West, in relation to science or technology apply the perspective of a dichotomy of 
modern/culture, whereby the West is not perceived as a culture due to the ability to have 
access to a particular kind of knowledge (i.e. scientific knowledge).  
 
The two mentioned authors point at a crucial theme that I attempted to connect to the 
process of the formation of Jordan and its relation to the domain of development. Both 
Rosaldo’s and Latour’s attention for the distinction culture-modern and us-them has become 
very real during the research.  The discursive distinction between us and them and mainly 
the use of the notion of culture as opposite towards modernity, have had real implications in 
Jordan or Wadi Araba.  
 Especially the choice of Wadi Araba as a focus for the cases of this dissertation has given 
the opportunity to point at the continuity of the strategy of culturalisation (of difference) in the 
development of a political formation as Jordan. The Bedouin population of Jordan has been 
targeted for transformation schemes since the beginning of the creation of the modern state 
of Jordan. At different points in time, a Bedouin could embody the Jordanian national symbol 
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or the last of the Mohicans living outside modernity. Not only the more nomadic lifestyle is 
indicated as an obstacle to full integration in the modern society but also the very claim of 
Jordan to modernity is ‘polluted’ with such a deviation in its midst. The cultural problem can 
be alleviated through (economic and infrastructural) development.  
 
For this dissertation I conceived the notions of culture, development and governmentality as 
a triangle. Each notion is in need of the others and they support each other. From the early 
beginning of Jordan the governing of the area has never been the monopoly of its formal 
rulers. Previous colonial powers stayed present in Jordan, international cooperation entered 
the area, internal power struggles inside Jordan intensified etc. each had its effect on the 
steering of the way Jordan would grow in the future.  
 The idea of a modern state – which is constantly under challenges from outside and 
inside – could evolve under the umbrella of development. With the idea of modernity, the 
idea of a modern population or citizens is accompanied. This is the point where I take 
Rosaldo’s and Latour’s remarks on culture into the case of Wadi Araba. Through 
development interventions in the area, driven by the idea of modernity versus culture, a 
process of moulding citizens in modern citizens can be enhanced.  As such I addressed 
development as an act of govermentality supported by different strategies as bio-politics (for 
example the ‘construction’ of the Bedouin soldiers).   
 
I am very aware that the connection between governmentality and development has been 
the subject of research for the last decades. At the same time, the analyses on theory and 
practices of development and its effects have been supported by concepts as culture, mainly 
in the discipline of anthropology. Nevertheless, with this dissertation I intended to bring the 
(old) notion of culture back into the analysis of development and its historical background in 
relation to Jordan for two reasons. First, it is a scarcely used concept in the political sciences. 
As mentioned above, the connection between culture and development, development and 
governmentality or governmentality and culture has a history in social sciences such as 
anthropology. I intended to push these connections further into the political sciences; 
therefore I would refer to the dissertation as a political cultural critique.  Second and related 
to the previous point, the notion of culture is perceived as an obsolete concept of analysis. 
The general tenor in the dissertation has been that culture matters to understand the social 
and political implications of development discourse and practice in a reality. The use of the 
idea of culture as a tool of power has been very effective in the history of Jordan. 
  
Despite the long history of critical development research, I would argue for a lasting attention 
since the same (colonial) development patterns are currently still present. Through 
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elaborating on the cases that illustrate ‘state’ and non-state initiatives that are situated in 
Wadi Araba I wanted to demonstrate continuation and parallels between the different 
illustrated initiatives.   
 When the mandate period ended, the opportunity came for the Hashemite king and its 
entourage to develop the previous colony as an independent kingdom. Obviously the 
kingdom did not develop in a vacuum. Internationally, regionally and locally the king was 
pushed in different directions. When the peace treaty in 1994 was signed, also Wadi Araba 
was released from it military designation. A new area opened up for interventions. The vision 
for a Valley of Opportunities was digged up again. Already before 1994 housing projects 
were installed in Wadi Araba, but from the late 90s early 2000s more actors got involved 
there. For me both the ‘start’ of Jordan and the change of Wadi Araba from a blind spot to a 
hot spot show similar patterns; they are driven by the assumption that this was a beginning 
from scratch. I read the initiatives for the bigger project of the formation of Jordan or the 
small-scale projects for Wadi Araba as if they were to be implemented in an empty page 
without any existing political and social reality and broader context.  
 An organisation as the RSCN shows some equal similarities in their positioning as a 
conservation organisation that is internationally steered and in the way they approach Wadi 
Araba. They started from fenced conservation to move towards a participatory approach. In 
the fifth chapter I illustrate that this was much orchestrated internationally. New trends in 
development were projected on the RSCN to follow. Although they did follow the new 
approach, the bottom idea is still that people (i.e. Bedouins) are a threat to nature. It has 
resulted in a situation whereby every intervention in the area makes new forms of conflict 
arise around control of land, resources etc. The fact that they did take participation and 
‘communities’ in consideration could be a way to enter and encourage the conservation 
projects in relation to a social and political ‘empowerment’ of the involved local population. 
Counter-reactions are a constant, because of the denial of the political and social meaning 
the implementation of conservation areas have.  
The resistance or counter-projects that are observed in Wadi Araba could open doors for a 
different, broader and more political understanding of participation. Reaction towards 
initiatives is not per definition a withdrawal. More constructively it could be regarded as an 
engagement to changes in the area. People are not resistant to change but are confronted 
with social and political conflicts within their daily lives. Any of the involved development 
actors in Wadi Araba (non-governmental and governmental) has been reluctant to 
incorporate these conflicts in their project planning.  
Unfortunately when plans do not work out, the ‘failure’ is pointed towards the ‘target’ 
population. Therefore I also saw the value of governmentality within the triangle with culture 
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and development. Power is never a monopoly of the ruler. Although the central state has 
given/self-proclaimed authority and development organisation come with a certain expertise 
or knowledge, it does not equal a power that subjugates a population as a whole. The 
‘witches’ brew’ cannot be ignored.  
The situation of the RSCN resembles to a certain extend with the situation of the JRF, 
although the latter receives much less direct counter-reaction. The project concerning the 
water conveyor might seem to be a different story. However, it contains some of the basic 
arguments of the dissertation. Latour points out very clearly in his ‘War of Worlds’ how ‘the 
West’ has been able to put itself outside culture. The idea is that through the scientific 
knowledge that the West has appropriated, it has been able to overcome nature and places 
itself outside culture, but within modernity. The authority that has been given to scientific 
knowledge has put other forms of knowledge on the side. Many times the card of science 
has served to dismiss counter-arguments from local inhabitants. A water conveyor that 
covers a distance of 180 km and that will desalinate billons of liters of water annually is a 
pure performance of scientific technology. Humans and nature are thereby placed against 
each other. Jordan can show itself to be part of the modern societies by pushing forward the 
water conveyor to solve the needed water for consumption and to save the Dead Sea.  The 
project in itself is supported by a rational that is based on a technocratic approach that 
disconnects the conveyor from the context it will eventually be constructed. The physical 
context is Wadi Araba, besides environmental research the people themselves have hardly 
been informed. Wadi Araba is again the white spot on the planner’s map, what reduces the 
challenges of being slowed down by social or political obstacles.   
The dissertation questioned the role of the idea of culture in the process of Jordan’s state 
formation and interrelated politics of development. I focused on Wadi Araba to illustrate how 
this processes of state formation and development are reflected in Wadi Araba. As a ‘recent’ 
hotspot for development initiatives, the interaction in Wadi Araba between development 
actors, the idea of culture and Foucault’s notion of governmentality has been illuminating to 
show the continuous culturalisation of governance in Wadi Araba. Economic and 
infrastructural development has to give a push to Wadi Araba and its inhabitants to move 
with the whole Hashemite Kingdom towards modernity. Housing, agriculture, tourism or 
nature conservation are implemented emptied of social and political meaning. I have referred 
to this as  ‘designs for life’ for the ‘target groups’. If the people would follow this design, it 
would help Jordan to complete as a modern state (i.e. a neoliberal state) with some space for 
‘the Bedouin culture’ as a living heritage in the tourism sector. Despite the planned designs, 
the interactions have caused an interesting dynamic of counter-projects and reactions 
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initiated by the people of Wadi Araba. Glubb experienced this during the mandate period, the 
JVA or RSCN encounter this today in the ‘pristine’ landscape of Wadi Araba.  
 
Limitations and future research 
 
The limitations of the research for the finalisation of the dissertation can at the same time be 
perceived as challenges and new approaches for future research. The struggles during the 
research are elaborated in the methodological chapter. In this final point I will go further with 
the limitations.  
 
Although my academic background is situated in the cultural sciences, the aim of the 
dissertation was to introduce the notion of culture more into the political sciences and bring it 
back to the realm of development studies. In anthropology there is already a great amount of 
attention for the interrelation of different scales (local to global) and ‘the politics’. As such I 
sought to bring ‘the politics’ to different kinds of scales through using the notion of culture 
within a political analysis. In this attempt it was important to relate Wadi Araba with Jordan 
and the even broader regional/international scale. The use of anthropological literature and a 
lack of (classical or contemporary) political theory to form a political cultural critique, could be 
interpreted as a rather ‘in between’ approach. The interdisciplinary way of working is often 
encouraged, but not being able to situate one’s work in a specific discipline can have 
(negative) consequences for a researcher’s future. Nevertheless, I would argue that a closer 
approach between political sciences and anthropology or cultural sciences could be a 
workable and more in depth way of doing research, both in terms of methodology and theory.  
 
A second issue that limited the research and the final dissertation has been the lack of 
knowledge of the Arabic language. The rather limited literature about Wadi Araba made the 
need for interviews in the area stronger. As I could not inform myself on existing literature to 
orient my interests or questions and as I was dependent on an interpreter, it was complicated 
to gather a great amount of empirical data in short periods of time. The crucial presence of 
an interpreter created a distance between the interviewees. This all slowed down the 
information gathering. Due to the ability of most NGO or governmental employees to conduct 
interviews in English, the equilibrium between empirical data from local Wadi Araba 
inhabitants and Amman/Aqaba based officials was likely to go out of balance. The data that 
was collected from Wadi Araba has been, in the end, more limited in quantity. I am aware 
that I put emphasis on a rather anthropological approach of research but at the same time I 
myself have not been able to succeed fully in this attempt. With the information that I was 
able to analyse and bring together with a theoretical political-cultural perspective, I aspire 
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that this dissertation can help as a base to build on future research in Wadi Araba or to start 
a critique from. 
 
Future research in the area of Wadi Araba should take the history of the area with 
questionnaires and surveys strongly in consideration. People have been questioned about 
many topics and asked about opinions, but have hardly seen their answers come into 
existence. This has created a certain reluctance to participate into interviews and to share 
sometime sensitive information. Nevertheless this can create a challenge or opportunity for 
an approach of research that is more engaged with the encountered realities. As I mentioned 
in my methodological chapter, a more engaged (which is not per se equal to ‘take side’) 
manner of research could be a step to a decolonisation of (social) sciences. Within the 
engagement, one can take the knowledge that is not one’s own as part of the analysis (cf. 
Mignolo and Grosfoguel) or one can go as far as being an activist or militant scholar (cf. 
Scheper-Hughes).     
 During the research of the doctorate I experienced the difficulty of not being biased 
towards development initiatives or actors. For me being engaged meant in the beginning to 
take the side of the inhabitants of Wadi Araba. Obviously this attitude does not contribute to 
a better understanding of the situation in Wadi Araba. Therefore, the critique that I formulate 
in this dissertation is not to accuse the development initiatives of being inherently ‘harmful’ or 
‘bad’. With the critique I wanted to point at struggles that are often ignored and keep on 
causing friction. I experienced that addressing these critiques to involved actors can be 
appreciated and perceived as useful. At other moments the critique can also be dismissed or 
felt as offensive. Either way, a critique can be useful for all involved actors, even for the 
researcher who will receive reaction to his or her analysis   
 
 After finalising the research and assembling the dissertation, new events occurred in Wadi 
Araba. New protests arose against proposed conservation areas and the Red Sea Dead Sea 
water conveyor received the signatures that will give room for next steps towards 
implementation.  The resistant that becomes stronger and more forceful towards RSCN, but 
also experienced by JVA could bring more interesting dynamics in the area and beyond. 
Although the area has been given the label of being empty, I have experienced it as a very 
dynamic area in the last four years of research. The landscape and its inhabitants contain a 
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